The role of the Internet in the European Union's public communication strategy and the emerging European public sphere by Michailidou, Asimina
Loughborough University
Institutional Repository
The role of the Internet in
the European Union's public
communication strategy and
the emerging European
public sphere
This item was submitted to Loughborough University's Institutional Repository
by the/an author.
Additional Information:
• A Doctoral Thesis. Submitted in partial fulﬁlment of the requirements for
the award of Doctor of Philosophy of Loughborough University.
Metadata Record: https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/2134/3055
Please cite the published version.
 
 
 
This item was submitted to Loughborough’s Institutional Repository by the 
author and is made available under the following Creative Commons Licence 
conditions. 
 
 
 
 
 
For the full text of this licence, please go to: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ 
 
i“The role of the Internet in the European Union’s public 
communication strategy and the emerging European public 
sphere”
by
Asimina Michailidou
Doctoral thesis
Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award 
of PhD of Loughborough University
December 2006
© by Asimina Michailidou 2006
ii
Thesis Abstract
The focus of this thesis is on the vertical Europeanisation of the 
online public debate and more specifically on the EU’s online public 
communication strategy, i.e. the top-down process of the unmediated, 
direct, online communication between the EU and the general public. The 
empirical data has been collected in four stages, namely public 
communication policy-making; public communication policy 
implementation online; online public communication policy impact on key 
Internet audiences; and interviews with key senior Commission officials.
The review of the EU public communication documents has shown
that the Commission has unambiguously committed to facilitate direct 
communication with the EU public as part of the process of building the EU 
citizens’ trust towards its institutions and in addressing the issues of 
transparency and democratic legitimation of the EU’s decision-making 
process, while the Internet is seen as a key tool in facilitating direct 
communication. However, after monitoring three of the EU’s official 
websites for a year and analyzing the views of 221 Internet users on the 
EU’s Information and Communication strategy online, it has become 
evident that the Commission has not yet fulfilled these commitments.
The interviews with key Commission officials have revealed that 
behind this gap between policy and online implementation lie: a) an 
institutional culture which conflicts with the aims of the Commission’s 
public communication strategy; and b) constant institutional restructuring 
in the last six years.
Very recently the Commission has begun to address some of the 
shortfalls in the online implementation of its public communication 
strategy, yet there is no indication that the results of the online debate 
regarding the EU’s future will be incorporated in the decision-making 
process, while further study is required in the future in order to assess any 
change in the institutional culture in relation to its public communication
strategy.  
Keywords: the Internet, public communication, public sphere, the EU, 
democracy, participation, deliberation, the EU democratic deficit.
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Introduction
The present thesis focuses on the vertical Europeanisation of the 
online public debate and more specifically on the EU’s online public 
communication strategy, i.e. the top-down process of the unmediated, 
direct, online communication between the EU and the general public.
Over the past few years the European Commission has 
unambiguously committed to facilitate direct communication with the EU 
public as part of the process of building the EU citizens’ trust towards its 
institutions and in addressing the issues of transparency and democratic 
legitimation of the EU’s decision-making process, while the Internet is 
seen as a key tool in facilitating direct communication. This commitment 
seems to have been inspired by two theoretical debates which have been 
developing in parallel over the past 10-15 years: The democratising impact 
of the Internet on politics and the conceptual association of the European 
public sphere with the EU’s democratic deficit.
Combining the core elements of the these two debates, the concept 
of the European public sphere is understood in this project in Habermasian 
terms, i.e. as public realm where a) potentially everyone has access to and 
no one enters into discourse with an advantage over another (who); b) is 
a realm in which individuals gather to participate in open discussions 
(how); and c) has the potential to be a foundation for a critique of a society 
based on democratic principles (what).
In this context, the questions that this thesis aims to address are 
formulated as follows: Does the Internet have any impact on the 
communication process between the EU institutions and the public? Is the 
EU’s online public communication encouraging and enabling public 
discourse within the EU, with the scope to contribute to the elimination of 
the EU’s democratic deficit? 
These questions are addressed in this thesis on four levels, namely:
a)Policy-making level of the EU’s online public communication strategy;
b)Policy-implementation;
c)Policy impact on key EU audiences; and
2d)Interviews with key Commission communication officials.
The following sections look at the conceptual background of this 
research project in more detail and present a detailed overview of the
thesis’s structure.
i. The European public sphere
The concept of a European public sphere has been the subject of a 
number of scholarly works in recent and contemporary research (Weiler, 
Begg, Peterson 2003; de Beus 2002; Koopmans, Neidhardt, Pfetsch 2002; 
van de Steeg 2002; Kunelius and Sparks 2001; Scharpf 1999; Weiler 
1999; Weiler 1996). Analysis of this work demonstrates that several key 
questions remain contentious. Does a European public sphere exist in the 
first place? Is it only a public sphere for the elites or does it involve the 
general public too? Are there several or just one European public sphere? 
Are cultural and linguistic diversity and national identities a serious 
obstacle or advantage in the construction of a European public sphere?
The academic interest of this debate notwithstanding, how 
important is it for the day-to-day EU politics that we understand the nature 
and role of the emerging European public sphere?
The concept of the public sphere is linked with citizens’ participation 
in the decision-making process, equality in the possibility of participation 
and ultimately democracy (Habermas 1996). In the case of the EU, few 
scholars reject the notion that there is a link between the public political 
discourse on EU issues and the EU’s democratic deficit. In fact, for most 
authors, the argument that the EU institutions and decision-making 
process lack democratic legitimation is a given, although there is no 
consensus on whether the EU’s democratic deficit is the cause or result of 
an absent/deficient European public sphere (Trenz 2004; de Beus 2002; 
Weiler 1996)1. A first step towards democratic legitimation is to establish a 
public dialogue between the decision-making institutions and the public, 
with the latter’s feedback incorporated in the decision-making process.
The democratic deficit of the EU institutions aside, the Union is 
currently also facing an identity crisis: The candidacy of Turkey as an EU 
member has sparked numerous and lengthy debates, nationally and on 
3EU level, about the geographical and cultural boundaries of Europe. It has 
also forced politicians and the public alike to rethink what the EU stands 
for and what we want it to represent in the future. And the issue of 
Turkey’s candidacy is not the only one that has fuelled the debate 
regarding the concept of the European identity and European values: The 
rejection of the Constitutional Treaty by national referenda in France and 
the Netherlands in 2005 highlighted the gap between public opinion and 
EU policy as far as the future of the EU is concerned. The matter of “what 
Europe is all about” became yet more pressing in 2006, which saw one of 
the most intense cultural conflicts erupt within the European society, after 
the publication by the Danish newspaper Jyllands Posten of cartoons 
depicting the Prophet Mohammed sparked violent protests by Muslims 
throughout the world (Wikipedia.org 2006b)2.
At the same time, the EU has emerged politically weak from 
international crises, such as Afghanistan, Iraq, the “War on Terror”, the 
ongoing Palestinian-Israeli conflict and most recently, Israel’s invasion of 
Lebanon and the case of third-country secret services abducting and 
illegally interrogating individuals on EU ground. In these cases the EU has 
appeared unable to act with a single voice and to effectively promote and 
defend its core values of democracy and peace in the international front.
With the number of the EU member-states due to rise to 27 in 2007, 
when Romania and Bulgaria are set to join the Union, defining the identity 
of the EU and bridging the gap between public opinion and EU policy 
regarding the role and aims of the Union are vital if the future of this polity 
is to be safeguarded. It is for this reason that understanding the concept of 
the European public sphere is so important: Who are the participants in 
the debate regarding the identity, values and future of the Union;
particularly pertinent, is it an elite public sphere or is it open to the general 
public as well? Can we observe common reference frameworks regarding 
the identity and values of the EU emerging from this debate? More 
crucially, is there any evidence that this identity crisis has finally led to a 
dialogue of substance between the EU decision-making elites and the 
general public? 
So far, evidence of the emergence of a European public sphere has 
4usually been sought within the national public discourses of the EU 
member-states, which are mediated by national conventional mass media, 
such as the press and television (Koopmans, Statham, Kriesi, Della Porta, 
de Beus, Guiraudon, Medrano, Pfetsch 2004; Pfetsch 2004; Trenz 2004; 
Koopmans and Pfetsch 2003; Rauer, Rivet, van de Steeg 2002; Kevin 
2001). Examining the emerging European public sphere from such a 
perspective has provided invaluable data on the level of Europeanisation 
of national public political discourses (i.e. the level of reporting and 
debating of EU issues within national public spheres) and on the level of 
interconnectedness of the national public spheres (reporting and debating 
within a reference framework of shared European values, linkages 
between national actors). In other words, this analytical perspective on the 
emerging European public sphere has offered empirical data on the 
“horizontal” (Pfetsch 2004) process of the Europeanisation of the national 
public spheres.
However, the role of EU institutions as both actors in this public 
sphere, and facilitators of the public debate, has been largely unexplored. 
The present thesis focuses on the official EU strategy of communication 
with the general public (EU public communication strategy) and its role 
in the emerging European public sphere. In order to observe the degree of 
interaction between the EU institutions and the public, i.e. the “vertical” 
(Pfetsch 2004: 4) Europeanisation of the public dialogue, one needs to 
move beyond the fora of national/ regional public debates, as these are 
moderated by national/regional media, which intercede any official EU 
input and frame the debate within the context of regional/national 
reference values. The main argument of the present thesis is that an 
analysis of the public sphere may offer us a clearer idea of the level and 
quality of interaction between the EU institutions and the public, and more 
specifically of the aims and outcomes of the EU’s public communication 
strategy within the online public sphere.
ii. The role of the Internet in the EU’s public communication 
strategy and the emerging European public sphere
Of all the mass media, it is the Internet that presents the most 
5interesting, challenging case, because of its rapid growth and unique 
capabilities for uninterrupted flow of information, identity fluidity and direct 
interaction of its users. It is not only one of the most popular means of 
communication but it is ‘invading’ more and more aspects of our everyday 
life: Commerce; entertainment; health; the news; economy; politics; 
lifestyle3. It is the medium that offers to its users the ability to interact and 
communicate without necessarily knowing each other, let alone having 
physical contact with each other (Jordan 2000). Time and space also have 
a totally different meaning in the digital reality of cyberspace. In that sense 
the concept of matter and non-matter, the concept of interpersonal 
communication is reconfigured in cyberspace (Poster 1995).
As far as politics is concerned, the opportunities that the Internet 
offers for interaction with the public, the continuous flow of information and 
the possibility to reach audiences larger than ever more quickly than ever, 
have already influenced the way politics is conducted. The more people 
gain access to the Internet, the more governments, politicians, 
organizations (governmental and non-governmental) and activists become 
interested, for various reasons, in this new means of communication and 
try to gain access and control over it, in an attempt to influence/control 
their mass audiences.
On the one hand, under the pressure of several governments, as 
well as religious institutions, even the pioneers of uncensored online 
information, GOOGLE (Google Inc. 2006), have bowed and have 
eventually had to impose restrictions on the online material available on 
certain of its versions (Wikipedia.org 2006a). On the other hand, among 
the first to realise the potential of the Internet have been political activists 
from both mainstream and extremist groups and movements, who have 
been quick to use it to promote their causes, raise support and achieve 
uncensored coverage of their actions. The anti-globalisation movement 
started online and fundamentalist militia are using the Internet to circulate 
their, often gruesome, propaganda videos.
In more recent years, the Internet’s influence has also become 
evident in mainstream politics. An increasing number of parliamentary and 
local/regional authority candidates in Europe and the US maintain 
6websites and electronic diaries (blogs) and rely on online political 
marketing as much as conventional forms of campaigning prior to 
elections (Howard 2005; Johnson 2004; Todd and Taylor 2004; 
Zimmermann, Koopmans, Schlecht 2004; Gibson, Nixon, Ward 2003; 
Koopmans and Pfetsch 2003; Mälkiä, Anttiroiko, Savolainen 2003; 
Zimmermann and Koopmans 2003). Of course, there is no consensus 
among scholars over the precise nature of the impact of the Internet on 
politics. For some, particularly early theorists, the Internet is meant to be 
an “anti-authoritarian, anarchistic” (Tsaliki 2000: 1) means of 
communication, introducing a “new, global and antisovereign social space, 
where anybody can express his or her beliefs without fear” (Barlow 1996). 
Other theorists take the notion of the (potentially) alternative public sphere 
that the Internet offers further and examine the role of new 
communications’ technologies in warfare and diplomacy, suggesting that 
the Internet and cyberspace are rapidly changing the nature of power, 
whether this is military or political (Jordan 2000; Arquilla and Rondfeldt 
1999). At the same time, several other scholars dismiss the early claims of 
the Internet being the new Habermasian public sphere as unsubstantiated 
and adopt a more sceptical view over the democratising potential of the 
medium (Venkatesh, Nosovitch, Miner 2004; Hibberd, McNair, Schlesinger 
2003; le Grignou and Patou 2003).
Political authorities have also been slowly adopting the concept of 
e-governance, from the more common provision of information and 
services in electronic form, to electronic voting. According to the latest 
statistical data available, in the European Union alone, in October 2004, 
84% of the public service providers4 had a website and 40% of all public 
service providers measured in all 28 countries5 offered 100% electronic 
case handling (Capgemini 2005). E-democracy still has a long way to go, 
as far as transparency and citizens’ participation in the decision-making 
progress are concerned, but certain European countries, like Estonia and 
Sweden, are paving the way for full online access of the decision-making 
process.
The Commission of the European Communities has long 
acknowledged the importance of the Internet as a medium of reaching out 
7to a wider European public (COM(2005)229, final; COM(2004)196, final; 
COM(2002)350, final/2; COM(2002)705; final; COM(2001)354, final;
Commission of the European Communities 2006h; EUROPA 2006j). The 
Internet is identified as one of the key public diplomacy tools in every 
Communication from the Commission to the other European Institutions 
and in all the versions of the Information and Communication Strategy of 
the EU. The time-and-space-free, interactive communication that the 
Internet offers has enabled the Commission to make the policy-making 
process more open to the public’s feedback, while it has also been key in 
strengthening the networking process between European educational and 
cultural institutions. Furthermore, the Internet has enabled fast and cost-
free access to a very large amount of EU official documentation (from legal 
documents, to speeches, communications, reports, recommendations etc) 
and has thus facilitated the “opening-up” process of the EU institutions.
Despite all this, analysis of the impact that the Internet has had on the 
way the EU institutions operate, and more specifically on the public 
communication strategy of the EU is non-existent to date. It was only after 
2003 that scholars began to look at the potential of the Internet as an all-
inclusive space for public discussion of EU issues, mainly focussing on the 
use of the medium by political actors across Europe and from the 
perspective of member-states and/or national political parties, rather than 
the perspective of an EU, centralised public communication strategy online 
(van Os 2005a; Van Os 2005b; Zimmermann, Koopmans, Schlecht 2004; 
Zimmermann and Koopmans 2003; Zimmermann and Erbe 2002)6. In 
other words, these research projects did not address the top-down aspect 
of public dialogue within the European public sphere. Is there any 
contribution from the EU establishment to the emerging “Europeanised” 
public debate (vertical Europeanisation: Pfetsch, op.cit.)? And what about 
the opportunity that the Internet offers for unmediated direct interaction 
with the general public? Is the EU taking advantage of that possibility 
when making its messages known to the public? These are questions 
which this thesis seeks to address.
8iii. Structure of the thesis
The conceptual framework for this thesis is based on a correlation of 
the following key issues. The debate regarding the democratic deficit of 
the EU Institutions inevitably leads to the discussion of the key terms of 
participation and deliberation, openness and accountability, all core 
characteristics of democracy. On the one hand, openness of the decision-
making processes and accountability are linked with democratic 
legitimation of governing institutions. On a second level, openness could 
be linked with an all-inclusive, non-elitist public sphere. On the other hand, 
deliberation and participation are key characteristics of the public dialogue. 
A fundamental prerequisite of both deliberation and participation is 
interactivity between participating individuals and/or groups/institutions. 
Public communication is the top-down process of the interaction between 
the EU institutions and the public. The Internet then becomes relevant 
because it facilitates interactivity and openness, as well as participation in 
the public dialogue on equal terms, all attributes found in the theoretical 
works regarding the concept of the public sphere (Habermas 1989).
A general normative model of the concept of the public sphere is 
established in Chapter 1, based on the Habermasian approach of the 
public sphere. Furthermore, that chapter provides an outline of the main 
theoretical issues concerning the European public sphere and the EU’s 
democratic deficit and defines the term “public communication” in detail, 
identifying its theoretical origins in the concepts of public affairs and public 
diplomacy.
These four elements (the Habermasian normative model of the public 
sphere, the European public sphere, the EU’s democratic deficit and public 
communication) are used to form the theoretical framework within which 
the research question and objectives of this thesis are defined and further 
discussed in Chapter 1. More specifically, that chapter examines the 
theoretical issues concerning the democratising potential of the Internet in 
general and in the case of the EU in particular and puts the concept of EU 
public communication within the context of the online public sphere.
Chapter 2 then sets out the research questions and objectives, 
9within this theoretical context, and identifies the components of the 
empirical part of the thesis. What is the role of the Internet in the above 
issues, as far as the EU’s public communication is concerned? 
Furthermore, could the Internet play a role in promoting shared European 
values and thus assist in the formation of a shared European identity? Is 
the Internet used by the EU in order to promote this shared collective 
identity to the European public? Is the promoting of such a collective 
European identity part of the EU’s online public communication strategy at 
all?
The empirical data regarding these questions is presented in 
Chapters 3-5, on three levels, namely
a) Policy-making level of the EU’s online public communication strategy;
b) Policy-implementation; and
c) Policy impact on key EU audiences.
Interviews with EU officials in key policy-making and policy-
implementation positions are used at each stage of the EU’s online public 
communication analysis, in order to put the findings of the policy-making 
and policy-implementation evaluation into a wider context.
In terms of policy-making (a), the thesis investigates the extent to 
which the EU is aware of the issues regarding the EU’s democratic deficit, 
the European public sphere and the potential role of the Internet in 
addressing these issues on an EU level. To this end, the main official 
documents which are at the core of the EU’s Information and 
Communication strategy are critically reviewed in Chapter 3, in order to 
determine how the above issues are addressed on a policy-making level 
and identify any further aims that the EU has set for its online Information 
and Communication strategy.
Following that, the ways in which these official policies are put into
practice online (policy-implementation-b) are investigated in Chapter 4, by 
means of a thorough analysis of three key official EU websites. The aim is 
partly to juxtapose the messages and interaction opportunities provided on 
these three websites with the goals set out in the EU Information and 
Communication strategy documents and partly to evaluate how close this 
policy-implementation is to the normative role of the EU’s public 
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communication online, as outlined in Chapters 1 and 2.
Chapter 5 investigates the impact that the online EU Information and 
Communication strategy has on key online audiences (c), through a 
qualitative EU websites’ online user survey. In particular, the survey was 
used to gain an insight into how the messages communicated from a top-
down level are actually perceived by the recipients (i.e. the users of the 
EU’s official websites). The survey’s results are analysed in relation to the 
findings of the EU’s websites homepage analysis and the goals set out in 
the EU’s official documents regarding its Information and Communication 
strategy, in order to evaluate to what degree these goals are achieved. On 
a second level the results of the user survey are juxtaposed with the 
theories regarding the nature of the emerging European public sphere in 
order to establish whether the emerging European public sphere has the 
potential to be all-inclusive or elitist.
Finally, the concluding chapter summarises the empirical findings, and 
revisits the theoretical model established in Chapter 2, in order to adjust its 
elements so that they reflect the online reality of the EU’s public 
communication strategy. The empirical findings are used in this final 
chapter to formulate possible improvements to the online implementation 
of the EU’s public communication strategy. The Conclusion also looks at 
developments in the online implementation of the EU’s public 
communication strategy in the months after the empirical stage of this 
research project concluded and evaluates these accordingly.
  
Notes
1 See also Pfetsch 2004; Risse and van de Steeg 2003; Kantner 2002; Koopmans, 
Neidhardt, Pfetsch 2002; Waldenström 2002; Kevin 2001; Kunelius and Sparks 2001.
2 The intensity of the conflict has caused the Danish journalists involved to go in hiding, 
after a fatwa was issued on their name. Jyllands Posten has refused to offer an apology 
to Muslims to this day, although it has withdrawn the cartoons from its website. The 
cartoons have become increasingly difficult to trace online.
3 In 1973, when the Internet first appeared, there were only 25 computers in the network. 
In August 1995, the number of users only in the USA was estimated to be at 9.5 million 
and in November of the same year another survey showed that the number of users only 
in the USA had ridden up to 24 million (Castells 2000: 375-376). By 2004, that number 
had reached 934 million users, while the projected number of Internet users for 2010 is 
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1.8 billion (ClickZ Stats 2006c).
4 The public service providers taken into consideration here were:
a) National governmental units; b) Regional governmental units; c) Cities and 
municipalities; d) Specific multiple service providers; e) Public libraries; f) Hospitals; g)
Universities/institutes of higher education; h) Police offices; i) Public insurance 
companies.
5 Apart from the 25 EU member-states, the survey also included data from Switzerland, 
Iceland and Norway.
6 The results of these projects were rather inconclusive: Vas Os (2005a) found that 
French political parties displayed a high level of Europeanisation on their websites’ 
content during the European parliamentary elections of 2004. On the other hand, 
Zimmermann (2004; 2003) found no patterns of horizontal Europeanisation (i.e. 
communicative linkages between member-states: Pfetsch 2004: 5).
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Chapter 1- Theoretical framework
This chapter sets out the general theoretical framework within which 
the role of the Internet in the EU’s public communication strategy and its 
role in the emerging European public sphere will be examined:
The concept of the public sphere is analysed from three 
perspectives:
a)The participants of the public sphere (Who);
b)The processes within the public sphere (How);
c)The purpose of the public sphere or the outcome/ impact that the 
processes within the public sphere have on society and politics (What).
Each of these components of the public sphere is examined in four 
stages, through four theoretical aspects: the Habermasian normative 
approach of the public sphere (1), the debate regarding the EU’s 
democratic deficit (2) in relation to the definition of the European public 
sphere (3) and the concept of public communication (4).
The first part of the chapter focuses on the concept of the public 
sphere. The Habermasian approach is used as the basis for a normative 
definition of the public sphere, in the context of which the other three 
theoretical components mentioned above are then examined. In Part 2 of 
this chapter, the focus is on the case of the European public sphere and 
the theoretical debate regarding its participants and its role in the decision-
making process on EU level. The aim here is to analyse the issues 
regarding the European public sphere within the context of the 
Habermasian normative model of the public sphere. This part of the 
chapter also examines the issue of the EU’s democratic deficit and its link 
with the European public sphere. Finally, Part 3 defines the content of the 
term “public communication”, identifies its role in the European public 
sphere and the role that it could play in addressing the EU’s democratic 
deficit.
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1.1 The concept of the public sphere
The concept of the public sphere has been the subject of a number 
of scholarly writings, in sociology, politics and philosophy1. However, the 
present chapter does not present a comparative study of the theoretical 
approaches of the public sphere, nor does this study aim to evaluate any 
theoretical models of the public sphere. The aim here is to define a 
normative model of the public sphere, which will then be used in 
addressing the research questions concerning the Internet’s role in the EU 
public communication strategy and its impact on the European public 
sphere.
As mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, the theoretical 
concept of the public sphere is understood here as three-dimensional:
Firstly, it is necessary to identify who the participants of the public sphere 
are/ should be. Secondly, we need to define the process through which 
these participants debate public issues, i.e. to define how the public 
sphere works/ is expected to work. Finally, it is not possible to discuss the 
concept of the public sphere without looking at what this public sphere 
does, primarily what its purpose is and what impact/outcome it has on 
society and politics.
These three parameters of the public sphere are discussed here 
within the context of the Habermasian approach of the public sphere. 
Jürgen Habermas’s work on the context of the public sphere is one of the 
most influential of recent times and offers the basis for a model of an all-
inclusive (who) public sphere which ensures that society functions on 
democratic principles (what), by publicly discussing all aspects of societal 
life (how).
In the Structural transformation of the public sphere (Habermas 
1989), Habermas examines the public sphere as it was formed in what he 
defines as the bourgeois society of the 17th and 18th-century Europe. He 
identifies in it a public discourse based on rational critical argument (the 
process parameter of the public sphere/”how”) and not influenced by the 
identity of the participants (the participants parameter/”who”). In this public 
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sphere Habermas saw the beginning of the development of the modern 
democratic public sphere2.
For Habermas the bourgeois public sphere was “above all, the 
sphere of private people that come together as a public” (ibid.: 27) to claim 
the public sphere from the public authorities, who until then regulated the 
public sphere. Thus, the public authorities were forced to engage in a 
debate over the general rules of governing relations in the “basically 
privatised but publicly relevant sphere of commodity exchange and social 
labour” (ibid.). In other words, from the perspective of the third parameter 
of the public sphere, i.e. the outcome/impact parameter (“what”), the 
bourgeois public sphere aimed to renegotiate the terms of the decision-
making process.
What brought these “private people” together was the liberal, 
capitalist market (ibid.: 74), driven by profit rather than class, and their will 
to safeguard their profits and their right to trade freely as individuals. So, 
although the public sphere of the 17th and 18th centuries was “initially 
constituted in the world of letters” (Calhoun 1999:10), for Habermas this 
public sphere was inclusive in principle, in the sense that “it (the bourgeois 
public sphere) always understood and found itself immersed in within a 
more inclusive public of all private people […]” (Habermas 1989: 37).
Habermas identifies the uniqueness of the bourgeois public sphere 
in the medium that was used in the political confrontation with the public 
authorities: people’s public use of their own reason (Habermas 1989). The 
media of that time, i.e. newspapers, books, journals, contributed to the 
rational-critical debate within the bourgeois public sphere (ibid.). This 
public rational-critical dialogue influenced, although not always directly, the 
parliamentary procedures, and contributed to what Poster describes as “a 
healthy representative democracy” (Poster 1995b).
However, a profit-driven market is only interested in encouraging 
the establishment of a public sphere to the extent that it can generate 
profit from that public sphere. That, according to Habermas, ultimately led 
to the transformation of the public sphere into a sphere of publicity and 
substituted the rational-critical debate with the consumption of culture3
(Habermas 1989); a transformation in which the profit-driven monopolies 
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that control the modern media (radio, television) hold a central role4
(another factor of the process parameter/”how” of the concept of the public 
sphere).
In his later work, Between facts and norms: contributions to a 
discourse theory of law and democracy (Habermas 1996), Habermas 
expands the element of inclusiveness inherent in the bourgeois public 
sphere model, to the normative concept of the general public sphere. For 
Habermas, the general public sphere comprises all other public spheres 
which may be present within a society and which may be class-, race- or 
gender-specific. Within the general public sphere all participants are equal 
and their communication is underpinned by the principles of the rational-
critical debate (ibid.: 329-387). He proposes a concept of the public sphere 
which comprises “processes of communication and decision-making in 
constitutional systems” which “are structured by a system of ‘sluices’” 
(ibid.: 354). According to this “sluice” model, public opinion is generated in 
a variety of informal ways and eventually “washes through” to influence 
formal decision-making processes (Stolze 2000:153). Only the decisions 
which are steered by the bottom-up communication flows (i.e. those 
discussions that start on the periphery and pass to the parliamentary 
complex and/or the courts through democratic and constitutional 
procedures) can be considered binding within a society (Habermas 1996: 
356).
The important point to note in this context is that, unlike the 
bourgeois public sphere which is class-particular, the “sluice” model of the 
public sphere is based on two interrelated spheres. Firstly, the specific fora
organized around administrative bodies of the state, which make decisions 
and serve as the means of “justification” of the administration and its 
actions; and secondly, the general public of citizens, which forms the 
unregulated public sphere, within which the decision-making fora function 
(ibid.: 307-308).
From Habermas’ perspective, the unregulated nature of the general 
public sphere is both an advantage and a disadvantage. It is anarchic in 
nature and more vulnerable to the repressive and exclusionary effects of 
unequally distributed social power, structural violence and systematically 
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distorted communication (ibid.). However, it also has the advantage of a 
medium of unrestricted communication and consists of an open and 
inclusive network of overlapping, sub-cultural publics having fluid temporal, 
social and substantive boundaries (ibid.). Nevertheless, this general public 
sphere can only form opinions; it does not have the capability to make any 
decisions. 
This description accepts, in effect, the existence of an elite public 
sphere/forum and a weaker general public sphere. Not all individuals are 
included in the more structured and more powerful fora organized around 
the administrative bodies (e.g. the parliament). The universality and 
inclusiveness only applies to the general public sphere, which is, however, 
more vulnerable to all types of external pressures and, although it debates 
issues freely and forms opinions, is not always able to influence the 
decision-making process.
Of course Habermas’s approach to the public sphere is not entirely 
unproblematic and has been criticised by feminists, poststructuralists and 
other schools of thought. One of the main points in the feminist critique of 
Habermas’s approach is that he ignores the absence of women from the 
bourgeois public sphere (Felski 1989). Park and Wald use the 
Habermasian approach of the public sphere as an example of how gender, 
like race and nationality in scholarly feminist discussion, maintains a 
“position of invisibility” in the scholarly debate regarding the public sphere 
(Park and Wald 2000). This invisibility of gender means that gender 
becomes/ is considered to belong to the private sphere, thus women enter 
the public sphere not liberated from patriarchal restraints, but following 
precisely the rules and structures of the patriarchal model they are trying 
to liberate themselves from (ibid.: 232-234). In other words, gender is not 
acknowledged and discussed and the issues that prevent women from 
preserving their true identity within the public sphere are not addressed 
(i.e. women enter the public sphere either “masculinised” or having 
maintained their private, “degraded” identity (ibid.: 234). From that point of 
view, the public sphere cannot have a liberating effect on women and, in 
the case of the Habermasian concept of the public sphere, its claims of 
universality and rationality are undermined.
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Furthermore, from a poststructuralist perspective, Habermas’s 
approach of the public sphere is considered too defeatist, as it is 
characterised by a lack, or restriction, of collective action (Montag 2000; 
Stolze 2000). Poststructuralists also question the liberating potential of the 
public sphere through rational debate, where the rational individual 
constitutes the universal foundation of democracy (Lyotard 1984). Other 
theorists have also expressed a similar argument: Dahlgren points out that 
“a blooming public sphere per se does not guarantee a democracy; it is a 
necessary but not sufficient ingredient” (Dahlgren 2001: 37). Similarly, 
Sparks finds that although historically the two concepts have tended to 
emerge almost simultaneously, there is no direct link between democratic 
structures and the emergence of a public sphere (Sparks 2001: 76).
Although several points in the critique on Habermas’s work may be 
valid, there is a debate as to whether Habermas’s work on the bourgeois 
public sphere is normative or historical and any criticism on his work 
depends on how his work is approached. Dahlgren, for example, is of the 
opinion that it is not clear whether Habermas’s work is normative, historical 
or merely offering the ideological context for a specific social class 
(Dahlgren 2001). Holub, on the other hand, regards Habermas’s approach 
of the bourgeois public sphere as normative (Holub 1991).
The present thesis adopts the latter’s approach of Habermas’s work 
as normative. Habermas’s work on the bourgeois public sphere and his 
later-proposed sluice model of the public sphere offer a normative 
framework of analysis which may be applied to democratic and non-
democratic public spheres alike. The key factor that ties in Habermas’s 
sluice model with his model of an all-inclusive public sphere is the level of 
democracy within a society. The more authoritative and less democratic a 
society is, the stronger the division between the decision-making, elite 
public sphere and the general public. The stronger the democratic values 
and decision-making procedures, the more accountable the decision-
making elite public sphere will be to the general public, which in turn 
means that the general public will be able to affect the decision-making 
process rather than just generate opinions.
From that perspective, an extreme version of Habermas’s public 
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sphere model would correspond with an absolute dictatorial regime (no 
possibility for the oppressed general public sphere to affect the decision-
making process) whilst on the opposite side of the spectrum, Habermas’s 
model of an all inclusive public sphere based on the principle of equality 
and working towards the continuous enlightenment of its participants 
would correspond with a fully-functioning democratic state of governance 
(where the decision-making elite public sphere is part of and accountable 
to the general public, rather than operating separately from it). In between 
these two versions of the public sphere can be found several variations of 
the two models, depending on how big or small a part democratic 
principles and processes play in the formation of a public sphere.
In this context, Habermas’s work on the public sphere offers for this 
thesis the most useful normative model, within which the discussion 
regarding the European public sphere and the EU’s public communication 
strategy can be located. The Habermasian approach does not presume a 
specific outcome of the public dialogue. The public sphere could be an 
elite or an all-inclusive one, and the debate could serve either as a means 
for people to express dissatisfaction and thus preventing them from taking 
more radical/extreme actions, or it could lead to changes in the decision-
making process, or both. When examined from the perspective of the
“who (participants); how (process); what (outcome)” model introduced in 
the beginning of this chapter, Habermas’s normative model of the public 
sphere is one which a) potentially everyone has access to and no one 
enters into discourse with an advantage over another (who); b) is a realm 
in which individuals gather to participate in open discussions (how); and c)
has the potential to be a foundation for a critique of a society based on 
democratic principles (what)5.
Having established the general normative model of the public 
sphere concept, the next part of this chapter looks at the case of the EU in 
particular and applies the above parameters to the European public 
sphere.
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1.2 The case of the EU
1.2.1 The European Public Sphere and the Democratic deficit of the 
EU
The discussion regarding the European public sphere is closely 
related to the debate regarding the democratic deficit of the European 
Union (Follesdal and Hix 2006; Zweifel 2003; Moravcsik 2002). Scholars 
agree that a European public sphere is needed in order for the EU to 
achieve the desired democratic legitimation. However, the approaches on 
the issue vary and can be broadly divided in two categories:
a)Those who maintain that, since there are no democratic institutions that 
allow citizen participation in decision-making processes on an EU level, 
the European public sphere is dysfunctional/ does not (cannot) exist, and
b)Those who argue that it is the very absence of a European public 
sphere which is the cause of the democratic deficit in the European Union.
Interestingly, the first view is supported by theorists who otherwise 
disagree on the nature of the European public sphere: The “pessimistic, 
particularist view” (Kantner 2002: 2) maintains that there is a lack of 
European democratic institutions that establish arenas of public 
communication and link them to political decision-making (ibid.). If there is 
no public political debate on a European level, the citizens of the EU 
cannot exercise and protect their political rights (ibid.). Similarly, Weiler
maintains that the democratic deficit of the EU relates to “the deficient 
processes, e.g. the weakness of the European parliament, rather than the 
deep structural absence of a demos” (Weiler 1996: 7). The claim that there 
is no European public (demos) is simply not a valid one: There is a 
European people, in the sense that there is “a shared history and cultural 
habits required to bestow potential authority and democratic legitimacy on 
European institutions” (ibid.).
On the other hand, what Kantner calls the “optimistic, federalist 
view” (Kantner 2002: 4) considers “the political debate across national 
borders as one of the most important preconditions for the democratisation 
of the EU” (ibid.). Likewise, Habermas argues that in the case of the EU, 
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its democratisation is possible even in the near future, provided that the 
European public sphere will be institutionalised by a European constitution 
(Habermas 2004: 28-29). His argument is based on the notion that the 
arenas of political communication need to be institutionalised and 
protected by human and political rights, in order for a democratic public 
sphere to emerge (Habermas 2004; Habermas 1996). For Eriksen and 
Fossum (2002) this institutionalisation of the European public sphere is 
already taking place: The European Parliament and the Convention for the 
(EU) Constitutional Treaty (European Convention 2003)6 are considered 
by the authors as examples of “strong (European) publics” (Eriksen and 
Fossum 2002: 419) which are characterised by deliberation and decision-
making and are crucial to the democratic process, as they are accountable 
to the citizens (Eriksen and Fossum 2002)7.
Although the possibility of a wholly institutionalised European public 
sphere is still remote, empirical evidence shows that the national media in 
the countries of the EU do report on European issues (Kantner 2002; 
Koopmans, Statham, Kriesi, Della Porta, de Beus, Guiraudon, Medrano, 
Pfetsch 2004; Risse and van de Steeg 2003; Rauer, Rivet, van de Steeg 
2002). Therefore, there are simultaneous public debates on European 
issues on a national level. This also means that the information needed for 
participation in a public debate regarding the EU is available to the 
majority of Europeans through conventional media and not just to elites, 
who have access to more advanced media, such as the Internet. 
Consequently, there exists the potential for an all-inclusive, democratic 
European public sphere to emerge. Democratic decision-making is 
achieved when the citizens can build their opinion on public issues by 
accessing as much relevant information as possible; consensus is not a 
pre-requisite for a democratic public sphere. Yet are national media 
reports on EU issues enough to satisfy the requirements for a European 
public sphere?
Using the empirical evidence regarding the Haider debate (i.e. 
whether Austria should have received sanctions by the EU for allowing an 
extreme-right politician to be democratically elected as leader of the 
country) in various European countries (Risse and van de Steeg 2003; 
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Rauer, Rivet, van de Steeg 2002), as well as the evidence collected 
regarding the whole range of European and Europeanised national issues 
that appeared in the Austrian, British, French, German, Spanish and US-
American quality newspapers in 2000, Kantner dismisses the claims 
regarding the democratic deficit of media communication in the EU and the 
absence of a European public sphere (Kantner 2002). However, like 
Habermas (Habermas 2004; Habermas 1996) and Weiler (Weiler and 
Wind 2003; Weiler 1999; Weiler 1996), Kantner recognises that, media 
reporting aside, there is a need for a democratisation of the European 
institutions, which would help to improve the communication between the 
European political mass communication and the European decision-
making institutions (Kantner 2002). If there is no systematic interaction 
between the vertical perspective of the European public sphere (i.e. the 
top-down processes of decision-making) and the horizontal perspective of 
the interconnected European national public spheres, then EU governance 
lacks democratic legitimation. Participation, therefore, is key in the process 
of establishing an all-inclusive and democratic European public sphere.
Leonard and Arbuthnott suggest four key areas where the 
democratic deficit of the EU is clearly demonstrated and also where 
improvements can take place towards a more democratic EU:
a)Matching policies to public priorities
b)Accountability
c)Political competition
d)Participation (Leonard and Arbuthnott 2002).
Here again participation, in particular, is linked to the issue of the 
European public sphere: Citizens need to be able to express their opinions 
and debate over common European issues in a public sphere directly 
related to the centres of decision-making (ibid.: 11), if an all-inclusive, 
democratising Habermasian public sphere is to be achieved. It is not 
enough for citizens to only be able to discuss European issues, if they 
cannot influence and participate in the process of decision-making. At the 
moment, one of the main causes of the democratic deficit of the EU is that 
there is no regular feedback flow from the citizens to the EU decision-
making centres (ibid.).
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The argumentation regarding the EU’s democratic deficit examined 
so far is linked with a specific type of democracy, i.e. that of participatory 
democracy8. However, even from the point of view of representative 
democracy, the EU institutions appear insufficiently democratic.
Although the members of the European Parliament9, the Council 
and the Commissioners are either directly or indirectly accountable to the 
European citizens through national and European electoral processes and 
despite recent attempts to increase the role of citizens in the decision-
making process10, the latter still have less influence on the decision-
making process compared to the various lobbies, corporations, NGOs and 
similar. Weiler points out that the decision-making process of the EU lacks 
the structures and controls that ensure parliamentary accountability and 
administrative responsibility (Weiler 1999: 348). He also draws attention to 
the increasing expansion of comitology, or what is otherwise defined as 
“the expert committees largely responsible for administrative rulemaking” 
(Bignami 1999) or the “discrete administrative process of management the 
key public actors of which are European and national mid-level civil 
servants” and the networks of public and private interested parties also 
involved in the process which “by nature tend to privilege certain interests”
(Weiler 1999: 278).  Although it would be unrealistic to assume that this 
phenomenon could be ruled out completely, the demand for comitology to 
become more transparent is by all means legitimate and feasible (Weiler 
1999)11.
Whichever is the case, representative, participatory or deliberative 
democracy, and whichever stance is adopted on the relation between the 
European public sphere and the EU’s democratic deficit, the consensus 
among theorists is that: a) a European public sphere is at the very least 
desirable, or, at best, it already exists but its functions need to be 
enhanced; and b) overcoming the democratic deficit of the EU is 
dependent upon the creation of a European public sphere.
1.2.2 What public sphere Europe?
When it comes to defining the European public sphere, the 
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theoretical approaches are equally, if not more, divided as those regarding 
the relation of the European public sphere to the democratic deficit of the 
EU. To begin with, there is no consensus as to whether a European public 
sphere of any kind already exists, as seen in the previous section. 
Furthermore, scholars disagree as to whether we should speak of a 
“European” public sphere or of a “Europeanised” public sphere. Finally, 
there is disagreement with regard to the quantity of the European public 
spheres: Is there only one public sphere, or several? And what is their 
nature: do elite public spheres or general public spheres exist on a 
European level? In what follows, each of these issues is examined in more 
detail.
Is there a European public sphere?
The theories that view the possibility of a European public sphere 
as impossible [e.g. “the pessimistic, particularist view” (Kantner 2002)] are 
based on the argument that such a public sphere does not, and could not, 
fulfil the criteria that define a public sphere in the first place, i.e.:
a)A collective identity
b)A civil society
c)Common mass media
d)Common language.
From the particularist perspective, not only these features are 
absent at the moment on an EU level, but to assume these could appear 
in the future would also be misguided, since the establishment of pan-
European mass media would not be possible, given that there cannot be a 
common pan-European language in the first place. Furthermore the ethno-
cultural differences among the peoples of the EU are many and too deep-
rooted to allow for a European collective identity to emerge (Kantner 2002: 
2-4).
Such arguments are flawed in several respects. The issues of 
collective identity, language, mass media and culture can be addressed in 
such a way that they are not insurmountable obstacles in the emergence 
of a European public sphere.
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According to Risse and van de Steeg (2003: 2 and 21), for 
example, a European public sphere would have the following 
characteristics:
a)Same European themes are discussed at the same time at similar levels 
of attention across national public spheres and media.
b)Similar frames of reference, meaning structures and patterns of 
interpretation are used across national public spheres and media.
c)A transnational community of communication in which speakers and 
listeners not only observe each other across national spaces but also 
recognise that Europe is an issue of common concern for them.
This approach also finds that language is not necessarily a barrier 
for transnational communications. Furthermore, it agrees with Kantner’s 
approach that although a public sphere presupposes reference to the 
same structure of meaning in a community of communication, this is not 
synonymous with consensus over an issue (Kantner 2002; Risse and van 
de Steeg 2003).
The issues of language, common mass media, collective identity 
and civil society are convincingly addressed in another approach, which 
borrows its counter-arguments from the process of the hermeneutic circle 
(Kantner 2002). According to this viewpoint, in order to communicate, one 
has to make certain presuppositions. These, namely, are:
a)Every competent speaker, who masters a human language, knows a lot 
about the world (principle of charity). There is only one ‘logical space of 
reason’ which is a universal one (Kantner 2002: 7). This means that even 
in the case of speakers who have no common tradition at all (situation of 
radical interpretation: Davidson 2001), every competent speaker who 
speaks any language can enter a conversation and communicate his/her 
views.
b)One need not suspend their antecedent convictions in order to 
understand another opinion about the issue concerned (Kantner 2002: 8).
Another scholarly approach which supports a similar argument 
regarding the issue of language in the European public sphere is the one 
which Kantner identifies as “the federalist view” (Kantner 2002). 
Federalists define the public sphere as “a universe of many different 
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arenas of public political communication” (ibid.: 5). Speakers seek the 
attention of an audience for the political issues they consider important 
and for which they want to convince the audience of their opinion. Mass 
media mediate the relation between speakers and general public (ibid.). 
According to this approach, the language problem can be addressed and 
the Internet will also play an important role in eliminating the distance 
between the various national publics, thus helping in the emergence of a 
European public sphere (ibid.: 6).
In support of this argument, one may also consider the facts 
regarding Europeans and languages: Over half of the citizens of the EU 
speak a foreign language, while a large number also speak a second 
foreign language, with English being the first foreign language for over a 
third of all EU citizens (Eurobarometer 2005; COM(2005)596, final). Of 
course the number of Europeans speaking a foreign language varies 
amongst Member states, yet this number is expected to rise even more in 
the next years (ibid.). Furthermore, within the EU institutions English is 
generally accepted as the common “working language” of the EU.
For Schlesinger, this “multilingual capacity of many Europeans and 
the growing ascendancy of English” indicate that languages in the EU, and 
in Europe, are not an insurmountable communication obstacle [“the 
continent is less of a Babel than might be supposed” (Schlesinger 2003: 
7)]. If one bears in mind the above points, it becomes more likely that the 
absence of a common European language and of a common European 
tradition need not be an obstacle in the formation of a European public 
sphere.
Coming from a different perspective, Weiler argues that it is 
unnecessary to approach the concept of the European public sphere from 
the point of view of an ethno-culturally homogeneous Demos like the 
demoi found in the member states. Neither the sense of shared collective 
identity and loyalty, nor the homogeneighty of the ethno-national 
conditions on which peoplehood depend, exist on an EU level (Weiler 
1996: 2). A European demos in that sense would be not only “unrealistic” 
but also “undesirable” according to Weiler (ibid.: 17). In this respect, not 
only is the absence of a pan-European public sphere not problematic, but 
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such a public sphere is not necessary either. The aim of the EU should not 
be to create a European nation/ people but an “ever-closer Union among 
the peoples of Europe” (ibid.: 4).
European or Europeanised public sphere?
Having established that the potential for a European public sphere 
exists in the form of the several national public spheres, the next issue to 
be addressed is whether we should talk about a European or a 
Europeanised public sphere. Although the difference between these two 
terms is not always obvious (i.e. scholars tend to use both terms to refer to 
the same issue at different points within the same text), Pfetsch offers one 
of the clearest distinctions between the two: She points out that a 
“European” public sphere denotes a supra-national, unified, pan-European 
public sphere, which in order to exist, would have to be supported by 
supra-national, pan-European mass media, which would be almost 
impossible to establish, because of the cultural and linguistic differences 
amongst the peoples of Europe, although such a “European” public sphere 
could exist on an elite level (Pfetsch 2004: 4)12.
A “Europeanised” public sphere on the other hand, refers to the 
whole of national public spheres and the degree to which they incorporate 
European issues into the public debate, or the EU perspective on issues 
already under public discussion (ibid.). Furthermore, Pfetsch distinguishes 
between two levels of “Europeanisation” of public spaces: Vertical 
Europeanisation, which allows for communicative linkages between 
national and European level to be established; and horizontal 
Europeanisation, which refers to communicative linkages between various
EU member states (ibid.: 5).
As we have already seen, several other scholars also argue that the 
potentially emerging European public sphere should be sought within the 
national public spheres of the various European countries (Risse and van 
de Steeg 2003; Schlesinger 2003; Kantner 2002; Weiler 1996).
Within the context of the present thesis, two points are of interest 
here: Firstly, Pfetsch’s distinction between horizontal and vertical 
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Europeanisation of the public discourse offers the conceptual framework 
within which the EU’s public communication is defined, in the following part 
of this chapter (Part 1.3). Secondly, in distinguishing a European from a 
Europeanised public sphere, Pfetsch reinforces the argument several 
other scholars support as well that the possibility exists for a multi-faceted 
European public sphere rather than a single, homogeneous one. This 
brings us to the final issue that needs to be discussed in relation to the 
concept of the European public sphere: How many European public 
spheres are there?
One or several public spheres in the EU?
In the debate as to whether there exist/ whether we should aim to 
create one European public sphere or several, Weiler is one of the 
scholars to support the idea of multiple, interrelated national public 
spheres (Weiler 1996), as discussed earlier. Schlesinger is another one, 
although his argument derives from a sociological rather than 
governance/legal point of view: He, too, views European politics as a 
system of overlapping and interrelated spheres (Schlesinger 2003; 
Schlesinger 1999). Risse and van de Steeg also see a European public 
sphere emerging “out of the interconnectedness of and mutual exchanges 
between various national public spheres” (Risse and van de Steeg 2003: 
2).
An altogether different view regarding the European public sphere 
is the approach of the no-public thesis (i.e. a missing public) (de Beus 
2002). Limited access and publicity are not the breach of norms but 
necessary tools for integration in the best interests of ordinary Europeans 
(ibid.). De Beus distinguishes between a public policy sphere, which 
consists of the interest groups around state organs with major regulatory 
and financial powers; and the public sphere in society, which is merely the 
collection of voluntary associations distinct from the state (ibid.).
De Beus suggests that, in effect, what we are dealing with on an EU 
level is an elite public sphere and a public sphere of the masses. In that 
respect, his model is not so different from Habermas’s “sluice” model, 
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examined earlier in Part 1.1 of this chapter. Of the two, only the elite public 
sphere needs to and can have access to decision-making processes and 
institutional information/data. The “mass” public sphere needs only to 
know what the elites decide to broadcast/disseminate.
De Beus is not alone in the suggestion that, in fact, there exist two 
diverse types of public sphere within the EU. Koopmans, Neidhardt and 
Pfetsch argue that, on a national level, there are mass and elite public 
spheres and that the “Europeanisation” of national political discourses 
does not necessarily have to involve national mass publics (Koopmans, 
Neidhardt, Pfetsch 2002: 4). In this model, the elites assume the role of 
“translators”, meaning that they are responsible for bringing national 
discourses on the EU level and vice versa (ibid.). In other words, these 
elites possess soft power, i.e. their power stems from knowledge and 
expertise on the issues that are being publicly debated at a national and 
EU level. Their role is to educate the masses, in order to enable them to 
make informed decisions and also in order to create amongst the EU 
publics a common identity, a collective conscience.
To support this view, Koopmans et al compare the EU to Germany, 
the Netherlands and Switzerland, three countries whose publics were not 
always united under a collective identity and where the elites played an 
active role in unifying the segmented mass publics (ibid.: 5-13). What the 
authors suggest is that the examples of these three states indicate that a 
model that combines an integrated, transnational elite public sphere with 
nationally segmented, thematically “Europeanised” mass public spheres is 
indeed viable (ibid.: 4).
The recent negative referenda on the EU’s Constitutional Treaty in 
France and the Netherlands could be used as an example to support de 
Beus’s view: One could argue that had the process of the ratification of the 
Constitutional Treaty been left to the national governments/parliamentary 
assemblies and not to public referenda, the process would have been 
successfully completed by now, as the ratification of the Treaty by national 
parliaments in several other EU Member states indicates. The de Beus 
and Koopmans models of an elite decision-making public sphere may, 
therefore, be beneficial when it comes to maintaining power or controlling 
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the outcomes of the decision-making process to suit the aims of one or 
few socio-political groups/institutions. Nevertheless, such a model neither 
constitutes an all-inclusive public sphere, nor does it guarantee democratic 
procedures.
The problem, with the two-level European public sphere model is 
that a) it assumes that the elites will be willing to inform the masses and 
educate them in favour of the EU, and b) it overlooks the possibility that 
instead of achieving a “Europeanisation” of the mass public sphere thanks 
to the efforts of the elite public spheres, the latter could become even 
more attached to the decision-making institutions. This would lead the elite 
public sphere/s to gain even more power through their ever-increasing 
knowledge and expertise on both EU and national issues and to aim to 
manipulate rather than educate the mass publics, in order to maintain that 
power.
In order to avoid the flaws of the approaches examined so far and 
provide a normative concept that fits with the Habermasian normative 
model of the public sphere outlined in Part 1.1, it is necessary to combine 
elements of more than one definition. The approach that better 
corresponds with the Habermasian normative model of the public sphere 
is one that combines the “Europeanised national public spheres” 
approaches (e.g. Pfetsch 2004) with Guidry, Kennedy and Zald’s definition 
of transnational public spheres, according to which a transnational public 
sphere is
“a space in which both residents of distinct places (states or 
localities) and members of transnational entities (organizations or 
firms) elaborate discourse and practices whose consumption 
moves beyond national boundaries” (Guidry, Kennedy and Zald 
2000: p.6).
Such a combined approach allows for the ethno-cultural differences 
among the various member states public spheres to be taken into 
consideration, as well as  the existence of transnational organisations and 
lobbies, whose interests stretch across the member states’ national 
borders and who play a key role in the EU’s decision-making process 
(participants’ parameter of the public sphere model-“who”). At the same 
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time, such an approach can also incorporate the argument that in the case 
of the EU the participants in this transnational public sphere do share a 
history and certain values, as Weiler has pointed out (Weiler 1999; Weiler 
1996), as well as a political system of co-decided, supra-national policies. 
The outcome of such a public sphere (“what” parameter) is not actually 
predetermined in this definition, although the democratisation of the EU 
decision-making process would be a desired outcome. What is defined, 
though, is the way that public dialogue happens (the process parameter-
“how”): Through “elaborate discourse”, in other words through rational-
critical debate, also a fundamental element of the Habermasian model of 
the public sphere.
Consequently, by using this combined definition of the European 
public sphere, the link with the Habermasian normative model of the public 
sphere is established: Because of the particularities of the EU decision-
making system, transparency and accountability are crucial. If these are to 
be achieved, an all-inclusive and democratic European public sphere is 
necessary (the Habermasian all-inclusive public sphere). In addition, this 
European public sphere is not homogeneous, but consists of several, 
interrelated national public spheres, the participants of which have not 
necessarily developed a European collective consciousness.
Having outlined the general normative model of the public sphere 
and the specific normative definition of the European public sphere, it is 
now necessary to address the fourth theoretical element identified in the 
introduction of this chapter: public communication. The following, final part 
defines the term “public communication” and establishes its role in the 
European public sphere, within the wider context of the Habermasian 
normative approach of the public sphere.
1.3 Public Communication
Based on Pfetsch’s definition of what constitutes a Europeanised 
public sphere examined in the previous part of this chapter, the present 
study focuses on vertical Europeanisation (Pfetsch 2004: 5), and in 
particular its top-down process, which from now on will be referred to as 
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“EU public communication”. Why focus on public communication? And 
how is this process relevant to the theoretical issues concerning the 
European public sphere, identified in Part 1.2 of this chapter?
This final part of the chapter aims to answer these questions and 
further determine the function of public communication (exactly what
public communication should do) in relation to:
a)Each parameter of the normative model of the public sphere, i.e. the 
participants of the public sphere (who), the process (how) and the 
outcome of the public dialogue (what); and
b)The European public sphere in particular, in order to complete the 
theoretical framework within which the research questions will be 
discussed in Chapter 2. 
1.3.1 Why public communication?
The previous part of this chapter has served to highlight the 
complexity of the European public sphere and the issues of democracy 
and identity directly linked to it. Citizens’ participation in both the public 
debate regarding EU issues and the decision-making process has been 
shown to be a key factor in establishing a European public sphere closer 
to the Habermasian, all-inclusive, normative model and in achieving the 
democratisation of the EU institutions.
The role of national media and of civil society organisations in the
process of Europeanisation of the interrelated national public spheres has 
already been examined and analysed both empirically and theoretically by 
several scholars (for example Pfetsch 2004; de Vreese 2003a)13. 
However, in most of these cases the European public sphere was 
explored from the perspective of national actors/information gatekeepers 
rather than EU institutions. Moreover, this research still leaves largely 
unanswered the question of the EU institutions’ role in the European public 
sphere. Is there any top-down communication between the EU institutions 
and the European public, i.e. public communication, taking place at all? If 
so, does public communication have any other functions within the 
European public sphere? And why is it important to look at this top-down 
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aspect of vertical Europeanisation?
While it would not always be necessary to have interaction between 
EU institutions and the European public within the horizontal process of 
Europeanisation of the national public spheres [communicative linkages 
between the several EU member states (Pfetsch 2004: 5)], the vertical 
process of Europeanisation explicitly requires direct communication from 
national to EU level and vice versa. This is where the importance of the 
EU public communication lies: Although the EU may well be established 
on a formal level, it is not quite established in the mentality of its people, or 
at least it is not established in a way the EU institutions would like, as the 
ratification process of the EU’s Constitutional Treaty has recently shown14. 
Furthermore, since public communication takes place in the public sphere, 
the nature of the EU’s public sphere (the level of democratisation and 
political legitimacy of the participants) would affect the EU’s public 
communication content and outcome and vice versa.
Very little research has been done on this aspect of the 
Europeanisation of the public debate so far and the results call for further 
investigation of the EU’s public communication strategy: Meyer has shown 
how the 1999 resignation of the entire College of Commissioners15
highlights the shortcomings of the EU’s public communication, which in 
turn is linked to “the fragmentation of political authority” within the EU 
institutions and “a system of governance, which depoliticises conflict and 
obfuscates political accountability” (Meyer 1999: 617)16. Meyer’s view was 
based on the analysis of the role of conventional media in the debate 
regarding EU issues during the turbulent period of the Commission’s 
resignation in 1999. Seven years and two Commission Colleges later, how 
has the EU’s public communication strategy evolved? Is there any 
evidence that the issues Meyer pointed out have been addressed? How 
are the new media, and more specifically the Internet, affecting the EU’s 
public communication strategy and the nature of the European public 
sphere?
Before proceeding to address these questions, some further 
theoretical clarifications are necessary, with regard to the concept of public 
communication and why it has been chosen in this thesis instead of two 
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more traditional terms used when discussing the communication strategy 
of a polity with the public: a) public diplomacy, if referring to the 
communication process with foreign publics, and b) public affairs, to 
describe the communication process with domestic audiences. In the 
following sections, the definitions and main aims of public diplomacy and 
public affairs and their relevance to the case of the EU are summarised 
and it is argued that the term “public communication” is more relevant and 
useful for the case of the EU than these two traditional terms. 
1.3.2 Public Diplomacy
The concept of public diplomacy is relatively new in the field of 
international politics. The term was first used in 1965 by Dean Edmund 
Gullion of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, 
U.S. upon the establishment of the Edward R. Murrow Center for Public 
Diplomacy (Murrow, Edward R. Center 2005). Two of the most recent 
definitions of public diplomacy (in 2005) are those of Alan K. Henrickson
and Crocker Snow Jr., who both define public diplomacy as the set of 
actions conducted by governments with the purpose of influencing foreign 
publics (Henrickson and Crocker Snow Jr. quoted in Murrow, Edward R. 
Center 2005). They also argue that public diplomacy nowadays stretches 
to the relations of governments with nongovernmental entities, the media, 
corporations, faith-based organizations, civil society, ethnic groups and 
even “influential individuals” (ibid.)17.
Until recent years foreign policy, including public diplomacy, had
been mainly about the pursuit of national interests, by whatever means 
available, disregarding both the internal working of other states and the 
importance of values in international relations (Riordan 2003: 120). 
However, as the experience with the recent cases of Afghanistan and Iraq, 
as well as the ongoing unrest in the Middle East, have shown, Western 
political values, and particularly the idea of civil society as it is understood 
in Western political theory terms, cannot be imposed, together with their 
Western cultural contexts, on other states (ibid.: 132). Riordan calls the 
strategy of might-makes-right followed by several Western countries, 
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including the US and the UK, the “realist school of diplomacy” (ibid.: 120). 
It became evident already in the late 1990s that this school of thought 
could no longer deliver satisfactory results in an era of increasingly 
complicated and demanding global politics.
This is where public diplomacy comes in: For Riordan, it is an 
indispensable part of the New Diplomacy, which will increasingly be more 
about promoting values and ideas rather than about might-makes-right 
strategies (Riordan 2003). In this context, public diplomacy’s main aim is 
to engage in a country’s political and social debates, in order to create the 
intellectual and political climate in which desired policies can flourish (ibid.: 
122). These policies are also formulated within the context of public 
diplomacy, i.e. taking into account the other states’ internal political and 
cultural values. Leonard, Stead and Smewing express a similar view, 
according to which, public diplomacy should be “less about winning 
arguments and more about engagement” (Leonard, Stead, Smewing 2002: 
6). These approaches can be linked to Arquilla and Rondfeld’s notion of 
noopolitik18, according to which the new era of knowledge-based 
international politics is based on soft power and the idea that right makes 
might rather than the other way around (Arquilla and Rondfeldt 1999: 20).
The Diplo Foundation19, a non-profit foundation which “works to 
assist all countries, particularly those with limited resources, to participate 
meaningfully in international relations” defines public diplomacy as
“a process of communicating with foreign audiences by 
addressing them with the help of various tools, aimed at bringing 
about the positive perception of one’s country, national 
institutions, culture, foreign policy goals etc, in the minds of the 
foreign and domestic public and their elites; non-coercive in 
nature and based on the use of soft power” (DiploFoundation 
website 2005a). 
All the above definitions are brought together in Leonard, Stead and 
Smewing’s normative approach of public diplomacy’s four main functions: 
a)To increase people’s familiarity with one’s country
b)To increase people’s appreciation of one’s country
c)To engage people with one’s country/state
d)To influence people (Leonard, Stead, & Smewing 2002: 9-10).
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This approach enables us to place public diplomacy in the context 
of the public sphere, as all of the above functions require some form of 
public dialogue to take place, if they are to be achieved. Particularly the 
process of engaging people with one’s country explicitly denotes the 
relation between public diplomacy and the public sphere. Engaging people 
in the affairs of another country presupposes the existence of a public 
sphere, where interaction between citizens and state/government 
bodies/institutions takes place. Interaction is inherent in the engagement of 
people in any affairs, activities or issues and when it comes to interaction 
between large audiences and institutions, that interaction can only take 
place within what in the Habermasian model of public sphere is the 
general public sphere.
The relevance of the Habermasian normative approach of the 
public sphere to public diplomacy lies mainly in the element of equal 
opportunity in participating in the public sphere which is crucial in 
establishing trust amongst the participants. Any form of exclusion can 
undermine people’s trust towards that public sphere and the state 
institutions that appear to support it.
This is crucial, as trust is also fundamental when aiming to establish 
an institution (or polity for that matter) in the minds of a people. According 
to Fisher, the full conception or image of an institution (i.e. idea patterns, 
role expectations, assumptions regarding the function of that institution), 
which make it function, is rooted in the psycho-cultural base of the larger 
society and in its total way of life (Fisher 1972). Unless this full conception 
of an institution is established in the minds of people, that institution will 
not be able to function successfully, even if it has already been formally 
established (Fisher 1972: 86). Public diplomacy is, therefore, the tool that 
enables institutions/polities to become established in the collective 
consciousness of a people. Building the audiences’ trust towards a 
country’s governing institutions is a first step towards achieving that aim.
Of course, consistency of actions is also necessary, if public 
diplomacy is to succeed in building a state’s/organisation’s credibility 
among third countries. Invading a third state, for example, and branding 
the loss of civilian lives “collateral damage”, whilst at the same time calling 
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on people to adhere to the rule of law and the principles of democracy is a 
political (and ethical) oxymoron that public diplomacy cannot justify, as the 
US and the UK have discovered in the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan.
Public diplomacy can also be seen as three-dimensional: According 
to Leonard et al, public diplomacy strategies can be reactive (hours/days 
after an incident has taken place); proactive (strategy aiming to get results 
within weeks/months); and relationship-building (long-term strategy that 
shows results after years) (Leonard, Stead, & Smewing 2002: 10). None of 
the strategies set within this time-related model can be achieved if public 
diplomacy is a one-dimensional process of delivering messages (ibid.). It 
is necessary that public diplomacy encourages interaction with the 
audiences it is addressing. It is also important that there are methods in 
place to measure as effectively as possible the reactions of the target 
audiences to the messages of public diplomacy.
In addition, Leonard et al identify some key areas in which public 
diplomacy should aim to become more efficient, if it were to produce more 
effective results:
a)Ensuring crisis responses (reactive public diplomacy) do not divert 
governments from long-term goals (proactive/relationship-building public 
diplomacy).
b)Rapid reaction.
c) Internal co-ordination.
d)International co-ordination.
e)The ability to keep track of long-term goals.
f) Moving beyond propaganda: It is necessary to understand the target 
audience/ Proving relevance to target audience.
g)Interaction.
h)Moving beyond intellectual forms of communication (Leonard, Stead, 
Smewing 2002).
Three of the above areas are of particular interest here: 
Understanding the target audience and proving relevance to it; interaction; 
and non-intellectual forms of communication. These three areas are 
crucial in encouraging the emergence of a Habermasian public dialogue 
(i.e. where anyone can take part, not only those who understand 
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legal/political/economic terminology or those who already have a solid 
knowledge of a particular issue; and where the attempt is not to 
indoctrinate the audience but encourage critical dialogue).
It becomes apparent, therefore, that the connection between public 
diplomacy and the public sphere is direct: Public diplomacy cannot occur 
in a vacuum, it presupposes the existence of a public sphere. With regard 
to the Habermasian normative model of the public sphere, public 
diplomacy can be seen as the top-down communication process of public 
discourse (how institutions communicate with the general public). Whether 
these institutions and the general public participate in the public sphere on 
equal terms depends, in the case of public diplomacy, on the opportunities 
given to the public to interact with the institutions. The more linear the 
communication process is, the less likely it is that the public diplomacy 
strategy will succeed in endearing its messages to the general public (the 
outcome of the public dialogue).
How is all this relevant to the case of the EU? There is growing 
evidence that third countries and their citizens have a very unclear idea 
about what the EU is and what it does (de Gouveia and Plumridge 2005; 
Youngs, Emerson, Smith, Whitman 2005; Suteu and Counterpoint think 
tank 2004). As a result certain states, like China, which are of strategic 
importance to the EU, tend to pursue bilateral relations with certain 
member states rather than approach the EU institutions, precisely because 
they are uncertain about how the EU works or about who they need to 
approach on an EU level (de Gouveia and Plumridge 2005: vii). 
Furthermore, although the EU is the world’s biggest donor in foreign aid, 
its contribution and work largely goes unnoticed, as a result of poor 
presentation on behalf of the EU and also because of the better organised 
and more “aggressive” promotion of aid contributions made by other large 
donors, such as the US (ibid.: 16). Public diplomacy would be the means 
of explaining the EU to the world, and of promoting its activities worldwide.
1.3.3 Public Affairs
“Public affairs” is a “blanket” term used to describe a variety of 
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issues and concepts: The term may denote public policy, public 
administration, lobbying or public relations, depending on the author’s 
background and target audience. There is also a difference of approach 
amongst authors, with regard to who conducts public affairs: According to 
one view, it is the governments’ way of informing the public about policies 
they intend to implement, while for others public affairs denote the actions 
that non-governmental organisations and businesses take in order to 
affect policies that a government intends to or has already implemented.
According to Harris and Fleisher, for example, public affairs 
encompass the relations between governments and organisations from all 
sectors and include the process of policy-making, and the consequent 
lobbying process that ensues from it (Harris and Fleisher 2005). For the 
DiploFoundation, however, public affairs deal with explaining foreign policy 
goals to domestic constituencies to ensure a positive understanding of a 
policy and are distinct from Information strategies, which describe the 
communication process between an institution/ polity and domestic 
audiences (DiploFoundation website 2005a). A third definition comes from
strategic marketing and communications management consultant Prejean-
Motanky, according to whom public affairs is a strand of public relations, 
and concerns the “relationship between an organisation and a 
government/ political entity” in matters of “societal public policy action and 
legislation” (Prejean-Motanky 2003). Yet one popular source, the 
electronic encyclopaedia Wikipedia, distinguishes between public policy 
and public affairs by defining the first as “partisan”, where all parties 
involved overtly try to achieve their goals through discussion, whilst the 
latter is generally “non-partisan” and “ focuses on methods of public 
administration, illustrated by historical examples recording outcomes” 
(Wikipedia.org 2006d).
Regardless of which approach one chooses to follow, the fact 
remains that public affairs entails the engagement in public dialogue of 
policy-making elites and civil society and/or the general public. As with 
public diplomacy, the success of such public dialogue can be measured by 
the degree of acceptance of the policies by the general public. Of course, 
in cases of an extreme version of Habermas’s sluice model of public 
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sphere20, there is no public dialogue and the policies are simply imposed 
upon the general public. If however, a government/ polity is aiming 
towards a more democratic, more inclusive governance, and therefore, of 
such a public sphere, then public affairs, similarly to public diplomacy, 
should be about facilitating public dialogue, rather than just communicating 
policies to the general public. The degree to which the decision-making 
elites and the general public engage in a public dialogue regarding intra-
state/ intra-polity policies, and the degree to which the general public can 
influence the policy-making process through public dialogue, ultimately 
indicates how close a polity is in achieving the ideal, all-inclusive 
Habermasian public sphere.
Public affairs is not only about influencing policies or “selling” 
policies to the general public. The fact that there exist so many different 
definitions and approaches of public affairs, yet all entail public dialogue, 
indicates that ultimately this is a process through which the various
organisations and bodies and socio-economic groups within a society in a 
way negotiate their coexistence and work towards achieving social 
harmony. Again, as with the case of Habermas’s models of the public 
sphere, the degree to which public affairs achieve that role depends on the 
wider socio-political context in which it takes place. From that point of 
view, public affairs may be seen as the process through which institutions 
are accepted in their host cultural and social landscape. This is a 
necessary procedure, if an institution wants to survive within a society 
(Fisher 1972: 83)21 and achieve political legitimation.
The issues of transparency of the decision-making process through 
public debate and of legitimation have already been discussed in this 
chapter as part of the debate regarding the EU’s democratic deficit. In this 
respect, public affairs, offers the conceptual framework within which the 
EU’s democratic deficit could be addressed, provided that it incorporates 
public dialogue on policies and is not limited just to their promotion.
1.3.4 EU public communication
Although the EU could benefit from applying the principles of public 
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diplomacy and public affairs in its communication strategy with the public, 
the use of these two terms in research analysis presents certain 
theoretical problems.
Firstly, both of these terms were formulated with reference to 
sovereign states and their governmental (political, cultural or otherwise) 
institutions. Consequently, public diplomacy and public affairs, when used 
separately, do not reflect the overall communication process between a 
unique political formation, such as the EU, and the general public for the 
following reasons:
a)The EU is not a state or even a federation of states, although some 
would argue that it should aim to become one.
b)The boundaries between foreign and domestic audiences are not 
always clear, partly because there is no European/ EU identity fully 
established in the minds of the EU’s citizens22 and partly because of 
technical reasons. Under which category would the UK be classified, for 
example, where the public is one of the most Eurosceptic and the UK state 
has permanently opted out of several EU policies/strategies, such as the 
monetary union? What about Norway and Iceland, two European countries 
which have special relations with the EU, enjoy several of the benefits and 
share certain obligation as the EU Member states, but are not members of 
the EU? Would the Norwegian and Icelandic publics be defined as 
“foreign” or “domestic”?
c)There is not one, unified supranational European public sphere, but 
several interrelated Europeanised national public spheres, as discussed in 
Part 1.2 of this chapter.
Although some authors, like Lynch (2005), Moravcsik and 
Nikolaïdes (2006), would disagree with this view and confidently use the 
terms “public diplomacy” and “public affairs” to describe the EU’s 
communication policies, EU officials themselves refrain from using those 
terms, referring to the EU’s Information and Communication Strategy 
instead, as will be seen in following chapters.
Furthermore, it is difficult to theorise “public affairs” since the term 
has so many contradictory definitions, which makes it an insufficiently 
robust basis for analysis. In contrast, public diplomacy is a term that can 
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be used only with regard to the communication process that is initiated by 
governmental or other institutions and is directed to foreign general 
publics. As an analytical concept, it does not allow for the communication 
process between decision-making institutions and domestic audiences to 
be included.
What is, then, the role of EU public communication in the European 
public sphere? In other words, with regard to the normative model of the 
public sphere examined in Part 1.1, what outcome should public 
communication aim to achieve through the public sphere (the “what” 
aspect of the public sphere)?
We have already seen that external audiences are not familiar with 
the EU’s work, structure and values23 while the intra-EU public sphere is 
linked with the issues of a) democratisation of the EU institutions and 
decision-making process and b) the EU/European collective identity or the 
lack of it24.
The role of the EU’s public communication with regard to both 
external and intra-EU audiences25 may therefore be defined as aiming to:
a) Increase people’s familiarity with the EU;
b)Increase people’s appreciation of what the EU does; and
c)Engage people with the EU/ in the debate of EU affairs, to paraphrase 
Leonard et al’s definition of public diplomacy presented earlier in this 
chapter26.
In addition to these, with reference to the intra-EU public, we have 
already seen that citizens’ participation in the public dialogue regarding
EU issues and in the decision-making process on EU level is considered 
as a key factor in addressing the EU’s democratic deficit27. Another key 
factor is the accountability of the EU institutions while Leonard and 
Arbuthnott (2002) also identify the matching of EU policies to public 
priorities as another key area where the democratic deficit of the EU is 
clearly demonstrated28.
The process through which these aims may be achieved (the “how” 
parameter of the public sphere) in terms of the EU public communication 
strategy, should, therefore, involve the following actions: 
a)Promoting interaction within the public sphere.
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b)Moving beyond propaganda: it is necessary to understand the target 
audience and demonstrate relevance to target audience.
c)Moving beyond intellectual forms of communication (adapted from 
Leonard, Stead, Smewing 2002 definition of areas where public 
diplomacy, in general, should aim to become more efficient29).
Having defined the general theoretical framework of the concept of 
the public sphere and having determined the specific issues and problems 
linked with the European public sphere and the role that the EU public 
communication would be expected to play in this public sphere, there 
remains one final component to be discussed, one that is at the core of 
this thesis– the role of the Internet in the EU’s public communication 
strategy and its impact on the European public sphere. The following 
chapter presents the research question and its parameters, examines the 
theoretical links between the Internet and the concept of the public sphere 
and, more specifically, determines the function of the Internet in the 
theoretical model of the European public sphere established in the present
chapter.
  
Notes
1 Some of the most influential works on the public sphere have been those of Kant (1990); 
Hegel, (1999); Marx (1971, 1976); Arendt (1986) and, most recently, of Habermas (1989, 
1996); Calhoun (1999); and Thompson (1999), to name but a few.
2 The words “private” and “public” took a different meaning in the bourgeois public sphere 
than the one they had in the classical ancient Greek democracy: The public and the 
private were strongly separated then, with the “public” meaning the place of the “agora” 
where all the citizens could gather and discuss public matters, regardless of their social or 
economic status. On the other hand, the private was everything that involved the family 
and one’s house (oikos) and included all those who were excluded from the public life 
(women, children, slaves). In the bourgeois public sphere it is the private that constitutes 
the public sphere, in the sense that individual ownership was the precondition for 
becoming a member of the public sphere; and that public sphere consisting of individuals 
was also strongly separated from the state (Ober 1989; Hansen 1991).
3 Habermas uses the term “refeudalization of society” to describe how the separation of 
the public from the private eventually became blurred, therefore leading to “the process of 
the politically relevant exercise and equilibration of power taking place directly between 
the private bureaucracies, special-interest associations, parties and public administration” 
(Habermas 1989: 175-176).
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4 The role of the media in the public sphere and the European public sphere in particular 
is further examined in Chapter 2.
5 These generic qualities were adapted from Holub’s view of the Habermasian public 
sphere (Holub 1991) and of course, as Holub points out, they are subject to both the 
historical context within which a public sphere is examined and on the topics that are 
admitted for discussion (ibid.).
6 With regard to the institutionalisation of the European public sphere, a Constitutional 
Treaty was signed after lengthy negotiations (the process of elaborating the Constitutional 
Treaty for the EU began in 2000 in Nice, with the Declaration on the future of the Union 
(The European Union 2004). However, the ratification process which commenced right 
afterwards has left both the leaders and the public of the EU disillusioned as far as the 
political union of the Member states is concerned. So far, two national referenda in 
France and the Netherlands have rejected the Constitutional Treaty. This has created a 
negative state of affairs with reference to the process of political union of the Member 
states, or even more so, whether such a union is necessary at all, despite the fact that 
fourteen other Member states have already ratified the Treaty. There are nine remaining 
Member states that have yet to ratify the Treaty and the process was due to conclude, in 
principle, in 2006 but under the circumstances the possibility of an institutionalised 
European public sphere materialising is now less probable. For more information, national 
debates, links, fact sheets and the official EU position on this matter see EUROPA 2006a 
and 2006i.
7 As opposed to these strong publics, there are the “weak or general” publics, in which 
public opinion is formed. These are less institutionalised and operate in the “sphere of 
deliberation outside the political system” (Eriksen and Fossum 2002: 405). Eriksen and 
Fossum’s approach of strong publics with decision-making power and weak, general 
publics which form opinions but not necessarily influence the decision-making process is 
very close to Habermas’s sluice model, examined in Part 1.1, of elite publics within the 
decision-making mechanism and weak general publics which form opinions but cannot 
always influence the decision-making process.
8 In political theory, participatory democracy is seen as a concept of ideas of direct 
democracy, where direct democracy refers both to the referendum model and the 
classical city-state democracy of ancient Greece (Smismans 2004: 128). Participatory 
democracy emerged as a concept in order to re-introduce the element of direct 
participation in the decision-making process of the more complex societies of the second 
half of the 20th century (Korsten, Pateman, Barber quoted in Smismans 2004: 128). This 
concept extended the idea of participation beyond the political decision-making process, 
to include the workplace, education and local public administration. The main point of 
difference between direct democracy and participatory democracy lies in the fact that the 
latter refers to a “small-group model of democracy” (Sarton 1987 quoted in Smismans 
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2004: 128), where self-realisation and face-to-face deliberation are of central importance. 
On the other hand, the direct-democracy model initially focused on the referendum issue 
(ibid.). The EU Constitutional Treaty also clearly stated that the EU is based on both the 
principle of the representative and participatory democracy, but it did not provide a 
definition of the term “democracy”, nor did it explain how democracy, as a principle “on 
which the Union is founded”, is to be applied/ implemented (Smismans 2004: 122-123). 
On a theoretical level, Smismans points out that the whole debate regarding direct citizen 
participation in the decision-making process on an EU level (Weiler 1999; Verhoeven 
1998a; Curtin 1997; Weiler 1997; Nentwich 1996 quoted in Smismans 2004: 128) has 
mainly focused on an alternative form of representation (i.e. representation via 
associations and interest groups) rather than direct participation (Smismans 2004: 129).
9 For a concise overview of the European Parliaments development and legislative role 
see Sarikakis 2002.
10 As far as the European Parliament is concerned, the “right to petition” for citizens has 
been introduced (citizens can contest European legislation through the Parliament). If a 
petition becomes admissible the relevant parliamentary committee can take action in any 
of the following forms:
a) Requests that the European Commission conducts a preliminary investigation and 
provide information regarding compliance with the relevant Community legislation;
b) Refers the petition to other European Parliament committees for information or further 
action (a committee might, for example, take account of a petition in its legislative 
activities);
c) In some exceptional cases submits a report to Parliament to be voted upon in plenary 
or conduct a fact-finding visit; or
d) Takes any other action considered appropriate to try to resolve an issue (European 
Parliament 2005).
A similar provision was made as far as the Commission is concerned, in the, of obscure 
future, Constitutional Treaty, according to which a minimum of one million citizens can 
invite the Commission to take a legislative initiative on a particular matter, although the 
Commission is not obliged to act on such an initiative (The European Union 2004: Article 
I-46).
11 See also Euractiv.com PLC 2003; Weiler and Wind 2003; Wind 2001; Yataganas 2001 
on the issue of comitology and EU governance.
12 See also Koopmans, Neidhardt, Pfetsch 2002 on the same issue.
13 See also Meyer 2005; Koopmans, Statham, Kriesi, Della Porta, de Beus, Guiraudon, 
Medrano, Pfetsch 2004; Trenz 2004; Koopmans and Pfetsch 2003; Risse and van de 
Steeg 2003; Kantner 2002; Koopmans, Neidhardt, Pfetsch 2002; Rauer, Rivet, van de
Steeg 2002; Waldenström 2002; De Vreese 2001; De Vreese, Peter, Semetko 2001; 
Kevin 2001; Kunelius and Sparks 2001; Semetko, De Vreese, Peter 2000; Trenz 2000; 
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Schlesinger 1999.
14 See note 6, above.
15 See Chapter 3, Part 3.1, Section 3.1.1 for more details on this.
16 Meyer’s view was based on the analysis of the role of conventional media in the debate 
regarding EU issues during the turbulent period of the Commission’s resignation in 1999.
17 For more information on the history of public diplomacy and its deployment by the U.S 
institutions see Murrow, Edward R. Center 2005; Publicdiplomacy.org 2005; 
DiploFoundation website 2005a.
18 From the Greek word “nous” which means mind, logic, thought. See also note 23 in 
Chapter 2.
19 The foundation has grown from a project to introduce information technology tools to 
the practice of diplomacy, initiated in 1993 at the Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic 
Studies in Malta. Retaining the development of information and communications 
technologies for diplomatic activities at its core, Diplo was established as an independent 
foundation in November 2002 by the governments of Malta and Switzerland, to include 
other new and traditional aspects of the practice of diplomacy and international relations. 
Furthermore, the foundation is also part of a growing online and off-line network of 
governments, civil society groups, donor agencies, private sector companies and inter-
governmental organisations, the Global Knowledge Partnership (GKP), which come 
together with the aim to “harness the potential of information and communication 
technologies (ICTs) for sustainable and equitable development” (Global Knowledge 
Partnership 2005). The aims of this network are very similar to the aims of ATTAC, the 
online network examined in Chapter 2, Part 2.2, although the aims here are wider and the 
members comprise organisations only and not individuals, although the contents of the 
website are available to anyone.
20 See Part 1.1.
21 However, Fisher suggests that the responsibility of integrating community culture into 
community institutions lies within the culture itself i.e., if a culture fails to achieve a certain 
degree of integration and mutual consistency among its parts, it will not be able to serve 
adequately the group/community which practices the culture and will eventually come 
apart with contradictions and inconsistencies (Fisher 1972: 83).
22 Most Europeans (whether pro- or anti-EU) do not identify themselves as EU nationals 
yet (Eurobarometer 2006a; Eurobarometer 2006b).
23 Part 1.3, Section 1.3.2.
24 Part 1.2.
25 Despite the fact that the boundaries between internal and external audiences are not 
always clear in the case of the EU a distinction is still necessary for practical/ 
methodological purposes. Consequently, this thesis will use de Gouveia’s term “intra-EU 
communication” (de Gouveia and Plumridge 2005) with reference to the EU’s public 
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communication strategy towards EU audiences, whilst public communication towards 
third-country audiences will be referred to as “external public communication”, wherever 
necessary.
26 Leonard, Stead, Smewing 2002 quoted in Part 1.3, Section 1.3.2.
27 Part 1.2, Section 1.2.1.
28 Leonard and Arbuthnott 2002 discussed in Part 1.2, Section 1.2.1.
29 Leonard, Stead, Smewing 2002 quoted in Part 1.3, Section 1.3.2.
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Chapter 2- Research questions, methodology and 
theoretical clarifications
The previous chapter presented the concept of the EU’s public 
communication and identified its parameters, as far as content and aims
are concerned, within the theoretical concept of the European public 
sphere. As has been argued, public communication is the term used in this 
thesis to indicate the top-down communication process between the EU 
institutions and the general public1. What could the role of the Internet in 
this communication process be and why does the present study focus on 
this particular medium?
We have already seen in Chapter 1 that for Habermas the media 
have consistently had a crucial role in the public sphere: Initially, the media 
(primarily newspapers, books and journals) contributed to the rational-
critical debate within the bourgeois public sphere and thus played a role in 
the establishment of what Poster describes as “a healthy representative 
democracy” (Poster 1995b). In time, though, the profit-driven monopolies 
that control the modern media (radio, television) contributed to the 
transformation of the rational-critical public sphere into a sphere of 
publicity, more concerned with the consumption of culture, and thus the 
generation of profit, than with the democratising rational-critical public 
debate (Habermas 1989).
Other scholars have also highlighted the role of the media in the 
public sphere not only as facilitating but also as shaping public debate. For 
example, Elliott’s view on Britain’s technological and economic 
developments in the 1980s- that they “were promoting a continuation of 
the shift away from involving people in societies as political citizens of 
nation states towards involving them as consumption units in a corporate 
world” (Elliott 1982: 243-244, quoted in Golding and Murdock 1991: 23)- is 
quite close to Habermas’s view on the role of media in the public sphere. 
The media are characterized as the “fourth estate”, which from “guardians 
of the public sphere become increasingly converted into industries, wholly 
oriented towards the profit motive, just another business held by some 
conglomerate” (ibid.).
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Coming from a different perspective, the liberal and radical 
democratic approaches to the public sphere (Curran 1991) also agree that 
the media have a crucial role in the public debate, albeit a positive one. 
Both the liberal and the radical democratic approaches see the mass 
media as vital in restoring the balance in and encouraging further 
democratisation of the public sphere.
More specifically, for classical liberal theory, the public sphere is
“the space between government and society, in which private 
individuals exercise formal (election of governments) and informal 
(pressure of the public opinion) control over the state […] The 
media are central to this process” (Curran 1991: 29).
This approach does not delve deeper into the ways in which the 
media affect the democratic procedures in contemporary societies nor 
does it identify any types of conflict between the individuals and the state. 
It is important, though, to note that it recognises individuals’ ability to 
control the actions of the state through a public sphere, and that it sees in 
the media not a state ideological apparatus but a space that improves 
democratic processes.
Similarly, the radical democratic approach sees in the public sphere 
“a public space in which private individuals and organized interests seek to 
influence the allocation of resources and regulate the social relations” 
(ibid.: 35). The media are not just seen as intermediaries between the 
individuals and the state but more in the context of a “battleground 
between contending forces” (ibid.: 29). According to this approach, the 
media broaden the access to the public domain thus restoring the balance 
of power in societies where elites initially had privileged access to the 
public domain (Curran 1991). John Hartley takes the argument a step 
further by arguing that the media are the contemporary public sphere, “the 
public domain, the place where and the means by which the public is 
created and has its being” (Hartley 1992: 1, quoted in Poster 1995a: 6).
It thus becomes apparent that regardless of the theoretical 
approach one adopts as far as the nature of the media’s role in the public 
sphere is concerned the common denominator in all approaches is that the 
media have a significant role in the public debate, either as mediators or 
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as participants themselves. How does this affect the analysis of the
European public sphere and EU public communication in particular, 
considering that there are no pan-European mass media, mediating and/or 
participating in a pan-European, unified public sphere?
The national media are perceived as key to the Europeanisation of 
the national public spheres (Kevin 2003: 52, quoted in Pfetsch 2004: 4), as 
they function both as an institutionalised forum of debate between the 
public and the institutions, and as actors of the public debate/ agenda-
setters, i.e. they convey information regarding issues and actors according 
to their professional norms and values and their wider political and 
economic associations and interests. As has already been discussed in 
Chapter 1, the role of national media in the process of the horizontal 
Europeanisation (communicative linkages between member states) of the 
interrelated national public spheres has already been examined and 
analysed both empirically and theoretically by several scholars2, although 
the results have been inconclusive with regard to the media’s actual power 
to influence Europeanised public debates3.
In the case of the vertical Europeanisation (communicative linkages 
between EU institutions and the public), and more specifically of the EU’s 
public communication strategy (top-down aspect of the vertical 
Europeanisation), which is the focus of the present thesis, this (the 
process of vertical Europeanisation) may also be observed within national 
public spheres and it may be mediated by national media/ national 
information gatekeepers. Meyer (1999) has highlighted the problems of 
this process, particularly with regard to the EU’s public communication 
relying on the national media to convey its messages to the public.
However, vertical Europeanisation and the EU’s public 
communication may also be direct; that is to say, the EU institutions may 
be responsible for producing and broadcasting their messages to the 
general public and any interaction between the general public and the 
institutions may be unmediated and managed directly by the institutions 
themselves. It is in this context that the Internet becomes important, as, in 
the absence of traditional (television, radio, newspapers) media on a pan-
European level, it is the only medium offering the possibility for EU 
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institutions to establish unmediated communication with the general public.
Could the Internet become a new public sphere, in the way 
Habermas conceived the ideal public space? Can the Internet promote 
democracy and help promote an all-inclusive public sphere? Or will the 
Internet become the most powerful supporter of the contemporary political 
and social status quo? Will an alternative public sphere emerge from 
cyberspace? And what is the impact of the Internet on the European public 
sphere and the EU’s public communication strategy?
2.1 Cyberspace and the public sphere: Who participates?
To begin with, we need to define the term “cyberspace”. The phrase 
was first used by William Gibson to define a place “that collated all the 
information in the world and could be entered by disembodied 
consciousnesses” (Jordan 2000: 20). This place offers power to those who 
can access and/or manipulate the unlimited information that can be found 
in it. This definition underlines the problems that arise when we attempt to 
define cyberspace and the Internet as a new, alternative public sphere4: 
The power of cyberspace lies in the manipulation of information and also 
in knowledge (knowledge of how to access various parts of cyberspace; 
knowledge of how to bypass restrictions and censorship).  Since not 
everyone can achieve that, we could be facing the formation of a public 
sphere dominated by elites, like the bourgeois public sphere of the 17th
and 18th century.
More specifically, elites in cyberspace can appear in two forms: The 
first one consists of the people who have the privilege to use the new 
means of communication, and therefore can send and receive messages 
of political dissent and/ or participate in the political discourse. The 
statistics available so far all present the average Internet user as middle or 
upper-class white male, in his late twenties and thirties, with higher 
education, living in Western Europe or North America (ClickZ Network 
2006a; ClickZ Stats 2006c; Chen and Wellman 2003; Greenspan 2003a; 
Nielsen/Net Ratings 2003; Castells 2000)5. From that point of view, the 
emerging electronic public sphere could not be considered inclusive.
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However, according to the latest evidence, the gap between the rich 
and the poor (individuals as well as countries) and between the two sexes, 
as far as their representation online is concerned, is slowly being reduced 
(ClickZ Network 2006a; ClickZ Stats 2006c; Chen and Wellman 2003; 
Nielsen/Net Ratings 2003). The percentage of the world’s population that 
has access to the Internet rose to 10% in 2003 from 2.4% in 2000 (Chen 
and Wellman 2003; Castells 2000). In 2004 the worldwide Internet 
population was calculated at 934 million while it is estimated to reach 1.35 
billion by 2007 according to the Computer Industry Almanac (ClickZ Stats 
2006c). The same applies to socio-economical status, gender and 
educational status, all factors which are still discriminating as far as 
Internet access is concerned, yet they are becoming less and less 
determining of the profile of the Internet users on a global and national 
level (ClickZ Network 2006a; Chen and Wellman 2003; Lucas and Sylla 
2003)6. It is also important to note that although in most countries the 
majority of Internet users are higher-income individuals, in some countries 
age and/or education and not income are the definitive factors of 
accessing the Internet, as is the case, for example, in Mexico, China and 
South Korea (Chen and Wellman 2003)7.
What can be said about the electronic public sphere is that it 
generally reflects the social structure of the off-line societies (male-
dominated societies, where the higher-educated and higher income 
members generally dominate the public sphere). The Internet also reflects 
the inequalities between the various ethnic groups in off-line societies. For 
example, the socio-economic inequalities between Hispanic/ black 
Americans and white/Asian Americans are reflected in the numbers of the 
Internet users from these ethnic groups (ClickZ Network 2006a; Chen and 
Wellman 2003). Similarly, the inequalities between developed and 
developing countries are also present online: Not only more Internet users 
come from developed countries, but the infrastructure required to access 
the Internet is also more readily available and cheaper in developed 
countries8.
The electronic public sphere also reflects the dynamic of the off-line 
societies, in the sense that any advances towards inclusion made in off-
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line societies also appear online, and in a more obvious way than in off-
line societies9. For example, the advances of off-line societies towards the 
equality of sexes can definitely be observed in the electronic public sphere 
(increase of female users) and in certain cases, i.e. in societies where 
women are still highly socially disadvantaged compared to men, the 
Internet even facilitates the struggle of women for equality, as in the case 
of Afghanistan10. Day and Schuler point out that there is enough evidence 
to illustrate how ICTs encourage the re-emergence of social movements, 
civil society and community networking (Day and Schuler 2004a: 6). As 
examples, the authors use the anti-Iraq war movement, the anti-
globalisation and environmental movements, all of which have used ICTs 
for the production and sharing of information that sustains and helps 
expand their networks (Day and Schuler 2004a)11.
One should not forget, of course, that these positive examples of 
online activism go hand-in-hand with censorship of various degrees. 
Chinese citizens, for example, are experiencing one of the most severe 
cases of online state censorship, while European governments, among 
which the French, German and Austrian ones, have managed to impose 
online censorship with regard to views concerning one particular issue (in 
this case Nazi ideology and negation of the Holocaust). Even online 
information corporations like GOOGLE.com, whose founders Larry Page 
and Sergey Brin built their online services on the Internet’s fundamental 
characteristic of free and continuous flow of information, are now bowing 
to the pressure of the US and Chinese governments on the issue of 
censorship. This could potentially lead to what Orwell described as the Big 
Brother (Orwell 1987), a society where everyone is watched and all 
information is controlled to the point of distortion, or what is otherwise 
called the Superpanopticon, a place of absolute censorship and control 
(Jordan 2000).
However, one of the Internet’s core characteristics is that it was 
designed to override any obstacle in communication, as discussed earlier 
in this chapter. Online censorship, therefore, regardless of its severity, is 
bound to be temporary, as the case of online music and video file-sharing 
has shown. Despite the music and movie industries’ intense efforts, the 
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third generation of peer-to-peer (P2P) file-sharing protocols, such as 
Freenet (Free Network Project 2006), are not as dependent on a central 
server as first generation P2P protocols, like Napster12, and because they 
use encryption to transfer the shared data, it is much harder to shut down 
these systems through court actions. In addition, certain P2P protocol 
providers, like KaZaA (Sharman Networks 2006), change the company's 
organization or country of origin so that it is impossible or pointless to 
prosecute them for breeching copyright laws13.
Besides the access-related online elite (the people who have 
access to the Internet as opposed to the people who do not), in the early 
days of the Internet another elite group had been identified by analysts: 
the “technopower” elite, i.e. people and/or organizations that “have wider 
possibilities for taking action based on the ability to delve within layers of 
hardware and software” (Jordan 2000: 135). This elite group included the 
hackers, the software and hardware international corporations as well as 
people who have a deep knowledge of software systems and develop 
new, more user-friendly programmes for access to cyberspace for non-
profit reasons14. The technopower elite were seen as the ones that shaped 
the “environment” in which the actions of the rest of the Internet users take 
place (Jordan 2000)15.
Nevertheless, the validity of these claims regarding the existence of 
a technopower elite in cyberspace is questionable nowadays, as any 
average Internet user, without specialist software and hardware 
knowledge, can quite easily and cost-effectively create his/her own 
webpage, blog (online calendar), chat forum and/or mailing list, as well as 
access information about hacking16. Furthermore, a large proportion of 
software is available online for free, and even if it is not, there are ways to 
copy and distribute software for free, even without the manufacturer’s 
consent. And although, as far as server software usage is concerned, the 
market is dominated by 2 corporations, namely Apache and Microsoft 
(Securityspace.com 2004; Netcraft 2003), there are several other 
operating systems available (often for free or for little cost) and most of 
them are nowadays compatible with most others17.
After looking at all the possible manifestations of elite groups online 
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in the above paragraphs, it is safe to conclude that these are temporary. 
Their power to access, control and/or shape the nature of the Internet is 
eventually surpassed by the capabilities that this medium offers.
Therefore, once we move beyond the demographic data regarding 
the off-line and online profile of Internet users, if we examine the potential 
power that cyberspace can offer to its users from the individuals’ point of 
view, there is enough evidence to suggest that there can be an alternative 
public sphere in cyberspace, which could fulfil the Habermasian ideal. The 
users of the Internet can communicate without necessarily knowing each 
other, let alone having physical contact with each other18, which means 
that the users’ offline identity, race or gender are irrelevant on the Internet. 
This is the first element that indicates the potential emergence of an all-
inclusive public sphere, where everyone can participate as equals and are 
judged by what they say and not by who they are19. 
Nevertheless, the ability of individuals to change online identities as 
often as they like or sustain multiple identities on cyberspace does not 
mean that identities are absent from cyberspace. Jordan summarises the 
counter-argument on the absence of identity from cyberspace by saying 
that
“cyberspace is not inherently free of gender or race or any other 
key constituents of offline identity, but these are recreated with 
different resources, in different ways and with variable connections 
to offline identity” (Jordan 2000: 66).
In other words, the power of the individuals in cyberspace lies in 
their ability to change their online identity in order to adjust to different 
“environments”. Individuals can have a more “fluid” identity online, and 
adapt their online “persona” according to the online environment they find 
themselves into every time (Poster 2003).This means that men can appear 
as women and vice versa and hardly ever can their true identity be 
revealed (Jordan 2000), but they still exist in cyberspace under a male or 
female identity.
Because of this identity fluidity, and because no central authority 
can have absolute control on the information flow [“the Net treats 
censorship as damage and it routes around it” (Gilmore 2006)], early 
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theorists argued that the Internet heralded a space of “anti-hierarchism” 
(Tsaliki 2000; Jones 1995) and “anti-authoritarianism” (Barlow 1996)20. 
The fact that everyone exists in cyberspace only through his or her words 
prevents the formation of any type of hierarchy. Furthermore, everyone 
enters or leaves cyberspace on their own will and no individual can impose 
themselves upon the others. Even if they try to do so, their action is 
cancelled simply by removing their online identity from the chat room or 
bulletin board where the discussion is taking place.
However, while the online public sphere is decentred and allows for 
identity fluidity, information overload and the expertise required to navigate 
through this information overload have led to the emergence of a new type 
of hierarchy, one which is based on the power of knowledge. In other 
words, hierarchy and elites in cyberspace are not eliminated, but 
reinvented. Nevertheless, as we have already discussed in previous 
paragraphs, online elites are ephemeral, as the element that gives them 
their status in the first place (access; knowledge; power to control the 
online content or software) sooner or later becomes available to the 
majority of users and/or is surpassed by the technology of the medium 
itself.
It is also important to note here that lack of hierarchy does not 
mean absence of a sense of community or of a collective imagination in 
cyberspace. Communities are abstract constructs that depend on the 
subjective and emotional loyalties of the community members (Day and 
Schuler 2004a: 11). Community-building is based on creating effective 
communication linkages, which in turn lead to a common sense of purpose 
and solidarity (White 1999: 29). In that sense the Internet can enable a 
sense of community in cyberspace not thanks to the technology itself or 
the access to information, but thanks to “the interactions and exchanges 
between people that it facilitates” (Day and Schuler 2004b: 218).
This possibility of an anti-hierarchical, all-inclusive online 
community, a core characteristic of which is the facilitation of 
communication among its members, is very similar to the Habermasian 
model of the public sphere and is at the heart of this project’s argument 
regarding the role of the Internet in the EU’s public communication
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strategy and the emerging European public sphere. Exactly how likely is 
such an online community to emerge and why is this relevant to the case 
of the European public sphere? These questions are addressed in the 
following two sections. 
2.2 The democratising potential of the Internet
Besides the ephemeral nature of the elites in cyberspace, another 
important point that emerges from the previous paragraphs is that 
cyberspace does not exist in a social and political vacuum. Online elites 
are very much defined by their offline demographic profile as well as the 
political and economic agendas of the (offline) societies within which they 
operate. Technologies are created and diffused within societies and there 
is a constant interaction between online and offline life. If we examine 
more closely the claims that the Internet facilitates an all-inclusive, anti-
hierarchical public sphere, is there enough evidence to confirm these? And 
what would be the role of such a public sphere in reinvigorating and/or 
further establishing democratic procedures in offline societies?
Looking at recent theories and empirical studies, it appears that 
scholars are divided on these issues. On the one hand, there are those 
scholars who find that although offline elites are very much willing to 
support the commercial and entertainment aspects of cyberspace, they 
are not as eager to support its political aspect, since the latter could put 
their interests and power at risk. For Tsagarousianou
“often behind the rhetoric of electronic democracy, what is initiated is 
a very particular version of publicness, arranged around ordered 
forms of dissemination of information in which official channels 
decide on the definition of the problem and the content of the 
message and thus strongly influence the direction of the outcome” 
(Tsagarousianou 1999: 202-203)21.
This is not promising as far as the fulfilment of the Habermasian 
model of an all-inclusive, democratic public sphere is concerned. In fact, it 
is more relevant to Habermas’s criticism of the bourgeois public sphere, 
which during its decline transformed into a public sphere of publicity 
(Habermas 1989).
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Similarly, “cyber-pessimists” (Norris 2001) are keen to point out that 
the participation that message-boards and online debates facilitate has
few if any tangible outcomes and, therefore, participation is illusory 
(Putnam 2000, quoted in Hibberd, McNair, Schlesinger 2003: 97). 
According to Norris, the Internet has so far failed to increase access to the 
policy-making elites or facilitate public participation in the decision-making 
process (Norris 2001: 113-114), whilst for Hill and Hughes “the Net makes 
up a tool, a resource for those who are politically committed but it does not 
generally draw in important crowds of new citizens towards the public 
space” (Hill and Hughes 1998: 177).
An online survey conducted for Channel 4 News in Britain confirms
the Cyber-Pessimists view (Hibberd, McNair, Schlesinger 2003). The 
survey showed that the majority of respondents were active participants in 
the democratic process in offline life as well, which confirms what many 
analysts have already pointed out- that online political surveys tend to 
attract those already most committed to the democratic process. The 
conclusion of the survey will have left many of the Cyber-Pessimists 
feeling vindicated, as it expressed “considerable doubt about the 
usefulness of the web for communication between politicians and the 
general public” (ibid.: 104).
Another study, of the Association for the Taxation of Financial 
Transactions for the aid of citizens (ATTAC), an online initiative, which 
started in France in June 1998, with the aim to help citizens understand 
tax issues, also provides rather pessimistic data regarding the online 
public sphere (le Grignou and Patou 2003). ATTAC’s influence quickly 
spread through French political life to other countries and there are now 35 
separate movements around the world, in Europe, Brazil, Japan, Quebec 
and Senegal. ATTAC’s aim is to
“produce and diffuse information to work together, like the 18th
century public sphere actors, to shed light on the secrecy of the 
decisions taken by international organisations and to fight against 
the opacity of many public policies” and
to promote education “so as to regain control altogether over the future of 
our world” like the 19th century pedagogics’ project (ibid.: 164-166). The 
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movement’s aim is to produce counter-expertise and counter-experts (le 
Grignou and Patou 2003).
However, despite the optimistic declarations of ATTAC’s founders, 
and despite ATTAC’s members comprising a mix of individuals and 
corporate bodies, of actors from the intellectual and cultural fields and 
members of the trade unions and associations, Le Grignou and Patou 
found that the use of the Internet by the Association actually highlights the 
strain between two contradictory goals: “The democratic aim of a social 
movement that seeks to spread knowledge as widely as possible and the 
unavoidably restrictive feature of expertise“ (ibid.: 168). Trautmann finds 
that the Internet failed to raise the level of democracy within the 
association despite the notions of increased representation associated 
with it (Trautmann 2001, quoted in le Grignou and Patou 2003: 168). Le 
Grignou and Patou (2003: 178) also support this view, as their study
indicates that within ATTAC, the electronic tools are used both for the 
democratic promotion of expert actors and the selection of actors, thus 
maintaining and even enlarging the gap between “expert” and “non-expert” 
contributors. In other words, what started as a movement which would use 
the Internet to make expert knowledge available to the public and to 
encourage people to be active and defend their interests from international 
corporations, has evolved in a movement which, as a result of the ever-
growing amount of expert information available to its members and the 
number of specialised debates carried out simultaneously, actually 
encourages “expertise” public debates, where the least informed take a 
more passive stance, and leave the debate to the “experts”.
For Venkatesh, Nosovitch and Miner, lack of knowledge can 
eventually become a barrier to participation, even if the necessary 
infrastructure is made available to everyone, and as a result a gap may 
form between the resource/knowledge-rich and the resource/knowledge-
poor (Venkatesh, Nosovitch, Miner 2004: 193-194). That coincides with 
the view expressed by many analysts, that what we are witnessing in 
cyberspace, is the emergence of a new elite, one that bases its power on 
knowledge, rather than money or military force.
However, Rheingold offers a different, more positive outlook on the 
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democratizing potential of the Internet. He argues that the Internet can be 
used to promote democracy, and thus political dissent, because the 
Internet, and computer-mediated communication (CMC), has the “capacity 
to challenge the existing political hierarchy’s monopoly on powerful 
communications media, and perhaps thus revitalise citizen-based 
democracy” (Rheingold 1994: 14).
Rheingold is not alone in his view of the Internet as a tool that can 
revitalise grass-roots democracy. Among the advocates of the Internet’s 
potential to strengthen participation and invigorate democracy is Coleman, 
who warns that if a crisis of democratic legitimacy and accountability is to 
be averted, new relationships between citizens and institutions of 
governance must emerge (Coleman and Gøtze 2001: 3). For “cyber-
optimists” (Norris 2001), such as Dick Morris, the Internet offers precisely 
this- a new forum where such relationships can be established, particularly 
within the websites which encourage public debate of political issues 
(Hibberd, McNair, Schlesinger 2003: 96). For Wertheim (1999: 299) the 
Internet is a “relational” technology, an attribute which Smith considers 
important when trying to improve participation in public life, since close 
relationships are the best source of political information, and participation 
in public life depends on the amount and quality of political information 
available to the citizens (Smith 2004: 178). Of course, one could argue 
that close relationships may be indeed a great source of information, but 
that does not guarantee either the quality of the information circulated or 
that the information circulated is of a political nature.
Cyber-optimists base their positive view of the Internet as a tool that 
can encourage citizens’ participation in democratic processes on the 
notion that the Internet’s main characteristics, i.e. interactivity; relative 
cost-effective access; communication dissociated from such constraints as 
time and space; and inclusiveness, can benefit the political process 
immensely, when applied to civic engagement. By transcending time, 
online debates allow time for reflection and the development of arguments. 
By transcending place, participation in political debates becomes 
independent of geographical constraints, whilst the interactive nature of 
the Internet chat rooms can facilitate contacts between groups and 
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politicians and citizens (Coleman and Gøtze 2001: 44)22. Arquilla and 
Rondfeldt take the democratising potential of the Internet even further, by 
suggesting that a new type of politics is emerging in cyberspace:
“’Noopolitik’ […] emphasises the role of informational soft power in 
expressing ideas, values, norms and ethics through all manner of 
media […] and makes sense because knowledge is fast becoming an 
even stronger source of power and strategy, in ways that classic 
realpolitik and internationalism cannot absorb” (Arquilla and 
Rondfeldt 1999: 9)23.
Although both cyber-optimists and cyber-pessimists present valid 
arguments in support of their view regarding the democratising potential of 
the Internet, the fact is that the empirical evidence has so far been 
inconclusive. There is indeed a gap between the cyber-optimistic theories 
which heralded the coming of a new era in politics and communication 
upon the Internet’s arrival, and today’s online reality, regarding which all 
data suggests that it is mainly Western, male and young users who are 
benefiting from this new medium so far. Nevertheless, there is also 
evidence that this gap between theory and reality online is closing more 
quickly than anticipated and the fact remains that the Internet does offer 
the possibility of an all-inclusive, democratic public sphere24.
In this respect, the Habermasian concept of the public sphere 
remains relevant: As discussed in Chapter 1, there are four elements in 
the Habermasian concept: democratic principles; openness; all-
inclusiveness; no participants have an advantage over the others. The 
Internet offers the possibility to fulfil all of the criteria of such a public 
sphere. Even if one accepts that the Internet is a communication medium 
for the elites, an analogy can be drawn between the bourgeois public 
sphere of the late 18th century, the participants of which used to gather in 
their clubs and cafés to discuss current matters, and the fragmented online 
public fora of today (Dahlgren quoted in le Grignou and Patou 2003: 178). 
In both cases we have an elite group, which forms a dynamic and 
politically influential public space through public debate facilitated by a new 
and thriving form of media: The press/printed material in the case of the 
bourgeois public sphere, the Internet in the case of the online public 
sphere (ibid.).
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Having established that the Internet offers the opportunity of a 
democratising, all-inclusive public sphere, even in the case that this public 
sphere is initially an elite one, the next section examines the possible ways 
in which the Internet could be deployed in the democratisation of the EU.
2.3 The Internet as a tool of democratisation of the EU
Given the nature of the European public sphere (interconnected 
national public spheres, multilingual community and geographical distance 
between members of the public) it is the contention of this thesis that the 
Internet can be deployed towards the formation of a democratic, strong 
European public sphere. As discussed earlier, the identity-fluidity and 
antihierarchical nature of the Internet allows for the publics of an online 
public sphere to be “less visible and less bound to physical locations and 
thus more deterritorialized” (Yang 2002) than in offline public spheres. In 
that sense, the Internet is the ideal space within which the multiple national 
publics of the EU could surpass their ethno-cultural/regional boundaries 
sufficiently to achieve the level of Europeanisation required before one can 
talk about a European public sphere, without at the same time losing their 
national identities. 
Engström suggests that information and communication 
technologies are already influencing European politics in the sense that 
more information on decision making-processes is now available to the 
citizens, and political debates are now more accessible to the general 
public thanks to the media (TV and the Internet in particular) (Engström 
2002). Therefore, the Internet poses an opportunity for deliberative 
democracy and broader citizens’ participation in decision-making at a 
European level (Engström 2002; Leonard and Arbuthnott 2002).
More specifically, and in relation to the nature of the Internet and 
the specific elements of the European democratic deficit as these were 
described in Chapter 1, the Internet can be used to target the participation 
deficit currently undermining EU’s democratic legitimacy. Leonard and 
Arbuthnott (2002) relate participation to e-democracy and identify three 
dimensions of the latter:
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a)Discussions about the private sphere (Internet polling, e-voting and 
other methods of collecting data online can develop new channels through 
which the public can express its preferences).
b)E-governance (new technologies can help government communicate 
better with its public through transparency, availability of documents and 
interfaces for interaction).
c)Governmental sphere (technology helps branches of government work 
together to deliver goals).
Applied to the case of the EU, the above dimensions of e-
democracy can help overcome the main obstacles towards 
democratisation of the European public sphere. The Internet can allow for 
debates to flourish across national borders (thus eliminating the issue of 
geographical distance). Transnational debates regarding European issues 
can develop through cross-national e-polling; through exchange of best 
practice within and outside government; and through enhancing the ability 
of government and parties to develop constituencies outside national 
borders (Leonard and Arbuthnott 2002).
Weiler proposes the creation of “Lexcalibur-The European Public 
Square”, which would allow for the entire decision-making process of the
EU, including the comitology process, to be placed online in order to 
enhance “the potential of all actors to play a much more informed, critical 
and involved role in the primary Public Square”, i.e. in the off-line public 
sphere (Weiler 1999: 351-352). For Weiler, the Internet is to play a key 
role in the emergence of a “functioning, deliberative, political community” 
within the EU (ibid.: 352). This is the prerequisite for the emergence of a 
European “polity-cum-civic society” (ibid.), which in turn is necessary if the 
democratisation of the EU is to succeed.
Engström refers to empirical evidence taken from European nation-
states, where the Internet is being used in all of the above ways, in order 
to improve citizen participation and public debate (Engström 2002)25. 
However, he points out that the Internet poses threats to deliberative 
democracy as well and that there needs to be a distinction between direct 
democracy (public opinion) and online public engagement in policy 
formation (ibid.).
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Blumler and Coleman also find that the Internet’s key 
characteristics (i.e. transcending time and place; enabling networking and 
participation; overriding hierarchy) are also the very benefits of online civic 
engagement and can enhance online deliberation (Blumler and Coleman 
2001). However, they warn that the benefits of online civic engagement 
need to be carefully measured against the potential risks (ibid.). As an 
example, they point out that the public dialogue can be used by the 
state/government under false pretences, to create an illusion of democracy 
(ibid.).
Thus far, this and the previous chapter have examined the 
Habermasian concept of the public sphere; the concept of public 
communication; the Internet as a tool of public communication and a 
facilitator of a Habermasian public sphere; and the relation of these three 
concepts with the EU public sphere in particular. The main points that 
emerged from the discussion of these issues can now be summarised in
the following figure.
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Figure 2.1: Key components of the theoretical concept regarding the EU public 
sphere, Source: The author.
Despite the problems and risks, and without implying that the 
Internet can actually become an all-encompassing solution for the 
democratic deficit in the EU, it has become clear that the Internet offers 
significant possibilities for improving the lack of democratic legitimisation 
and public participation in the EU’s decision-making. This theoretical 
assumption is already supported by some empirical evidence which shows 
that EU officials and members of the European Parliament are already 
turning to what the Internet offers (Engström 2002; Eriksen and Fossum 
2000). This analysis aims to investigate the issue further and produce a 
more detailed account of how the Internet is deployed by the EU’s public 
communication strategy. The following final section of this chapter outlines 
exactly what the issues under investigation are and how they will be 
examined in this thesis.
The European
public sphere
The Internet:
§ Transcends 
time and place;
§ Enables 
networking and 
participation;
§ Overrides 
hierarchy
Democratic 
deficit:
§ Participation;
§ Policies 
meeting public’s 
priorities;
§ Accountability
EU Public communication: Aims
§ To increase people’s familiarity with 
the EU;
§ To promote accountability of EU 
institutions;
§ To engage people in the debate of EU 
affairs.
The Habermasian normative model:
§ Potentially everyone has access to 
and no one enters into discourse with 
an advantage over another (who);
§ The public sphere is a realm in 
which individuals gather to participate 
in open discussions (how);
§ Has the potential to be a foundation 
for a critique of a society based on 
democratic principles (what).
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2.4 EU public communication and the Internet
As discussed in Chapter 1, the EU public communication is bi-
dimensional: Not only does the EU need to communicate its ideals and 
positions to extra-EU peoples but it also needs to communicate its 
decisions and ideals to the EU audiences, winning over euro-sceptics and 
establishing the EU public’s trust in the EU institutions. Of course, 
promoting shared European values to the EU public requires coordination 
and promotion on an EU level (Riordan 2003: 128). Furthermore, the role 
of the EU’s public communication with regard to both external and intra-EU 
audiences has already been defined in Chapter 1 as aiming to:
a) Increase people’s familiarity with the EU;
b)Increase people’s appreciation of what the EU does; and
c)Engage people with the EU/ in the debate of EU affairs.
In addition to these, with regard to the intra-EU public, we have 
already seen that citizens’ participation in the public dialogue regarding 
EU issues and in the decision-making process on EU level is considered 
as key factor in addressing the EU’s democratic deficit26. Another key 
factor is the accountability of the EU institutions27 while Leonard and 
Arbuthnott also identify the matching of EU policies to public priorities
as another key area where the democratic deficit of the EU is clearly 
demonstrated (Leonard and Arbuthnott 2002).
We have also seen in the present chapter how the Internet could 
help address the EU’s democratic deficit, with regard to participation, 
accountability and matching EU policies to the public’s priorities
through online debate, actively encouraged by the EU institutions, and e-
governance, which will increase transparency of the policy-making 
process and enable a feedback process and participation of the EU 
citizens in the decision-making process through e-polling and e-voting.
If these aims (the “how” parameter of the public sphere) are to be 
achieved through the EU public communication strategy, the following 
actions are required28: 
a)Promoting interaction within the public sphere.
b)Moving beyond propaganda: It is necessary to understand the target 
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audience/ Proving relevance to target audience.
c)Moving beyond intellectual forms of communication.
What is the role of the Internet in the above issues? Are the above 
aims of the EU’s public communication met online? If so, is there any 
evidence that the EU’s online public communication is successfully 
contributing to the emerging European public sphere?
These questions are addressed in this thesis on four levels, namely
e)Policy-making level of the EU’s online public communication strategy;
f) Policy-implementation;
g)Policy impact on key EU audiences; and
h)Interviews with key Commission communication officials.
In terms of policy-making (a), the present research project 
investigates the extent to which the EU is aware of the issues regarding 
the EU’s democratic deficit, the European public sphere and the potential 
role of the Internet in addressing these issues on EU level. For this 
purpose, the main official documents regarding the EU’s Information and 
Communication strategy are critically reviewed, in Chapter 3, in order to 
determine how the above issues are addressed on policy-making level and 
identify any further aims that the EU has set for its online Information and 
Communication strategy.
Following that, the ways in which these official policies are put into 
practice online (policy-implementation-b) are investigated in Chapter 4, 
through the analysis of three official EU websites. The aim is to juxtapose 
the messages and interaction opportunities provided on these three 
websites with the goals set out in the EU Information and Communication 
strategy documents, but also to evaluate how close this policy-
implementation is to the normative role of the EU’s public communication 
online, as this has been outlined in the present and previous chapter.
Finally, Chapter 5 investigates the impact that the online EU 
Information and Communication strategy has on key online audiences (c), 
through a qualitative EU websites’ online user survey.
Interviews with senior EU officials in key policy-making and policy-
implementation positions (d) are used on every stage of the EU’s online 
public communication analysis, in order to put the findings of the policy-
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making and policy-implementation evaluation into the wider context of the 
institutional culture, within which the EU’s public communication strategy is 
formulated and implemented.
  
Notes
1 Chapter 1, Part 1.3.
2 See, for example, Risse and van de Steeg 2003; Koopmans and Pfetsch 2003; Trenz 
2000; Koopmans, Statham, Kriesi, Della Porta, de Beus, Guiraudon, Medrano, Pfetsch 
2004; Kantner 2002; Rauer, Rivet, van de Steeg 2002; De Vreese 2003a; Semetko, De 
Vreese, Peter 2000; Trenz 2004; Schlesinger 1999.
3 As Pfetsch points out, a lot of these studies fail to assess whether the presence or 
absence of Europeanisation in a national public sphere is the result of the media’s own 
position or of the communication strategies of other political actors (Pfetsch 2004: 3).
4 It is important here to emphasise that the Internet is only part of what we call 
“cyberspace”. This includes not only the Internet but also “the informational space of flows 
and also a number of other computer networks that may not be connected to the Internet 
and contains resources that are not part of the space of flows” (Jordan 2000: 170).
5According to the data available in 2000, 88% of the Internet users came from the 
industrialized countries (which have just 15% of the world’s population), while as an 
overall only 2.4% of the world’s population had access to the Internet (Castells 2000: 
375). In 2003, of all the Internet users, 68% are situated in the USA, the UK, Germany, 
Italy, Japan, Korea, China and Mexico (Chen and Wellman 2003). Age, gender, race, 
education level and economic status were also major factors that affected the inequality in 
the Internet access: 30% of all the Internet users had a University degree, while this 
percentage tended to increase in certain countries, such as Russia, Mexico and China. In 
the USA men accessed the Internet more than women by three percentage points while 
in China only 7% of the Internet users were women (Castells 2000: 377). When it came to 
financial status, high-income households were 20 times more likely to have the Internet 
access than those of lower levels of income (USA) (ibid.: 377). For women, in particular, 
and their relation to the Internet see Greenspan 2003a, Poster 1995a, Tsaliki 2000, 
Tsaliki 1998.
6 For example, the gap between men and women accessing the Internet is rapidly 
closing, not only in the so-called developed countries but also in less developed ones: In 
2003 in the US, women were responsible for 51.4% of all Internet traffic (as opposed to 
48.6% of men), while in Sweden, the UK, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Spain and France 
women represented 40-47% of the Internet users in these countries (Greenspan 2003a). 
More remarkable is the case of China, where in 2003 41% of the Internet users were 
women (Chen and Wellman 2003) compared to only 7% four years before (Castells 
2000).
7 According to some of the most recent statistics available, in China 28% of the Internet 
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users are lower-income students accessing the Internet from university computer labs 
(Chen and Wellman 2003). In Korea, higher-education Internet users are 40% more than 
Internet users with a high-school diploma (ibid.).
8 While the average American, for example, can buy a computer with a month’s salary, 
the average Bangladeshi would need 8 years of salaries to buy the same computer 
(Lucas and Sylla 2003). One prediction that has been made is that, although now there is 
a big gap in contemporary societies between the haves and the have-nots, as far as the 
access to the new communications’ technologies is concerned, this gap will eventually 
disappear completely (Jordan 2000). This prediction is based on Moore’s Law, according 
to which the processing power of the computers will double approximately every eighteen 
months and the prices of the computers will follow the opposite route; that is they will be 
reduced in half every eighteen months (ibid.). However, the evidence regarding Internet 
access worldwide indicates that this prediction is mainly realised in the developing world.
9 For more information on the digital divide and how the Internet is being used even in 
deprived and remote areas of the planet see the Digital Divide Network (Benton 
Foundation 2004).
10There are several women’s organisations fighting for women’s rights in Afghanistan. 
The Internet has definitely facilitated their work and had allowed them to reach a broader 
audience and create a wider and stronger lobbying network. See Revolutionary 
Association of the Women of Afghanistan (2006) and Canadian Women for Women in 
Afghanistan (2006) to name just two organisations.
11However, Day accepts that “the organisational cultures and practices of sponsoring 
organisations and funding agencies can have a detrimental effect on and stifle active 
community involvement” (Day and Harris 1997, quoted in Day and Schuler 2004a: 11).
12Napster was the first widely-used peer-to-peer (P2P) music sharing service. After the 
music industry's accusations of copyright violation, Napster was ceased to operate by 
court order. Napster's brand and logo continue to be used by a pay service, after they 
were acquired by Roxio, a division and brand of the California-based digital media 
company Sonic Solutions (Wikipedia.org 2006e). Nevertheless, the original Napster 
service paved the way for the third-generation decentralized P2P file-sharing programs 
such as Kazaa (Sharman Networks 2006), Limewire (Gnutella network 2006) and eMule 
(eMule project 2006). For more information see Wikipedia.org 2006e.
13 For example, although it is illegal to use file sharing protocols in the US, where the 
Recording Industry Association of America initiated and eventually won the legal battle 
against file-sharing systems, in Canada the courts have ruled in favour of file sharing. For 
more information on file sharing and the technical and legal issues surrounding it see 
Wikipedia.org 2006f.
14The difference between software corporations and organisations/individuals who 
develop software programmes/applications for non-profit purposes and hackers is that 
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hackers develop software programmes/applications to bypass the restrictions of the 
applications/software programmes developed by the corporations. Hackers, therefore, do 
not play an important role in shaping the online environment. Rather, they develop ways 
to make online environment less restrictive for the individual user (Jones 1998; Jordan 
2000).
15According to Jordan (2000) it is not the powerful and up-to-date processors that allow 
people to gain power in cyberspace but the knowledge of how to make the most out of 
the available software and the Internet.
16 Although the US, China and other countries have established strict regulations and 
harsh sentences for hackers, hackers’ websites are still easily accessed online, under 
different domain names. A lot of hackers’ websites have German URLs. The English 
websites are less easy to find, and they tend to have a lot of hacking information 
encoded. However, it is still fairly easy for an average Internet user to obtain information 
from hackers’ websites, by running a simple search on Google or another search engine.
17 Another point that has concerned analysts and serves as the basis for the argument of 
the “technopower elite” is the impact Information and Communication Technologies 
(ICTs) have had, and continue to have, on social policy development (for an overview of 
the development of ICTs and how they were incorporated in the agenda of the US and 
the EU, see Day and Schuler 2004a: 7-8). For Sclove, technology experts have been able 
to influence social policy development “unchallenged by public scrutiny, in a way that 
would be unacceptable in other aspects of the public arena” (Sclove 1995, quoted in Day 
and Schuler 2004a: 9). The development of ICT’s and their consequent influence on the 
shaping of network society developments has taken place without the engagement or 
participation of civil society and this has lead to an unquestioning public acceptance of 
the current techno-economic policies (ibid.). Freeman puts this into context, in relation to 
contemporary socio-technological policy planning and implementation, by reminding us 
that the criteria for the selection and adoption of new technologies in capitalist economies 
are profit driven (Freeman 1994). Similarly, Castells, in his “network of flows” (Castells 
2000: 476), sees technology and information as two of the main sources of power in 
contemporary society, which are also used by “interconnected, global, capitalist networks” 
to organise (global) economic activity. Castells’ “network of flows” is part of the network 
society, and its techno-economic agenda is powerful enough to influence, if not 
determine, the prevalent social processes and functions within the network society 
(“space of flows”) (ibid.). Castells’ view is similar to that of Wellman, who, in the context of 
the social network theory, speaks of “networked individualism”, as opposed to local, 
geographic communities (Wellman and Haythornthwaite 2002: 10). From that point of 
view, the argument of the technopower elite is more valid, although it is more relevant to 
offline life than cyberspace and the Internet.
18 To put it another way, “the physical exists in cyberspace but is reinvented” perhaps in 
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what is called an “avatar”, meaning the online identity someone using cyberspace has 
created (Jordan 2000: 2 and 59).
19 For a thorough analysis of the early-years’ nature of politics on the Internet, see Loader 
1997.
20 John Perry Barlow, together with John Gilmore, Mitch Kapor and Steve Wozniak 
founded the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) in 1990, a donor-funded non-profit 
organisation which aims to protect freedom of speech online and has so far won several 
court cases against big corporations and even the federal US government on freedom of 
speech issues. For example, in May 2006 a California state appeals’ court ruled in favour 
of EFF's petition on behalf of three online journalists who were taken to court by APPLE 
in order to reveal their sources after “leaking” information about new Apple products to 
several online news sites. The court ruled that the online journalists have the same right 
to protect the confidentiality of their sources as offline reporters do. For more information 
on this case and the work of the EFF, see Electronic Frontier Foundation 2006.
21 Tsagarousianou’s view is based on the study of early computer-mediated 
communication (CMC) adopted by several cities in Europe and the USA, in an attempt to 
face the problem of political participation of their citizens. However, in those early days, 
evidence showed that in each of these initiatives the definition of the meaning and scope 
of electronic democracy was different, depending on whether the project was centrally 
designed by the local authorities (Berlin, Amsterdam) or more spontaneous, civil society-
led (Neighbourhoods On Line) or even created in a virtual social and political vacuum 
(Network Pericles) (Tsagarousianou, Tambini, Bryan 1998). In the end, what was really 
improved was the access to information (e.g. the civic network in Bologna) (ibid.). There 
was no evidence to suggest, however, that citizens became more engaged into the 
decision-making process, or that the outcome of any public debates had a direct or 
indirect impact on policies and governance.
22 Of course, the Internet is not likely to replace other off-line fora of public debate, such 
as those provided by TV and radio. In fact, short- to medium-term electronic participation 
in public debates actually complements rather than substitutes conventional 
broadcasting, as most broadcasters are actively promoting online political debate and 
discussion as supplements to their broadcasts (Hibberd, McNair, Schlesinger 2003). In 
Britain, for example, all of the main TV channels (BBC, ITV1, C4, Channel 5) maintain 
websites with a wide range of information related to the programmes they broadcast. 
Furthermore, viewers are often asked to give their opinion on certain political issues by 
logging on to the channels’ websites and voting or by emailing the programme’s
producers directly. Online chats with political analysts or reporters who have just 
presented a piece of political investigative journalism are often available after the end of a 
programme and viewers are always reminded and encouraged to go on online and share 
any views and/or questions that may have arisen from the issues presented. Similarly, all 
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the main radio stations (BBC, Radio 1, Virgin) have websites, which often facilitate real-
time interaction with the producer/s who is/are on air, and listeners are regularly 
encouraged to go online, vote on “hot” political issues and/or email the producers with 
their thoughts.
23 Arquilla and Rondfeldt’s term “noopolitik” stems from the Greek work “nous”, which 
means “the mind” or “the thought”. Their hypothesis is based on the idea that we are 
witnessing the emergence of a new social/political sphere (“noosphere”), one that “will 
raise mankind to a high, new evolutionary plane, one driven by a collective devotion to 
moral and juridical principles” (Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, 1925 quoted in Arquilla, 
Rondfeldt: 5).
24 See also Freedman 2000, for extensive empirical data of the democratising influence of 
the Internet through several case studies.
25 See also Tsagarousianou 1999 and Tsagarousianou, Tambini, Bryan 1998.
26 See Chapter 1, Section 1.2.1.
27 See Chapter 1, Section 1.2.1.
28 See Chapter 1, Part 1.3.
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Chapter 3- EU public communication: The policy
Has the EU’s public communication strategy taken into account the 
debate regarding the EU’s democratic deficit and the debate concerning 
the European public sphere? Is there any evidence that on a policy-
making level, the EU’s public communication strategy has been formulated 
in order to fulfil the criteria of successful public communication identified in 
the Chapter 11? What role has been reserved for the Internet in this public 
communication strategy? How close is this strategy to the theoretical 
model established in Chapters 1 and 2?
This chapter aims to answer the above questions by means of a 
critical review of the official Information and Communication strategy of the 
EU, as this emerges from Commission documents on the issue during the 
period 2000-2006 (Parts 3.1 and 3.2). The review of these documents is 
supplemented, where necessary, with interview material gathered during 
interviews with policy-making and policy-implementation EU officials, 
conducted over a period of approximately two years (October 2004- June 
2006)2. The main points of the documents regarding the official EU public 
communication strategy are juxtaposed with the key theoretical issues 
already identified in Chapters 1 and 2, regarding the European public 
sphere, the EU democratic deficit and the role of the EU public 
communication in these. In the final part of this chapter (Part 3.3), the 
theoretical model formulated in Chapter 23 is updated in order to reflect the 
key points of the official EU public communication policy.
As the European Union’s guardian of the Treaties, responsible for 
planning and implementing common policies and the sole institution with 
the right to initiate EU legislation, it is the European Commission that 
proposes and, with the approval of the European Parliament and the 
Council of the EU, implements the EU’s Information and Communication 
strategy (EUROPA 2006b; EUROPA 2006c; EUROPA 2006f). 
Consequently, the documents reviewed in this chapter have all been 
produced by the European Commission, although related documentation 
produced by the European Parliament, the Council, the Committee of the 
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Regions and the Economic and Social Committee was also consulted and 
references to these documents are provided where necessary.
The overview of official documents starts in 2001, when the first, 
lengthy, jargon-loaded Commission communication paper on the EU’s 
Information and Communication strategy was published, and ends with the 
White Paper on a European Communication Policy, published in February 
2006 and produced under the supervision of Vice-President Margot 
Wallström, the first Commissioner to be solely responsible for the EU’s 
Information and Communication Strategy.
Part 3.1 focuses on the documents from the period 2000-2004 and 
Part 3.2 on the documents from the period 2004- to date. This distinction 
was deemed necessary as significant differences occurred in the content, 
presentation and style of the documents after the appointment of Margot 
Wallström as Commissioner for the Communication of the EU in 2004.
All documents are reviewed with reference to the wider political 
context of the time of their publication, in the sections entitled “Historical 
overview: 2000-2004”4 and “Historical overview: 2004-2006”5. Following 
that, the documents are examined within the wider context of the theories 
regarding the EU’s democratic deficit and the discussion regarding the 
existence and characteristics of the European public sphere (Component 
A6), which were discussed in Chapter 1. The aim is to establish whether 
the EU, on a decision-making level, is aware of these theoretical 
discussions and whether it intends to address the issues that arise from 
these discussions (i.e. the EU’s democratic deficit, lack of accountability, 
openness and participation).The second aim (Component B7) when 
examining the documents is to identify the key points on which the 
Commission has chosen to base the Information and Communication 
strategy for the EU and compare these with the theoretical definition of 
public communication seen in Chapter 1. On a third level (Component 
C8), the aim of this policy review is to investigate what the role of the 
Internet within the EU public communication is, and if it is seen as a tool 
for encouraging the emerging European public sphere and for addressing 
the issues of participation, openness and accountability, as discussed in 
Chapter 2. The main points of the documents from each period are 
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summarised in Sections 3.1.5 and 3.2.5.
3.1 2000-2004: The “Pre-Wallström” era 
The documents examined from this period are the following:
a)Communication from the Commission to the Council, European 
Parliament, Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the 
Regions on A New Framework for Co-operation on Activities Concerning 
the Information and Communication Policy of the European Union 
(COM(2001)354, final).
b)European Governance- A White Paper (COM(2001)428, final).
c)Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European 
Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the 
Regions on an Information and Communication Strategy for the European 
Union (COM(2002)350, final/2).
d)Report from the Commission on European Governance 
(COM(2002)705, final).
e)Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European 
Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions on Implementing the Information and 
Communication Strategy for the European Union (COM(2004)196, final).
3.1.1 Historical overview: 2000-2004
In 2001 two documents were published, which were directly or 
indirectly relevant to the EU’s public communication strategy: A 
Commission Communication paper on an Information and 
Communication policy for the EU and a White paper on European 
Governance. These were the first documents of their kind and it is 
important here to consider why these documents were published at that 
specific point in time, in order to understand the reasons that spearheaded 
the Commission into action with regard to the Information and 
Communication policy for the EU9.
Two years before the publication of these two documents, in 1999, 
the Amsterdam Treaty (European Union 1997) had come into force, which, 
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amending the previous Treaty on European Union [Maastricht Treaty 
(European Union 1992)], put a greater emphasis on citizenship and the 
rights of individuals; increased the powers of the European Parliament; 
introduced a new title on employment; established a Community area of 
freedom, security and justice; set the beginnings of a common foreign and 
security policy (CFSP); and laid the reform of the institutions in the run-up 
to enlargement. However, that same year the entire body of the 
Commissioners of the European Communities, under the presidency of 
Jacques Santer, was forced to resign in early 1999 amidst allegations of 
corruption (EUROPA 2006h).
The Prodi Commission that took over in September 1999 (ibid.), 
after the brief interim Marin Commission (ibid.), was faced with an 
extended agenda: Not only were the aims of the Amsterdam Treaty still to 
be fully met but the trust of the public towards the EU institutions also 
needed to be restored. Furthermore, the Commission, and the other EU 
institutions, needed to start preparing for the largest EU enlargement in the 
Union’s history, while the transition from the Euro-zone member-states’ 
national currencies to the Euro was imminent. Aware of all these issues, 
the Prodi Commission included the reform of European governance and 
the establishment of the EU’s voice in the world amongst its strategic 
priorities (COM(2000)154, final). However, two negative referenda, one 
held in Denmark in September 2000 with regard to that member-state 
joining the Euro-zone, and one held in Ireland in May 2001 with regard to 
the ratification of the Nice Treaty (EUROPA 2006h)10, made it clear that 
the Commission was also failing to reach its own peoples.
By that time, the need for reform in EU governance and public 
communication had clearly, if not with a sense of urgency, been 
recognised by the Commission, which had been receiving requests for 
reform of the EU’s information and communication policy by the Council 
and the Parliament since 1998 (Council of the European Union 1999; 
European Parliament 1998)11. In both the 2001 documents the 
Commission recognised that the information and communication policy 
that had been followed up until then had not been effective (Commission 
of the European Communities 2001a: 4) and that it was this 
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ineffectiveness that spurred the institution into action (COM(2001)354, 
final: 3; COM(2001)428, final: 3).
In 2002 the Commission published its second Communication on 
an Information and Communication Strategy for the European Union
(COM(2002)350, final/2) and the Report on European Governance
(COM(2002)705, final), a document presenting the results of the public 
consultation the Commission initiated in 2001 on its White Paper on 
European Governance. The same year saw the introduction of the Euro 
currency in twelve of the EU member-states12 as well as the beginning of 
the proceedings of the Convention for the Future of Europe (European 
Convention 2003), which would later (in 2003) result in the draft 
Constitutional Treaty of the European Union.
The need for an effective public communication strategy was now 
even more pressing and these events clearly affected the aims of the EU 
public communication strategy as these appear in the 2002 documents 
examined here. However, there is no explicit reference to any political or 
economic developments on EU level in either of these documents: The 
2002 Communication is presented by the Commission as merely the 
development of the inter-institutional dialogue that ensued after the 2001 
Communication on an Information and Communication policy proposal13. 
Similarly, the Report on European Governance focuses solely on the 
results of the public consultation on the Commission’s White Paper, 
without further reference to the reality of the Euro zone or the European 
Convention works on the Constitutional Treaty14.
With the Treaty of Nice having entered into force in February 2003 
(European Union 2001) and the signing of the Treaty of Accession in 
Athens in April of the same year (European Union 2003a; European Union 
2003b), the need for a coherent public communication strategy and a 
reformed governance model which would now encompass the publics of 
the ten accession states became even more apparent. Furthermore, the 
negative result of the Swedish referendum on joining the Euro-zone in 
September 2003 (EUROPA 2006h) served as a reminder of the EU 
public’s scepticism towards certain aspects of the Union.
Although there was little activity on behalf of the Commission in that 
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year with reference to the EU’s public communication strategy, the 
relevant issues were discussed in the European Parliament (Béguin, Guy-
Quint, Elmar, Campo, Sacrédeus, Frassoni, Modrow, Martin 2003; 
Wenzel-Perillo 2003), which published a new resolution on the 
Commission’s proposal for cooperation in the information and 
communication strategy (European Parliament 2003). The Committee of 
the Regions also published two further opinions on the Commission’s 2002 
proposal for an EU information and Communication strategy and on the 
Commission’s White Paper on European Governance (Committee of the 
Regions 2003a; Committee of the Regions 2003b). Similarly, the 
Economic and Social Committee gave further feedback on the 
Commission’s proposal for an information and communication policy of the 
EU (European Economic and Social Committee 2003).
Despite the Commission remaining largely “quiet” on the issue of 
the EU’s public communication strategy during 2003, it participated in the 
relevant interinstitutional dialogue and commissioned some qualitative 
research analysis on the aims of the strategy. This becomes apparent in 
its 2004 Communication on implementing the information and 
communication strategy for the European Union (COM(2004)196, 
final), the final document regarding the EU’s public communication 
strategy from the period 2000-2004 to be examined in this part of the 
chapter and the last one concerning the EU’s public communication 
strategy to be produced under the Prodi Commission15. Of course, the 
extent to which all this feedback was taken into consideration by the 
Commission is very difficult to determine, yet, by its own admission, the 
Commission considered the outcome of the interinstitutional dialogue 
fruitful (ibid.: 3) and its 2004 information and communication strategy 
proposal finally moved from abstract suggestions to more practical issues-
the actions and cost required for the strategy’s implementation.
Exactly how does the EU’s public communication strategy emerge 
then, in April 2004, after more than four years of interinstitutional dialogue 
and Commission officials’ deliberation? The following three sections 
examine the EU’s public communication strategy through the three 
components identified earlier in this chapter, i.e. the position of the 
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strategy on the EU’s democratic deficit; the main public communication 
aims of the strategy; and the role of the Internet in this strategy, all three of 
which also reflect the theoretical framework of this research project, as this 
was outlined in Chapters 1 and 2. 
3.1.2 Component A: EU governance and the European public sphere
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, one of the key points common in 
all the documents examined in the period 2001-2004 is that they recognise 
the need for reform in EU governance and are aware that the public is 
suspicious towards the EU institutions and often also misinformed about 
their role and actions.
In its first public communication policy proposal, published in 2001, the 
Commission acknowledged that the EU citizens are isolated from the EU 
Institutions and attributed this largely to the inadequately designed 
Information and Communication strategy the EU had been deploying up to 
that point (COM(2001)354, final: 18). At the same time, the document 
recognized that the EU’s citizens have “increasing and legitimate 
expectations” to have “full and easy” access to all information relevant to 
the EU, from issues on European affairs, to external relations and the 
development of the EU (ibid.: 7). In order for the EU citizens to come 
closer to the EU Institutions, the Communication called for information
that would be “clear, appropriate and in touch with the citizens’ real 
concerns” (ibid.: 4, emphasis added).
The Commission also acknowledged the need for more participation
of the public in the EU governance, an issue which had initially been 
raised by the European Parliament (ibid.: 5). Linguistic, cultural, political or 
institutional barriers in communication needed not just to be addressed but 
overcome, according to this document, if the Information strategy was to 
succeed. At the same time, the Communication recommended that the 
differences between Member States had to be taken into full account, 
boldly stating that a homogeneous “European Public does not exist
today for most purposes” (ibid., emphasis added).
Similarly, the White Paper on European Governance (COM(2001)428,
final)16 recognised that the EU citizens have high expectations from the 
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European Union yet they show increasing distrust towards EU institutions 
and politics (ibid.: 3 and 7). Nevertheless, the Commission does not refer 
to the democratic deficit or the lack of democratic legitimisation which 
many citizens see in the EU.
The White Paper emphasised that the reform of the EU governance 
was one of Commission’s main strategic targets for 2000-2005 
(COM(2000)154, final quoted in COM(2001)428, final: 3) and called for:
a)More coherence in the EU institutions and policies;
b)Opening-up of policy-making process;
c)Accountability and responsibility for all parties involved in policy-
making;
d)Less top-down approach in the Community method (COM(2001)428, 
final: 3, emphasis added).
The White Paper also added participation as one of the main 
“principles of good governance” (ibid.: 10), which should underpin the 
decision-making and policy-implementation of the EU.
Putting the proposals in practice, the Commission submitted the White 
Paper to public consultation, giving the opportunity to the public and EU 
and national institutions to submit their feedback on the issues raised 
either by post or online (ibid.: 9). The results of that consultation were 
presented in a Report, in 2002, a document which is examined later in this 
section.
Further to the points made regarding more participation and better 
involvement, the White Paper underlined the need for the EU to 
communicate more actively with the general public on European issues, 
thus helping to create a sense of belonging amongst the EU citizens and 
to encourage them to participate in what is a definition of the European 
public sphere very close to that of Pfetsch’s and Guidry, Kennedy and 
Zald’s definitions of transnational public spheres (Pfetsch 2004; Guidry, 
Kennedy, Zald 2000) already discussed in Chapter 1: “A transnational 
space where citizens from various countries can discuss what they 
perceive as being important challenges for the European Union” 
(COM(2001)428, final: 11-12).
Finally, the principles of openness, participation, accountability, 
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effectiveness and coherence should be reflected, according to the White 
Paper, on the EU’s foreign policy and its relations with governmental and 
non-governmental stakeholders from other parts of the world. As with the 
other documents examined in this section, the White Paper underlines the 
importance of the EU speaking with a single voice in the international 
arena as well as the importance of leading by example, when it comes to 
democratic principles: “Openness, accountability and participation need to 
be reinforced and practiced extensively first within the EU, if we are to 
convince third countries to adopt similar practices” (ibid.: 26-27).
Following the White Paper on EU Governance, and more than a year 
since the Information and Communication Policy for the European Union 
had been published, the Commission produced a second Communication 
on the EU’s Information and Communication strategy (COM(2002)350, 
final/2). Continuing on its previous proposals, the Commission was now 
aiming to create a public forum for the European debate, thus 
contributing to the resolution of the issues of “good governance” and “the 
democratic challenge” linked with the European Union (COM(2002)350, 
final/2: 4). More specifically, the Information and Communication Strategy 
would aim to “complement the Institutions’ role as interface with the public 
[…] to contribute to an overall dynamic and to ensure consistency” (ibid.: 
5). Although these aims are quite vague, it is made clear already from the 
introduction of this document that the Commission was firmly adhering to 
the aims set out in the Information and Communication Policy, published a 
year and a half earlier.
Furthermore, by aiming to create a public forum for the European 
debate, the Commission appears to be taking into consideration the 
academic debate regarding the need for a European public sphere. 
Nevertheless, the interviews with Commission officials revealed that this 
was probably a coincidence rather than the result of informed opinion. As 
one interviewee put it, referring to the White Paper on EU governance in 
particular, any similarities or seeming references to this academic debate 
were
“a result of a bunch of bureaucrats rewriting again and again the
paper, hoping that they’d get enough reactions and feedback from 
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NGOs, experts, member-states etc”17.
On a different level, this document admits there is a lack of interest on 
behalf of the European public as far as the European Union is concerned 
and also goes on to attribute this lack of interest not only to the public’s 
“disaffection” with politics in general, but also to the “unclear perception 
of the legitimacy of the European Institutions” (COM(2002)350, final/2: 
6, emphasis added)18. The debate regarding the EU’s democratic deficit is 
thus acknowledged but the deficit itself is not accepted here.
The Commission was forced to slightly change its stance on the issue, 
though, after obtaining the feedback from the public consultation on its 
2001 White Paper on European Governance. The results of this 
consultation were published in the Report on European Governance in 
2002 (COM(2002)705, final). Although the Commission’s proposals on the 
principles that should underline the European governance, namely 
openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness and coherence found 
support among the academics and officials who responded to the 
Commission’s consultation, respondents almost unanimously proposed 
that democratic legitimacy and subsidiarity be added in the principles 
of the European governance. Despite the poor response rate19, the 
Commission incorporated most of the feedback in its new proposal. More 
interestingly, the Commission declared in the report that the way the White 
Paper had been received had challenged the Commission to
“take into account the positions of the various players in the further 
development of the European governance, including delaying or 
abandoning actions which do not generate sufficient support” 
(COM(2002)705, final: 4, emphasis added).
Although it is encouraging that the Commission showed a willingness 
to incorporate the feedback it had received into its proposal, this 
declaration is problematic in two ways. Such wording tends to be 
popularistic and could be perceived as an attempt by the Commission to 
flatter the parties involved in policy making. If this declaration is put into 
practice, then there is a danger of the Commission entering a process 
where policies or decisions which are deemed necessary for the progress 
of the EU economy or of the EU as a polity, yet are bound to cause 
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upheaval and reactions of the established institutions and polities which 
form the EU, will be abandoned for fear of displeasing the latter. In any 
case declarations of that sort create a precedent, to which actors may 
refer when asked to contribute to future policies.
The 2002 Report on European Governance (COM(2002)705, final) 
also repeated the importance of communicating the EU’s role in the 
international politics, emphasising the need for the EU to speak more often 
with a single voice (ibid.: 26) and to promote the dialogue with 
governmental and non-governmental actors of third countries (ibid.). The 
report also repeated the Commission’s position that the EU will gain the 
credibility it needs in order to pursue political reform internationally, by 
successfully reforming its internal governance (ibid.: 25).
How is the Information and Communication strategy for the EU 
relevant to the Commission proposals examined above regarding the 
governance of the EU? The following section presents an outline of the 
main principles and aims of the proposed public communication strategy 
for the period 2000-2004.
3.1.3 Component B: EU public communication strategic aims
As seen in the previous section above, all the EU public 
communication strategy proposals of the period 2000-2004 
(COM(2004)196, final; COM(2002)705, final; COM(2002)350, final/2; 
COM(2001)354, final; COM(2001)428, final) acknowledged the fact that 
the public is alienated from the EU institutions and that there needs to be 
more citizens’ participation in the EU policy-making process, as well as 
more transparency and accountability of the EU institutions. These issues 
were identified as the main aims of the reform of the EU governance but 
were also proposed as aims for the Information and Communication 
strategy of the EU, together with the creation and encouragement of a 
public forum for debate on European matters.
More specifically, the 2001 Commission Communication on an 
Information and Communication policy for the EU (COM(2001)354, final), 
in the context of what the Commission characterized as “a genuine 
overhaul of information policy” (ibid.: 3), proposed to:
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a)Develop a proper dialogue with the public;
b)Bridge the gap between the Union and the public;
c)Ensure that people have access to the right information; and
d)Keep messages to the point (ibid., emphasis added).
These aims exactly match the purpose and aims of the EU public 
communication theoretical model, as this was defined in Chapter 220. This 
becomes clearer by the Commission’s proposal that the EU needs to “be 
proactive rather than reactive and create a Europe that is close to people, 
familiar to them and means something to them” (COM(2001)354, final: 
3, emphasis added).
In order to achieve the aims of the Communication, the Commission 
underlined the need for full use of partnerships at all levels, i.e. 
partnerships with Member States21, civil society and NGOs
(COM(2001)354, final: 12), best use of new techniques and technologies 
of communication and the need for providing mechanisms for feedback 
from the citizens. Work with the press was also identified as “a high priority 
in today’s world” and “key to the immediate presentation of new 
information, policies and opinions” (ibid.: 5). The implementation proposal 
concerning the role of the new technologies (i.e. the Internet) is further 
examined in the following section.
What is more important in this section is to look at the public on which
the Commission proposed that the EU’s public communication strategy 
should focus. Although general information was to be aimed at the public 
as a whole, the Commission identified priority audiences such as women 
and youths, who should receive more specialised information, as well as 
EU specialists’ groups, who would require specialized in-depth information 
on some very particular aspects of EU policy (COM(2001)354, final). This 
indicates that a divide between elite and general public already exists on a 
policy-making level, as far as the EU’s public communication strategy is
concerned. Although the need for specialised information aimed at EU 
experts/specialists is understandable, the document does not explain on 
what the concept of priority audiences is based.
Most interestingly, the document suggests that any information 
provided by the EU institutions should be considered within a more 
84
general communication strategy, which should be designed to stimulate an 
informed debate on European matters. The Information and 
Communication policy does not concern only the EU public/ citizens but 
also foreign audiences: According to the Communication, “there is a 
particular role to be played by the DGs responsible for external relations in 
providing information to citizens of third countries including information for 
the general public in applicant states” (ibid.: 15).
The 2002 Information and Communication strategy for the EU 
(COM(2002)350, final/2) moves along the same lines, as far as the aims of 
the strategy are concerned. A “genuine” Information and Communication 
policy is seen as the main tool to fight the public’s ignorance, which is 
considered the main reason for the apathy displayed by the public on 
European matters/ politics (ibid.: 7 and 10). Furthermore, the Commission 
explicitly states that the aim of the Information and Communication 
Strategy should ultimately be to assist in “the development of better 
governance in Europe” (ibid.: 7), which in turn translates in having 
democratic procedures and achieving democratic legitimisation. This view 
was also expressed by the senior Commission officials interviewed in the 
context of this study. According to one senior policy-making official, for 
example,
“the legitimacy of the European Union should be regarded from 
two angles: The subjective and objective perspective. The 
subjective legitimacy stems from the citizens’ perception of the 
EU as being legitimate, while the latter, the objective legitimacy, 
has more to do with the democratic nature of the European 
Project. Looking at the objective legitimacy aspect, it is clear that 
the certain areas could be strengthened in order to render the EU 
more legitimate […] However, strengthening the democratic 
structure of the Union would not necessarily and automatically 
lead to greater subjective, public legitimacy […] One of the 
reasons has to do with information. As long as the European 
citizenry lack information about the Union and its undertakings, it 
will be difficult for them to form a reasoned opinion about the 
Union. This brings us to the deliberative deficit in the Union […] 
The lack of knowledge about the EU and its actions is problematic 
as it hinders free will-formation, vital to any democratic system. In 
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the light of this deliberative deficit, a Communication Strategy of 
the EU should address the very issues which hinder deliberation 
on European issues. The Communication Strategy of the EU 
should, in other words, focus on facilitating free will-formation in 
the Union”22.
In this document, the Commission also reaffirms its intention to focus 
its efforts not only on the effective and efficient informing of the public but 
also on enabling the individuals to participate in the public debate 
(COM(2002)350, final/2). This indicates that the theoretical linkage 
between the EU’s democratic deficit, the European public sphere and the 
role of public communication defined in Chapter 1 is also acknowledged by 
the EU policy-makers themselves, although, as mentioned in the previous 
section, it is likely that this occurred coincidentally rather than through 
established dialogue with the academic community23.
The European public sphere/space thus takes a central place in this 
Information and Communication Strategy proposed by the Commission: 
For the first time, the European public sphere is not only mentioned but the 
Commission also acknowledges that the European Institutions need to be 
actively involved in supporting that public sphere. This is an interesting 
contradiction with the previous documents, according to which a European 
public does not exist (COM(2001)354, final; COM(2001)428, final). Apart 
from stating the obvious [that in order to exist, “the European public sphere 
needs temporal, spatial and ideological points of reference and active 
public involvement” (COM(2002)350, final/2: 8), in this 2002 
Communication, the Commission also identifies specific areas of action 
that will strengthen the European public sphere: developing all forms of 
representation at European level; and building on all forms of cooperation, 
including journalists, media and national representations (ibid.).
As far as the Information and Communication strategy itself is 
concerned, the main aim again is to provide and achieve coherent and 
comprehensive information to and communication with the public (ibid.). 
The (rather controversial) concept of a voluntary working partnership with
the Member States is reintroduced here: The aim is to enable the EU and 
the Member States to “foster genuine synergy between their structures 
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and know-how and the activities of the European Union” (ibid.: 9), although 
the more centrally organised and directed Information and Communication 
strategy will not rely or depend on the member states24. The controversy 
lies in that the EU is the member states and quite how a central public 
communication policy can be implemented successfully without the 
cooperation of the member states is not made clear here25.
On a different level, the Commission makes a commitment in this 
document to achieve the aims of its public communication strategy by 
introducing “genuine dialogue” with the public (COM(2002)350, final/2: 10) 
and following a “two-tier” information strategy (ibid.), which will be based 
on a “genuine teaching function in relation to the EU’s role and tasks” 
(ibid.)26. This “didactic stance” would be two-fold:
a)Provision of general information aiming to boost awareness of the EU’s 
existence and legitimacy, polishing its image and highlighting its role.
b)Priority information topics (based on the EU’s major projects and 
challenges) to be slotted into the PRINCE Programme (Programme of 
Information for the Citizen of Europe), in accordance with the new inter-
institutional framework in place (ibid.: 10-11).
In keeping with one of the Commission’s main aims (coherence), the 
concept of the “main thread” is introduced in this document (ibid.: 10-11). 
By this the Commission means a common reference framework upon 
which the Information and Communication Strategy will be based. The 
“central thread” will be in effect “translating in simple and non-controversial 
communication terms the EU’s main objectives as stemming from the 
Treaty of the European Union” (ibid.: 12). These main objectives are 
identified in the document as follows:
a)The virtue of exchange (liberties, diversity, humanism)
b)Value added in terms of efficiency and solidarity
c)The concept of protection
d)The role of Europe in the world (ibid.)
The “central thread” of the EU’s Information and Communication 
Strategy would also draw upon certain “essential” values, which the EU 
stands for, such as rapprochement and exchange; opportunity; equality; 
solidarity; prosperity; protection; security (ibid.: 13). These values were 
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identified after studies were carried out on behalf of the Commission 
(OPTEM study, May 2002 quoted in COM(2002)350, final/2: 13). The 
Commission emphasises that the values “always need to be implicit in and 
closely connected to the practical objectives of the Community action and 
at the same time they must correspond to the generally accepted public 
perception of the EU” (COM(2002)350, final/2: 12).
As far as the main topics and messages that the “central thread” 
would cover are concerned, these are identified as follows:
a)Enlargement: Legitimacy of accession; efforts of the accessing countries 
to adopt the EU law and practice; value added after enlargement.
b)The future of the EU: General information and explanation of how the 
EU works; explanation of the work of the Convention on the future of the 
EU.
c)The area of freedom, security and justice: Immigration; human rights; 
citizenship.
d)The EU in the world: Issues in multilateral trade negotiations; EU’s 
determination to be a force for equilibrium in the world; strength of a united 
Europe speaking with one voice (ibid.: 13-15).
With the exception of the last topic (the EU in the world), all the topics 
identified in the 2002 Communication as the ones that should form the 
central thread/ common reference framework of the EU’s Information and 
Communication Strategy were also proposed in previous documents as 
core issues of the EU’s Information and Communication strategy (for 
example, COM(2001)428, final). The proposed topics are also in keeping 
with the Commission’s strategic plan for 2000-2005 (COM(2000)154, final) 
and the wider political context at the time27.
The Commission also emphasises the importance of communicating 
all messages in the public’s own language (COM(2002)350, final/2: 13) 
and proposes targeted communication with the public, not only with regard 
to the language but also with regard to the audience addressed each time. 
More specifically, the Commission proposes information flow on two 
levels:
a)Towards those who are interested and well-informed about the EU
b)Towards those who are apathetic and unfamiliar with the EU (ibid.: 16).
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Although similar to the distinction between priority, specialised and 
general audiences introduced in the 2001 Communication in an 
Information and Communication policy for the EU (COM(2001)354, final) 
examined earlier in this section, this is the first time that a distinction is 
made between an informed and a less informed/ignorant public in a 
Communication regarding the EU’s information and communication 
strategy. The issue is relevant to the theoretical discussion regarding the 
nature of the European public sphere, i.e. if it is a public sphere for elite 
groups and if so, what constitutes these groups elite. The following chapter
investigates if this proposal is reflected in the information provided on the 
three EU official websites chosen to be examined. Chapter 5 investigates 
whether the divide between the EU citizens who are interested/well-
informed about the EU and those who are not, is reflected in the websites’ 
user profile, through an EU websites’ user survey launched on 1 
September 2005.
The 2004 Commission Communication (COM(2004)196, final) came 
to clarify all the previous Commission proposals concerning the EU’s 
Information and Communication strategy, which had been rather vague, as 
the strategy for and progress in their implementation were not explicitly 
defined. By 2004, however, the Commission had solidified its main public 
communication concepts and now needed an action plan for their 
implementation. The main objectives of the EU’s Information and 
Communication Strategy are repeated in this document, more clearly than 
before:
a)To improve the perception of the EU and its institutions and their 
legitimacy by deepening the knowledge and understanding of its tasks, 
structure and achievements and by establishing a dialogue with its 
citizens.
b)To raise the quality of the European public debate.
c)To associate the public in European decision-making.
d)To listen to the public and its concerns more attentively.
e)To methodically and consistently rebuild the EU’s image (ibid.: 3).
The Commission’s aim for establishment of a voluntary working 
partnership with the Member States “fostering synergy between their 
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structures and know-how and the activities of the EU” (ibid.) continues to 
apply, with its inherent controversy not addressed28. In addition, the 
Commission repeats the importance of inter-institutional cooperation and 
of improved and better organised internal dissemination of information/ 
communication culture. The cooperation of both the Member States and 
the three EU institutions (Commission, Council and Parliament) is seen by 
the Commission as essential if the Information and Communication 
Strategy is to achieve its targets (ibid.: 5-6)29.
The European Union’s core values are ever-present in this document: 
Peace, freedom, solidarity and cultural diversity are defined as the EU’s 
fundamental values, which should form the basis for the Information and 
Communication Strategy, as they provide a common frame of reference 
for all of the EU’s policies (main thread) (ibid.: 6).
The document also repeats that the European public lacks basic 
information regarding the EU and finds the EU’s core values rather vague 
and insufficiently discriminating from other democracies, quoting a 2004 
study (ibid.: COM(2004)196, final). The Commission concludes that the 
EU citizens must be given specific examples of EU policies, referring back 
to those core values, if they are to understand and appreciate the EU’s 
role and efforts (ibid.).
The Commission repeats here its earlier position that the main 
information topics must be selected not only on the basis of the EU’s major 
policies for the years ahead but they should also meet the public’s needs
and concrete concerns (ibid.: 7). As far as the EU is concerned, the priority 
information topics should cover the following areas:
a)Enlargement
b)Future of the Union
c)Area of freedom, security and justice
d)The Euro
e)The role of Europe in the world (ibid.)
Since this document has also received the approval of the European 
Parliament and of the European Council, it means that the above key 
areas of information topics are a priority for all three main EU institutions. 
This is a step forward towards the implementation of the Commission’s 
90
proposal for better inter-institutional cooperation and coordination as far as 
the Information and Communication Strategy is concerned.
3.1.4 Component C: The role of the Internet
All of the documents examined in the period 2000-2004 propose that 
the Internet be deployed in the implementation of the EU’s Information and 
Communication strategy, particularly in the areas of transparency, citizens’ 
participation and public debate of EU issues.
Starting with the 2001 Communication (COM(2001)354, final), 
EUROPA, the EU’s official portal30, is identified as one of the main tools for 
the deployment of the Information and Communication strategy. One of 
the Commission's objectives, as they are set out in this Communication, is 
that EUROPA should represent the most up-to-date practices of the new 
governance in Europe, symbolized by the terms "e-Commission", "e-
Europe" and "e-governance" (ibid.: 26, emphasis added).
Key factors for selecting a website as one of the Commission’s main 
Information and Communication channels were the interactivity, speed 
and accessibility that the website offers (ibid.). These attributes are not 
exclusive to the EUROPA website of course, but apply to the Internet as a 
whole and make it such an attractive means of communication. 
Interactivity in particular is one of the key factors for a successful public 
communication strategy, as well as a prerequisite for a public sphere to 
emerge, as already discussed in Chapter 2.
The White Paper on European Governance (COM(2001)428, final) 
moves along the same lines, as far as the role of the Internet in the EU’s 
public communication strategy is concerned. The Commission underlines 
the importance of continuing to develop EUR-LEX, for example, as a 
single, online point in all languages (ibid.).  Another area where the 
Internet is proposed to have a key role is that of transparency and 
openness of the consultation process followed during policy-making (ibid.). 
At the time when the White Paper was published, the Commission had 
already started developing online consultation in the form of the 
Commission’s interactive policy-making initiative. As in the cases of 
governance and communication policy, dialogue with the public is seen as 
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a basic element of the consultation process and the White Paper strongly 
emphasises that “all European Institutions must adopt a reinforced culture 
of consultation and dialogue and associate the European Parliament in the 
consultative process” (ibid.: 15-16).
In 2002 the second Communication on an Information and 
Communication strategy for the EU (COM(2002)350, final/2) characterised 
the EUROPA website as an “essential instrument for bringing the 
Institutions closer to ordinary people and facilitating contact between 
Europeans” (ibid.: 19). However the wording of the sentence is different 
from previous documents and whilst the proposal that the portal should be 
used to “facilitate contact between Europeans” is neutral and inclusive in 
its expression, the use of the term “ordinary people” is presumptuous and
denotes a normative approach to the issue of the European public sphere.
Nevertheless, the fact that EUROPA is given such a prominent role in 
the Information and Communication strategy of the EU is indicative of the 
Commission’s views on the possibilities offered by the Internet, as far as
public communication is concerned. In particular, it is the interactive 
dimension of the Internet that is highlighted in this document, with the 
Internet seen as one of the main tools which can promote a “genuine 
dialogue with the public” (ibid.)31. This view coincides with the theoretical 
model of the European public sphere and the role of the Internet in it, 
which was discussed in Chapter 2.
Similarly, the 2002 Report on European Governance (COM(2002)705, 
final) emphasises the role of the Internet in establishing a public dialogue 
between the EU institutions and the public and promoting participation, 
openness and transparency of the EU decision-making process. According 
to the Report, since the publication of the White Paper on European 
Governance in 2001, the Commission continued improving its information 
services, by further developing EUR-LEX and committing to as multi-
linguistic information an environment as possible. 
The importance of electronic communication and interaction in 
implementing the Commission’s strategy for openness, participation, better 
involvement of the civil society in policy-making and more inter-institutional 
co-operation is evident also in the Commission’s statement that “electronic 
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communication is the most preferred tool” when it comes to inter-
institutional communication (ibid.: 17) and also in the commencement of 
two other EU governance projects: the Interactive Policy-making and E-
Europe 2005. The latter aims to “ensure the inclusion of all citizens in the 
information society” (ibid.: 18).
Furthermore, in the time following the publication of the 2001 White 
Paper and until the report was published, the Commission focused its 
actions on, amongst other things, the development of interactive services 
online, such as Dialogue with Citizens, Dialogue with Business, Europe 
Direct32, the FUTURUM webpage, the Convention website, Your Voice In 
Europe webpage, and the overall reform of the EUROPA portal (EUROPA 
“2nd generation”) and the EURLEX and CELEX websites (ibid.: 11 and 13). 
Nevertheless, there is no comprehensive report on the effectiveness of 
these projects or their impact in the overall Information and 
Communication strategy of the EU.
In 2004, with the Communication on the Implementation of the 
Information and Communication strategy for the EU (COM(2004)196, 
final),  in accordance with all its previous proposals, the Commission gives 
the audiovisual and new communication technology tools a central position 
in the implementation of the Information and Communication Strategy 
(ibid.: 12 and 16-22). 
More specifically, the audiovisual strategy continues to revolve 
primarily around the information tools intended for the media and 
information professionals (i.e. development of EbS, support for electronic 
media and the media library). The document also points out that these 
information tools are also being developed in digital format and the online
services are being expanded as well (ibid.: 17). EuroNews (pan-European 
channel and its website) is also deemed as “clearly relevant to the EU 
objectives” (ibid.: 18)33.
The other main tool of dissemination of EU information remains, of 
course, EUROPA, the official EU portal, which is now entering a new 
phase named “Second-generation EUROPA”. This Commission first 
proposed the services that EUROPA should be offering to Europe’s 
citizens in 2001, with its Communication entitled “Towards an E-
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Commission, Second-generation EUROPA: Advanced Web services to 
citizens, businesses and other professional users” (Commission of the 
European Communities, Press and Communication Service 2001), as part 
of its eEurope programme. The aim of that communication was to develop 
the interactive side of EUROPA, to adapt it to EU-25 and to make it more 
accessible using a system of portals for different categories of users
(COM(2004)196, final: 20).
In line with the communication issues identified in all of the documents 
examined here so far, as well as the values of the EU and the aims of the 
Information and Communication Strategy, the Commission explicitly states 
in this Communication that the material on EUROPA “must be presented 
at the first two levels of access to the EUROPA sites in the 20 official 
languages” (ibid.: 21).
The Commission further proposed the creation of a multimedia 
database which would provide basic information and would be 
supplemented and adapted locally to cater for public demand. The 
second-generation relays and networks could also evolve into Cyber-
relays offering free access to the information and interactive services 
available on EUROPA (ibid.).
Also in line with the aims of the previous Information and 
Communication policy and EU Governance proposals, the Commission 
announces here the development of more specific portals aimed at 
specific target audiences, such as students, young people and job-seekers 
(ibid.: 22). This is in accordance with the Commission’s earlier admission 
that the EU public does not always relate to the EU’s aims and policies 
and that the Information and Communication Strategy should therefore 
aim to disseminate messages that are sufficiently specific for the public to 
identify with and at the same time present efficiently the EU’s work on 
various areas (ibid: 7).
3.1.5 Concluding remarks: 2000-2004
To sum up, with regard to the theoretical framework of this project, 
set out in Chapters 1 and 2, the documents of this period share some core 
characteristics:
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Component A: In terms of the debate regarding the European 
public sphere and the EU’s democratic deficit34, they recognise the need 
for reform in EU governance and are aware of the public’s distrust of EU 
institutions, yet do not recognise that the EU suffers from a democratic 
deficit. The Commission also appears to be willing to promote 
accountability and transparency, but, ironically, these documents are 
produced by anonymous EU bureaucrats.
Component B: As far as public communication and the specific 
aims that should form the EU public communication strategy are 
concerned35, the documents of this period outline a general public 
communication strategy generally matching the theoretical framework set 
out in Chapter 1. However, the documents do not always present concrete 
proposals of action, nor do they provide the reader with specific data 
regarding the implementation progress of the public communication 
strategy.
Furthermore, despite acknowledging the need for interaction with 
the public and the importance of a European public sphere, the strategy 
proposed in these documents mainly focuses on one-way communication 
with the public. The documents themselves, despite advocating access of 
EU documentation for all and public-friendly format of official 
documentation, are rather lengthy and written in institutional jargon (i.e. 
their target audience is EU and national officials and/or communications’ 
experts, not the general public).
In addition, the public communication strategy proposed has its 
basis on a two-tier audience, i.e. specialised EU audiences and the 
general public. The latter is in turn divided in target audiences (women, 
youths, jobseekers) and the wider general public and the proposed 
strategy recommends that all information disseminated should be 
audience-specific, in order for the public to be able to relate to the EU’s 
aims and actions. This includes communicating with the various publics in 
their own language- another key priority of the proposed EU Information 
and Communication strategy of 2000-2004.
Component C: Finally, as far as the Internet is concerned, the 
strategy outlined in the documents of this period identifies an important 
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role for this medium in the EU’s public communication strategy, particularly 
with regard to the issues of public debate, openness, transparency and 
citizens’ participation in the EU policy-making process. EUROPA, the EU’s 
official portal, is the main focus of the actions proposed. Nevertheless, the 
actions outlined with regard to the Internet’s capability as a two-way 
communication tool with the public are few and rather abstract. With 
regard to the audiences, the documents examined from this period do not 
make clear which type/s of audiences will be targeted through the 
online/electronic version of the EU’s public communication strategy. On 
the other hand, it is made clear that the first two levels of the EUROPA 
website should be available in all official EU languages and that the EU 
Delegations’ websites should be available in the main language of the 
hosting country as well as in one or two of the EU’s working languages 
(English, French or German).
3.2 2004-2006: Something is changing?
What changes took place in the period 2004-2006 as far as the 
EU’s public communication strategy is concerned? Are these changes 
significant enough to allow us to discuss a change in the EU’s public 
communication strategy? This section examines the political context within 
which the 2004-2006 EU public communication strategy was developed as 
well as the Commission’s new proposals with regard to the three 
components of this project’s theoretical model (component A: EU 
governance and the European public sphere; component B: EU public 
communication; component C: The role of the Internet).
The documents under examination from this period are the 
following:
a)Action Plan to Improve Communicating Europe by the Commission 
(Commission of the European Communities 2005a).
b)Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European 
Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions- The Commission’s contribution to the period of 
reflection and beyond: Plan-D for Democracy, Dialogue and Debate 
(COM(2005)494, final).
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c)White Paper on a European Communication Policy, presented by the 
Commission (COM(2006)35).
Before the main points of the above documents are presented in 
relation to the theoretical model of this research project, a historical 
overview of the period 2004-2006 is necessary, in order to outline the 
political developments which have influenced the content of these 
documents.
3.2.1 Historical overview: 2004-2006
As we have already seen in section 3.1.1, the 2004 Commission 
Communication on implementing the Information and Communication 
strategy for the EU (COM(2004)196, final) was the last document of its 
kind to be produced under the Prodi Commission. In late 2004 the Barroso 
Commission was finally approved by the European Parliament and tool 
office in November 2004 (Wallström 2006) (EUROPA 2006h), after 
Commission President, José Manuel Barroso, had been forced to 
withdraw his original proposal for the body of Commissioners because of
the controversy some of his initial choices of Commissioners had caused.
However, 2004 is not considered here a key year for the EU’s 
public communication strategy solely because of the change in the 
Commission’s composition36: In May of that year the Accession Treaty 
came into force, and ten new member-states joined the EU37. With an 
intra-EU audience of now over 400 million people and several new official 
languages added, the EU was facing new communication challenges and 
the poor turnout at the European Parliament elections in June 2004 
confirmed this38. Furthermore, on 29 October of that year, the Heads of 
State and Foreign Ministers of the EU member-states signed the Treaty 
establishing a Constitution for the EU (European Union 2004), after a 
lengthy period of negotiations39. The Treaty needs to be ratified by all 
member-states by parliamentary vote, national referendum or other 
procedure determined by each member-state’s laws and constitution yet 
not all national publics are ready to accept an EU Constitutional Treaty, as 
we shall see in the following paragraphs. Understandably, the issue of the 
ratification of the Constitutional Treaty has been a major factor in shaping 
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the EU’s public communication strategy in the period 2004-2006.
The communication gap between the EU institutions and the public 
became gradually more obvious and pressing for the institutions in 2004, 
leading Commission President Barroso to appoint Commission Vice-
President, Margot Wallström, as Commissioner for Institutional Relations 
and Communication in August 2004, the first time that the communication 
with the public was made the sole subject of a Commission portfolio. 
Moving along the same lines, the Brussels European Council (4-5 
November 2004) declared the communicating of the EU as one of its three 
focus-issues (Council of the European Union 2004).
In addition, an independent report was published in 2004 by Friends 
of Europe, Euractiv and Gallup Europe, entitled “Can the EU hear me?” 
and presenting the opinions of over 3,000 respondents, including  political 
leaders and opinion makers from EU member-states (Davies and 
Readhead 2004). The data was collected partly through two opinion polls 
and partly through surveys and study group findings40 and was used to 
formulate the following set of recommendations for the Commission with 
regard to the EU’s public communication strategy:
§ Vice President Margot Wallström should visit all Member States 
during the first six months of her term to listen to citizens' views 
of the EU, find local supporters and beneficiaries of EU 
integration and meet national media representatives and leading 
politicians;
§ The Commission should promote the benefits of EU 
membership by researching and professionally communicating 
the advantages for citizens of their country belonging to the 
EU. Popular 'good-will ambassadors' should be employed to 
promote the benefits of Europe.
§ The message should be kept simple by cutting back on 
boring detail: stick to three key points.
§ The media should be encouraged to report on political 
differences at EU level and react more quickly to events by 
setting up an EU newsroom to feed international media with up-
to-date footage on EU developments. Journalists should be 
invited to Brussels for intensive training courses on EU 
reporting. Better contacts need to be established with national 
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and regional media.
§ The EU's communication and reporting structure should be 
streamlined by getting institutions to co-operate more closely 
and cutting down on administrative hurdles.
§ A decentralized approach needs to be adopted by making 
national governments responsible for communicating EU 
policies and setting up 'Communications Task Forces' at member 
state level (ibid.: 8-9).
Although no public communication strategy documents were 
published by the Commission until July 2005, the impact of this report and 
of the political developments during 2004 is evident in all official 
documents published in this second period examined here (2004-2006), 
as we shall see in more detail in the following paragraphs.
Another event that helped shape the “Wallström” era of the EU’s 
public communication strategy was the rejection, by referendum, of the 
Constitutional Treaty by the publics of France and the Netherlands (on 29 
May and 1 June 2005 respectively). Despite the fact that several other 
member-states had already ratified the Treaty by then41, or perhaps 
because of that and the sense of security it evoked among EU officials as 
far as the public’s trust is concerned42, the “No” of the French and the 
Dutch people created “shockwaves” in the EU institutions43. This, in turn, 
affected the content of all Commission documents regarding the EU’s 
public communication strategy published in 2005 and 200644, as can be 
seen in the following sections, which present the proposals of the 
Commission concerning the EU’s public communication strategy in 2004-
2006 with reference to the three components of the theoretical model of 
the European public sphere established in the previous two chapters and 
outlined briefly in the beginning of the present chapter.
3.2.2 Component A: EU governance and the European public sphere
The first public communication document to be published in the 
period 2004-2006, immediately after the negative referenda in France and 
the Netherlands, the Action Plan to Improve Communicating Europe 
(Commission of the European Communities 2005a), focuses solely on the 
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information and communication strategy that the EU needs to follow if it is 
to regain its citizens’ trust. Therefore, no extended references are made to 
the EU governance and/or its relation to the European public sphere.
It is with the Communication on the Commission’s contribution to 
the period of reflection and beyond: Plan-D for Democracy, Dialogue and 
Debate (Plan D) later in 2005 (COM(2005)494, final) that the Commission 
returns to the issues of EU governance and citizens’ participation in the 
decision-making process as parameters of the establishing of a European 
public sphere. In particular, Plan D identifies the promotion of citizens’ 
participation in the democratic process as one of the four broad areas of 
action required to help regain the EU citizens’ trust towards the EU 
institutions and address issues of democratic legitimation, accountability 
and openness within the EU (ibid.: 18)45.
Of particular importance are the actions proposed with regard to the 
EU’s democratic deficit and the emerging European public sphere. 
Although the Commission acknowledges that further citizen participation in 
EU matters and greater openness of the decision-making process are 
necessary to restore the public’s trust in the EU institutions, it still does not 
acknowledge the democratic deficit attributed to the EU institutions as real, 
and refers to it as a “perceived” deficit (ibid.: 9). This is made clearer by its 
proposal for actions in the area of citizen participation in the “democratic 
process” in general (ibid.: 18-19), as opposed to the “decision-making 
process” in particular, on which most of the criticism regarding the EU’s 
democratic deficit is focused on46. By persistently avoiding reference to the 
citizens’ participation in the decision-making process the Commission also 
makes an oxymoronic statement: A decision-making process is not 
democratic unless the citizens (i.e. the demos) participate in it. If citizens’ 
participation in the democratic process needs to be enhanced or 
encouraged, then this process has not become democratic yet, or is not 
democratic enough. Once again, the Commission is sending confusing 
messages to the public.
Finally, the Commission refers to the European Citizens’ Panels as 
a means to “make citizens feel more involved” in the democratic process47. 
The oxymoron is, thus, repeated: Feeling more involved in a decision-
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making process, as opposed to actually being more involved, does not 
make that process democratic. Such wording allows for this proposal on 
the EU’s public communication strategy to be interpreted as mainly 
intending to create a better impression of the EU institutions rather than to 
actually achieve more openness and accountability.
Nevertheless, Plan D also underlines the importance of matching 
the main messages of the EU public communication strategy, i.e. matching 
the policy, to the EU public’s priorities (ibid.: 5-6). This is a crucial 
prerequisite, according to Leonard and Arbuthnott (2002), if the EU’s 
institutions are to become more democratic, as already discussed in 
Chapter 148, and it is an issue on which the White Paper on a European 
Communication Policy, published in 2006, also focuses (COM(2006)35).
3.2.3 Component B: EU public communication strategic aims
The first public communication document of the period 2004-2006 
was the Action Plan to Improve Communicating Europe by the 
Commission (Commission of the European Communities 2005), published 
online on July 20th, 2005, only a month after the negative referenda in 
France and the Netherlands49.
As it is not a Communication or a White Paper, it is significantly 
shorter in length, and consequently clearer and more accessible. It 
continues in the mode set in the Communication for Implementing the 
Information and Communication strategy for the EU (COM(2004)196, 
final), in that it acknowledges the need for a more effective communication 
strategy on the part of the EU and for the EU institutions to listen more to 
rather than just project their messages to the European public. It also goes 
a step further, in that it criticises the previous Communications regarding 
the EU’s Information and Communication strategy for failing to achieve 
some of the main targets set- coherent and streamlined information 
strategy; addressing the public’s interests, needs and preoccupations; and 
focusing on dialogue and proactive communication (Commission of the 
European Communities 2005a: 3).
The Action Plan identifies three strategic principles, which will aim to 
earn people’s interest and trust:
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a)Listening to the public;
b)Communicating with the public (not just the elites); and
c)Connecting with citizens by “going local” (ibid.: 3-4).
Furthermore, it focuses on the training and recruitment of communication 
specialists, so that a “modern, professional” approach of communicating 
with the public is achieved (ibid.: 2). The importance of more efficient and 
professional communication between the different departments and 
institutions is also recognised, as it can significantly affect the coherence 
of the messages projected to the public (ibid.).
Whilst the documents of the pre-Wallström period were not clear on 
whether the focus of the Information and Communication strategy should 
be on the elites of the EU or on the European masses, this Action Plan 
clearly shifts the focus on the EU mass audience and criticises the 
previous strategy for putting too much emphasis on the communication 
with the elite audiences and forgetting the rest of the citizens (Commission 
of the European Communities 2005a). The Action Plan also prioritises 
local Representations, as key for conveying the Commission’s message to 
the public, in simple terms and in the native language. Although it is not 
the first time that the role of Representations is identified as important in 
the communication process with the public, it is the first time that so much 
emphasis is put on working to communicate the EU’s aims and 
achievements locally/ nationally: “The relationship of EU-member-states 
needs to be rebalanced and this is why the action plan talks about ‘going 
local’”50.
The influence of the “Can the EU hear me?” report on the 
Commission’s Action Plan is evident here, although the report itself is not 
mentioned in the document. Most of the Commission’s proposals with 
regard to the EU Information and Communication strategy are indirect 
references to the aforementioned report’s recommendations, in particular 
the recommendations concerning the deployment of communication 
professionals, communication with the public on local level and inter-
institutional cooperation on the issue of the EU’s Information and 
Communication strategy (Davies and Readhead 2004)51.
When Plan D was published in late 2005 (COM(2005)494, final), 
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the Commission elaborated on several of the proposals it had put forward 
with its Action Plan. It is a very ambitious plan that aims to involve national 
Parliaments, local and regional authorities, civil society and citizens 
(particularly target groups of specific importance, such as young people, 
women and ethnic minorities) in a pan-European public debate regarding 
the achievements and future aims of the EU (ibid.: 2-3). Furthermore, the 
proposed plan aims to be an on-going template for action in the field of 
public communication, and not just a sort-term public communication 
scheme aiming to overcome the resistance of EU citizens towards the 
Constitutional Treaty. It is also the first time that an Information and 
Communication-related document clearly states as its aim the contribution 
to the establishment of a European public sphere (ibid.: 2-3).
The Commission has identified four broad areas in which Plan D 
will be implemented in order to help regain the EU citizens’ trust towards 
the EU institutions and address issues of democratic legitimation, 
accountability and openness within the EU: “assisting national debates 
on the future of the EU”; “stimulating a wider public debate that will 
be driven forward by the EU institutions themselves”; “promoting 
citizens’ participation in the democratic process”; and “generating a 
real dialogue on European policies” (COM(2005)494, final: 4-10, 
emphasis added)52.
Plan D has also evidently been influenced by the 2004 “Can the EU 
hear me?” report (Davies and Readhead 2004)53, borrowing even exact 
phrases from it, as it has incorporated most of the report’s proposals 
concerning the Commissioner’s visits to all EU member-states within the 
first six months of taking on her duties; the introduction of European 
Goodwill Ambassadors to carry the EU messages in the member-states’ 
audiences; the promotion of consultation; better collaboration with the 
national media and almost all other proposed actions made by the Friends 
of Europe, Gallup and Euractiv joint report (Compare Davies and 
Readhead 2004: 8-10 with COM(2005)494, final: 4-10). Nevertheless, the 
Commission does not mention this report at all in this document, but 
instead generally speaks of a “period of reflection” (COM(2005)494, final: 
3-7, 10, 12 and 14), during which the Plan D proposals were composed.
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Despite the positive steps towards a more communication-oriented 
strategy, rather than an information-oriented one, Plan D has some weak 
points. To begin with, it is not always clear if the Commission is referring to 
EU member-states and citizens only, or to the wider European community. 
Although it makes sense to want to expand the debate on the EU to 
neighbouring countries, or candidate countries, the fact that the EU and 
Europe are often used as synonyms within the Commission’s official 
document is a step in the wrong direction as far as the EU’s Information 
and Communication strategy is concerned. Before even beginning to 
implement that strategy, the Commission is already sending confusing 
messages to the public (intra-EU and foreign alike).
Furthermore, the Commission is still reluctant to take the lead in the 
EU’s Information and Communication strategy and leaves most 
responsibility to the member-states. It is also unclear if the Commission is 
genuinely seeking to improve the level of the public’s participation in the 
EU’s decision-making process or just improve the public’s impression of 
the degree of democratic legitimation of the EU institutions.
When these issues were presented to the interviewees, one senior 
Commission official took the position that
“the Commission (is reluctant) to take the lead from the member-
states in the implementation of the EU’s Information and 
Communication strategy for fear that the Commission will be 
accused of propaganda and of attempting to countermand 
national sovereignty altogether”54.
With regard to the second issue, one Commission official involved in the 
implementation of the EU’s Information and Communication strategy 
expressed the view that
“The primary aim is to show people that the policy-making 
process is open and encourage people to participate and we do 
spend a lot of time processing feedback […] But there is another 
issue: The elected representatives of the EU citizens are in the EP 
and the national parliaments and the expression of these are the 
executives, i.e. the governments etc. So […] we shouldn’t think 
that we (the Commission) could somehow bypass the whole 
parliamentary process by consulting directly the NGOs or 
individuals (the public) […]”55.
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Following the style of the Action Plan and Plan D, i.e. being more 
concise, easier to read and written in a more every-day language 
compared to the official documents published before 2005, the White 
Paper on a European Communication Policy is the most recent document 
on the EU’s public communication strategy to have been published in the 
period 2004-2006 (COM(2006)35).
The White Paper is divided in two parts, the first being more like a 
manifesto of the Commission’s vision of the EU Communication strategy, 
and the second identifying the ways in which this vision can be 
implemented. This is a document that, like the Action Plan and Plan D, 
focuses on communication rather than information. True to its commitment 
for more openness and public dialogue with the citizens of the EU, the 
Commission has launched a six-month-long online and offline public 
consultation on the actions proposed in this White Paper, during which all 
citizens and civil society bodies are invited to submit their views and 
suggestions regarding the EU’s communication strategy56. Furthermore, a 
more public-friendly version of the Commission’s proposed public 
communication strategy was also published in 2006, in the form of a 
glossy pamphlet, which also includes a personal note form Vice-President 
Wallström (Commission of the European Communities 2006a).
In Part 1 of the White Paper, the Commission emphasises two points: 
a) The importance of an Information and Communication strategy on an 
EU level and the need to move beyond one-way communication to public 
dialogue with the EU citizens; and b) The need to encourage and support 
the emerging European public sphere, with the cooperation and 
involvement of national civil societies, national media, national public 
authorities and, of course, the other EU institution (COM(2006)35: 4-5).
Once more the Commission identifies the Member States as mainly 
responsible for informing the public about EU policies and encouraging 
public debate regarding EU issues (ibid.: 5). At the same time, the 
Commission gives us an idea of the EU public sphere it is envisaging, and 
that consists of interrelated Europeanised national public spheres (ibid.). 
The similarities of this proposal with the theoretical approaches of the 
European public sphere found in Kantner, Pfetsch, Koopmans, Weiler and 
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other scholars, who have suggested that we should be looking for a 
European public sphere in the national public spheres of the Member 
States57, are evident- although, as discussed earlier these did not 
necessarily occur through established dialogue with the academic 
community58.
Part 2 of the White Paper identifies key areas of action in order to 
implement the main principles of the EU’s Communication strategy. The 
following figure summarises these areas of action, which are then further 
analysed in the following paragraphs, with the exception of the actions 
concerning the Internet, which are examined in the next section 
(Component C).
Figure 3.1: Proposed areas of action, White Paper on a European Communication 
Policy, Source: The author, adapted from the White Paper on a European 
Common principles:
- Freedom of speech;
- Inclusiveness;
- Diversity;
- Participation
Proposed area of action 
1:
Empowering citizens
Proposed area of action 
2:
Understanding 
European public opinion
Proposed area of action 
3:
Doing the job together
-Cooperation between EU 
institutions and Member 
States;
-Cooperation with civil society, 
local and regional authorities, 
political parties and national 
government.
-Eurobarometer surveys;
-Public dialogue between the 
EU institutions and civil society;
-Creation of a network of 
“national experts in public 
opinion research”.
-Civic education;
-Citizens’ networking;
-Connecting citizens with public 
institutions.
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Communication Policy (COM(2006)35).
All proposed areas of action here are relying heavily on the 
cooperation of the member-states. However, the White Paper examined 
here attempts to achieve a balance in the cooperation with the member-
states by giving the EU institutions the key role in taking openness and 
public dialogue further (COM(2006)35: 6-8). In this context, all EU 
institutions should enhance their visitors’ programmes, complement their 
websites with online fora and hold joint open debates similar to the 
Parliamentary debates, where officials will accept comments and 
questions from the public and journalists (ibid.).
In order to better coordinate the public communication efforts of the 
EU institutions and the member-states, the Commission proposes that the 
four common principles be imprinted in a framework document (a Code of 
Conduct or Charter of EU Communication) which will serve as a reference 
point not only for EU institutions, but for civil society and local, regional 
and national governments and authorities too (COM(2006)35: 5-6).
The intention of the Commission to give the EU public a more 
central role in the EU’s information and communication strategy is also 
ever more evident in this White Paper. For example, the document informs 
us that the Commission has launched an online consultation forum, where 
citizens can give feedback on the proposed Charter of Communication, 
either as individuals or as representatives of organisations of any type 
(ibid.). The Commission also proposes the establishment of an 
“Independent Observatory for European Public Opinion”, whose aim would 
be to analyse trends in the EU’s public opinion (ibid.: 11). Even more 
interestingly, the Commission acknowledges the importance of 
communicating with foreign audiences with one voice and the significant 
role that the EU public can play in enhancing the EU’s image and voice in 
third countries (ibid.: 12).
3.2.4 Component C: The role of the Internet
The Internet is seen as a key tool of the EU’s public communication 
strategy in the period 2004-2006. Starting with the 2005 Action Plan 
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(Commission of the European Communities 2005a), the Commission 
focuses on EUROPA as the main online public communication portal and 
also mentions the Representations’ websites, which will focus on 
addressing more the needs of the local publics (ibid.). The document 
explicitly states that EUROPA is not focused enough on communication 
with the public and recognises that the portal still does not cater for the 
language needs of the EU’s multilingual public and that navigating around 
its pages is often difficult/ problematic (ibid.: 12).
In addition, the Action Plan does, finally, clarify the view of the 
Commission on who should be the target audience of its online strategy 
and which tools should be used to address that audience. EUROPA is 
identified as the key online portal to address “key target” audiences, such 
as young people and women (ibid.). The task of communicating with the 
general public is left to the Representations and their websites, whilst for 
more specialised audiences special thematic webpages will be set up and 
linked to the EUROPA homepage (ibid.).
Despite the Commission’s clarifications on the target audiences 
online, the interviews with Commission officials revealed a difference of 
opinion and approach on the issue of target audiences online, between 
policy-making and policy-implementation officials. On the one hand, policy-
makers firmly support the concept of target audiences, and feel strongly 
about the need to approach “difficult” audiences, such as young people 
and women, who appear to be amongst the least interested in and/or 
approving of the EU’s actions (Eurobarometer 2006a; Eurobarometer 
2006b). They recognise that these audiences may also be more difficult to 
attract online (particularly women), yet they believe that it is crucial to 
engage the most “vulnerable”, socially and politically, groups into a direct 
public dialogue with the EU institutions. As one interviewee put it
“That is exactly why we would like to address some specific (web) 
pages to young people and women – because they are not key 
users already and because they have fewer professional 
incentives to visit the site and we believe they have the 
democratic right to be included and participate as well”59.
On the other hand, policy-implementation officials are convinced that 
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the Internet is only a tool of communication with EU specialists and 
individuals and/or institutions with an interest in the EU and its actions. 
They are, therefore, not convinced that the so-called “vulnerable” target 
audiences can be successfully approached online: 
“We have found that women are the most sceptical when it comes 
to politics and the EU in particular, in opinion polls in Central 
Europe, also the more “blue-collar” are (more sceptical) […] so 
[…] we try to structure our communication around this. (But) we 
have to make a choice: Do we try to be defensive, or do we go to 
people who we think will react favourably? This is a debate that is 
going on at the moment”60.
The issue of target audiences and its diverse approach by policy-
making and policy-implementation Commission officials will be taken into 
consideration in the following chapter, when analysing the contents of the 
three EU websites that were chosen for this research project (EUROPA, 
EU@UN, EURUNION). On one level, the issue of audiences is important 
in relation to the theories regarding the European public sphere, and the 
Habermasian ideal of the all-inclusive public sphere: It is now becoming 
obvious that the Commission not only identifies two types of audiences 
(elite and mass) but also intends to continue to address them separately 
and with different communication tools. What is not clear is whether it is 
the Commission’s intention to eventually bridge the gap between the two 
types of European audience, or merely assist in establishing what in effect 
will be two parallel public spheres- one for the European elites, and one for 
the European general public. On a second level, a question that needs to 
be answered is whether the difference of opinion between policy-making 
and policy-implementation officials is affecting the actual implementation of 
the proposed information and communication strategy online.
Plan D (COM(2005)494, final) also gives the Internet a central role 
in facilitating the public dialogue regarding the EU, which indicates the 
Commission’s determination to encourage a European public sphere 
online. In that sense, the proposed strategy re-affirms the Internet’s 
theoretical importance in facilitating such a public sphere. The action plan 
regarding the deployment of the Internet is also more specific than 
previously (ibid.: 3, 4, 10, 14 and 19) and the Commission also proposes 
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to monitor the effectiveness of the online public communication actions 
through the monitoring of the website visits and capacity of its systems 
(ibid.: 19, Table 4.4), which is a first for a Commission document regarding 
the EU’s public communication strategy.
Similarly, the 2006 White Paper on a European Communication 
policy (COM(2006)35) emphasises once more the need to bridge the 
digital divide within the EU. Yet the proposed action in this field is limited to 
the recommendation that the “European Round Table for Democracy”, 
whose establishment was proposed in Plan D, should compose a report 
on the issue at some point in the future (ibid.: 10). The document mentions 
that there are other activities currently taking place that aim to close the 
digital divide, but these are not clearly identified in the document.
Nevertheless, it is possible to identify some of them by visiting the 
Commission’s website, EUROPA or Margot Wallström’s official webpage. 
Beginning with the latter, Vice-President Wallström has established her 
own weblog, which is updated frequently and is open to contributions from 
and criticism by the public. Furthermore, there is a new webpage on the 
EUROPA portal dedicated to the public debate about the future of the EU 
and of Europe (Commission of the European Communities 2006b), as well 
as a separate webpage devoted to the public dialogue and consultation on 
the EU’s communication strategy (Directorate General 
Communication/Commission of the European Communities 2006). Finally, 
on 7 April 2006 the “.eu” top-level domain opened for all residents within 
the EU providing a new Internet space and “promoting an EU identity” 
(EUROPA 2006h, emphasis added).
3.2.5 Concluding remarks: 2004-2006
The documents regarding the EU’s public communication strategy 
in 2004-2006 share some similarities with the documents of the previous 
period, yet differ from them in several crucial points:
Component A: As far as the issues of the EU governance and the 
European public sphere are concerned, the 2004-2006 documents 
continue to put emphasis on the issues of citizens’ participation in the 
public dialogue and the decision-making process of the EU as well as on 
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transparency. Unfortunately, the wording of the documents is often 
confusing with regard to the Commission’s true intensions: Is the aim to 
achieve democratic legitimation of the EU decision-making process by 
enabling citizens’ participation to a greater degree than today, or is the 
Commission’s goal to change the public’s perception regarding the EU’s 
democratic deficit (i.e. that there is no such deficit)?
Component B: While the public communication strategy 
documents of the previous period were written by “faceless” Commission 
official, this time it is possible to put some faces to the documents, as 
there is a Commissioner responsible solely for the EU’s Information and 
Communication strategy of the EU. This in turn means that there is also a 
Cabinet of EU officials working under the leadership of Vice-President 
Wallström and all their details are available on the relevant webpage of the 
Commission, including their photographs (Wallström 2006).
Moreover, the Commission documents on the EU’s Information and 
Communication strategy are short, more to the point, and clearly written 
with a wider audience in mind, unlike those of the pre-Wallström period. 
Although still not making a clear distinction between intra-EU 
communication and external public communication, the public 
communication strategy of the EU in 2004-2006 appears mainly focused 
towards communication with the EU citizens, rather than information. The 
influence of the 2004 report, produced by Friends of Europe, Euractiv and 
Gallup Europe (Davies and Readhead 2004), is evident throughout the 
2004-2006 documents examined here, and most of its recommendations 
have been adopted with only minor alterations in the wording of the 
sentences, although the report is not referenced in any of the official 
documents examined here.
Component C: The Internet’s key role in the EU’s public 
communication strategy is recognised and the medium is given an even 
more central role in the implementation of the strategy. The Commission 
identifies specific audiences that should be targeted by its online public 
communication strategy, consistent with the strategy outlined also during 
the period 2000-2004. In relation to the theoretical model of this research 
project, it is of particular interest that the Internet’s role in these policy 
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documents is linked with the European public sphere and the 
enhancement of democratic procedures, i.e. citizens’ participation in the 
decision-making process, transparency and openness. In this respect, the 
EU’s public communication aims coincide with the theoretical model 
established in Chapters 1 and 2.
3.3 Conclusion
It becomes evident from the documents reviewed above that the 
Commission is aware of the issues regarding the emerging European 
public sphere and the openness, accountability and democratic 
legitimation of the EU institutions, particularly after 2005. In this context the 
Commission is willing to establish a two-way communication process with 
the European public, in order to offer more opportunities for citizens’ 
participation in the decision-making process and to gain the trust of the 
public towards the EU institutions. Furthermore, the Commission is eager 
to create a more homogeneous communication amongst the EU 
institutions, which, in turn, will reflect a more coherent image of what the 
EU stands for and help communicate more clearly the EU’s goals and 
achievements to the European public.
However, it is not always clear if the Commission is referring to EU 
member-states and citizens only, or to the wider European community. 
Although it makes sense to want to expand the debate on the EU to 
neighbouring countries, or candidate countries etc, the fact that the EU 
and Europe are often used as synonyms within the Commission’s official 
documents is step towards the wrong direction as far as the EU’s 
Information and Communication strategy is concerned. Before even 
beginning to implement that strategy, the Commission is already sending 
confusing messages to the public (intra-EU and foreign alike).
When this issue was presented to the Commission officials 
interviewed for this research project, their responses all pointed to the 
same direction- the EU is a very complex polity, the distinction between 
EU citizens and EU residents is not straightforward, nor are the 
boundaries between intra-EU and European audiences (“there is the 
question of where Europe ends and who can be an EU citizen”61). This 
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admission of the Commission officials concerning the complexity of the 
EU/ European identity coincides with the theoretical argument presented in 
Chapter 1, which was used to support the choice of the term “public 
communication” instead of “public diplomacy” or “public affairs” in the case 
of the EU62. Nevertheless, a clearer distinction between intra-EU and 
external audiences is needed in order to avoid sending out confused 
messages to the public.
Despite that, there is coherence and consistency in the values that 
the Commission projects as core EU values. Figure 3.2 below illustrates 
the relation among these core values, as this transpires through the 
documents examined in this chapter.
Figure 3.2: “The circle of prosperity”, the three key ideas underlining the EU’s 
Information and Communication strategy, Source: The author, based on Commission 
Information and Communication strategy documents 2000-2004 and 2004-2006, 
examined in Part 3.1.
These core values are further related to more specific ideas and 
areas of public debate, which have been summarised in Table 3.1 below.
Peace
Democracy
Prosperity
The 
EU
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Table 3.1: Key ideas and related terms in the EU’s Information and Communication 
Strategy documents, Source: Commission Information and Communication strategy 
documents 2000-2004 and 2004-2006, examined in Part 3.1.
Peace Democracy Prosperity
Europe’s borders and its role 
in the world
1. A Europe open to the 
world: EU Common Foreign 
and Security Policy
2. Enlargement
3. Safety and security/ Rule 
of law
4. A sense of belonging/ A 
European identity?
Citizens’ rights: A citizens’ 
Europe
1. Accountability
2. Openness
3. Participation
Economic and social 
development:
1. Creating new jobs
2. Social security
3. The Euro
4. Sustainable development/ 
environmental protection
5. Freedom of movement
Although these values are constant throughout all the documents 
examined here, the context within which they are mentioned differs 
between the two periods: The documents produced during 2000-2004 
refer to these values more vaguely and mainly focus on what defines the 
EU and what it is that the public needs to be informed about, i.e. what the 
EU does and what it has achieved since it was founded. However, in the 
second period, 2004-2006, and after the realisation that the EU public has 
lost its trust in the EU institutions and the criticism that these core values 
were not specific enough to distinguish the EU from other democracies 
(Davies and Readhead 2004), these values were linked to specific issues 
concerning the European public, and not just to the EU’s achievements so 
far. The Commission now focuses more on creating a public debate 
around these values and the related issues, so there has been a shift from 
informing the public what the EU is about to communicating with the 
public on how the latter perceives these values and the EU’s role.
Of the three core EU values, democracy is of particular importance, 
since the debate regarding the EU and its emerging public sphere revolves 
around the issue of the democratic legitimation of the EU institutions and 
of the decision-making process on EU level63. Throughout the documents 
examined here, democracy is recognised as one of the EU’s central 
values, while at the same time the Commission recognises that the EU 
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public is questioning the democratic legitimacy of the EU institutions. 
However, the Commission never really goes beyond merely 
acknowledging the existence of this argument64.
This undermines the Commission’s emphasis on citizens’ 
participation in the decision-making process and on further openness of 
the EU institutions’ procedures, as it raises questions about the sincerity of 
the Commission’s intentions to provide more means (mainly online-based 
ones) of two-way interaction and communication with EU officials to civil 
society and individual citizens alike. In other words, is the Commission 
intending to actually address the EU’s democratic deficit by introducing 
new possibilities for the citizens to give feedback and monitor the decision-
making procedures on EU level, or are these measures aiming to create 
the impression that the EU’s democratic deficit is being addressed? These 
questions are addressed in the following chapter which also uses the 
above table of core EU values as the basis for the coding variables of 
content in the analysis of the three EU websites selected for this research 
project. Chapter 5, which examines the reactions and views of Internet 
users on these three websites also addresses this question from a 
different angle.
As far as the Internet is concerned, what emerges from the 
documents reviewed here is that the Commission sees the Internet as an 
integral part of public communication, yet it is not always clear if it is the 
Commission’s view that the Internet should be used to address a niche 
public, i.e. the European elites, more than it should be used to 
communicate with the general public. We have already seen that the views 
of Commission officials on this issue are divided. The following chapter,
which analyses the data collected by coding the three EU websites, will 
aim to further investigate this issue.
At this stage, the figure mapping out the key theoretical issues in 
Chapters 1 and 2 needs to be revisited, in order to add the new elements 
that have emerged from the review of the official documents regarding the 
EU’s Information and Communication strategy.
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Figure 3.3: Key components of the theoretical concept regarding the EU public 
sphere: The EU public communication policy documents, adapted from Figure 2.1, 
Chapter 2 and the analysis of key EU Information and Communication documents.
The data that will emerge from the coding of three of the EU’s 
official websites and the EU websites’ online user survey will be 
juxtaposed against this figure in the following chapters, in order to 
establish the relationship between theory, official policy and practice.
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2004. EU or 
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§ 2004-2006: A 
shift towards a 
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public dialogue 
online.
Democratic 
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the debate of EU affairs.
The Habermasian public sphere:
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§ It is not clear who the participants will 
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2006; Cowles and Dinan 2004; Dinan 2004; Dinan 1999).
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the second referendum in that country allowed for the Treaty to finally enter into force on 
1 February 2003.
11 It is interesting to note here that at the time that this Communication was published the 
Council had a different information and communication policy from that of the European 
Parliament and the European Commission (COM(2001)354, final: 11). It operated its own 
relations with the press and media and shared some means of communication with the 
other Institutions. However the Helsinki European Council asked that the Council be 
associated with the effort of providing general coherent information on the European 
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between the Representations in the Member States and the National Information 
Authorities. At the time, the Council participated in the EUROPA web-site and in “Europe 
by Satellite” alongside the other Institutions. The Council was also represented on the 
editorial and managerial committees but did not otherwise take part in the formulation of 
the Information and Communication policy.
The Council was not at that time a member of the IGI but the Communication stated that 
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second and third pillar issues. At the time when the Communication was published the 
Council had not put forward a comprehensive strategy regarding its role on the 
Information and Communication policy of the EU. Nevertheless, the Communication 
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final).
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Greece, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Portugal, Ireland and Finland on 
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the national currencies were withdrawn from circulation and the Euro became the sole 
currency in those twelve member-states. Slovenia will become the 13th member-state to 
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(Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovakia 
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2006g).
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the first Communication (European Parliament 2003, first published in the Official Journal 
on 13 March 2002) and its proposals on further developing the partnership of the two 
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Communication regarding its White Paper on European Governance in 2001 
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year (European Parliament 2001a). The Economic and Social Committee and the 
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2002 (Committee of the Regions 2002; European Economic and Social Committee, 
Subcommittee (98), Engelen-Kefer 2002).
15 In November 2004 the new Barroso Commission was approved by the European 
Parliament to take on its duties for the period 2005-2009.
16 For more information on the inter-institutional debate that led to the publication of this 
document, as well as on how the Commission’s proposed measures were received by the 
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Social Committee, Subcommittee (98), Engelen-Kefer 2002; COM(2001)0727, final;
European Parliament 2001a; European Parliament and European Council Regulation 
(EC) 30 May 2001; European Economic and Social Committee, Subcommittee (98), 
Rapporteur-General (98), Rodriguez-Garcia-Caro 2001; Kinnock 2001b; Kinnock 2001a.
17 Interviewee 1, Annex 2.
18 However, unlike the previous Information and Communication Policy communication, 
where similar statements were made without providing the necessary evidence to back 
them up, this time the Commission calls upon the results of a study regarding the public’s 
perception of the European Union, of its role and of the challenges facing the Union in the 
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future (OPTEM Study 2002 quoted in COM(2002)350, final/2).
19 Although the Commission tried to put a positive spin on the quantity of the feedback it 
had received, the fact remains that the number of responses was quite disappointing.
Considering that the EU consists of 450 million citizens, a return of 260 contributions 
cannot be considered just “modest”, which is how the Commission described it 
(COM(2002)705, final: 7). Even more disappointing was the fact that several Member-
states did not send any feedback, while the responses from EU institutions varied, with 
certain institutions not sending any feedback at all.
20 See Chapter 2, Part 2.4.
21 The options for joint actions with government agencies in the Member States include 
joint information activities co-financed and co-managed through a signed agreement 
(convention). Examples of co-operation concern mutual references and links to Internet 
sites and similar cross-referencing (COM(2001)354, final: 13).
22 Interviewee 2, Annex 2.
23 See Section 3.1.2.
24 The Commission also proposes here the introduction of the Memorandum of 
Understanding and also agreements on information topics prioritised by the 
Interinstitutional Group on Information (IGI), both of which proposals would need to be 
signed by Member States, as part of their cooperation with the Commission in 
implementing the Information and Communication Strategy (COM(2002)350, final/2: 24). 
The developments with regard to the Memorandum of Understanding are followed up in 
other documents examined later in this chapter.
25Similarly, the Report on European Governance, also published in 2002 (COM(2002)705, 
final), emphasised the importance of the Member States getting more actively involved in 
promoting public debate on EU affairs, without actually mentioning whether there had 
been any progress made on that aspect since the 2001 White Paper had been published 
(ibid.: 7).
26 The Commission also acknowledges the importance of education in raising awareness 
regarding the EU and its main tasks and achievements, but it does not elaborate on this 
aspect of informing the public, and defers the issue to future discussions, after the 
Member States have studied the issue and come up with proposals (COM(2002)350, 
final/2: 10)- most certainly because education is a sensitive matter, where the Member 
States have almost absolute autonomy from the EU decision-making bodies.
27 See Section 3.1.1.
28 See also Section 3.1.3 and notes 24 and 25 above. At the time that the Communication 
on the Implementation of the Information and Communication strategy examined here 
was published, 6 Member States had signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on 
cooperation in EU information and communication matters (Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal, 
France and Luxembourg) and 4 were in the process of concluding (Austria, Belgium, 
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Netherlands and Finland) (COM(2004)196, final: 9). The Commission suggested again 
that the Memorandum would be a “purely political” instrument “resting on a voluntary 
basis” which would “meet the need for adaptability and flexibility expressed by most of the 
national public authorities concerning the implementation of a joint communication plan” 
with the European Commission (ibid.). The Memorandum would be offered to the New 
Member States after 1 May 2004, once it had been validated by the then 15 EU Member 
States.
29 It should be noted here that since the publication of the first Information and 
Communication Policy, the European Council started participating fully in the 
development of the information and communication strategy, particularly within the 
Interinstitutional Group on Information (IGI) while the European Parliament with its vote in 
April 2003 approved of the Commission’s efforts in creating and implementing an 
Information and Communication Strategy (COM(2004)196, final: 5). The Parliament also 
emphasised the importance of cultural and linguistic diversities among the European 
public and stressed that these need to be taken into consideration when implementing 
priority information campaigns (ibid.).
30 EUROPA was initially launched on the Commission's initiative in 1995. Following a 
suggestion from the European Parliament, the Secretaries-General of all institutions set 
up a Task Force in 1997 which subsequently developed into the Inter-institutional Internet 
Editorial Committee, with the Commission providing the chair.
31 The other two tools are EuropeDirect, which provides direct contact with the EU 
institutions, and TV and radio, in particular Europe by Satellite. Interestingly, despite the 
emphasis on EUROPA, television and radio have been found to be the preferred means 
of information for the majority of the European public (COM(2002)350, final/2: 19-20). 
According to the Commission, 66% of Europeans use radio and television as their main 
source of information on the European Union (ibid.: 20). However, the source of this data 
is not provided in the document.
32 Europe Direct is a service which is available to all EU citizens in the form of a generic 
email address or a generic telephone number, both serving as a contact point for the 
public, providing information and help regarding European issues.
33 The Commission called for an ad hoc evaluation of EuroNews on 9 July 2003 and 
Deloitte and Touche carried out the project. The Commission’s view of EuroNews here is 
based on Deloitte and Touche’s report (COM(2004)196, final). Despite the fact that its 
effectiveness “is limited by financial constraints” (ibid.: 18) the Commission concludes that 
EuroNews is a very effective medium for disseminating information regarding the EU, as it 
is cost effective compared to other tools of informing the public and can broadcast the 
equivalent of 4 hours of information viewed every day by over 7.1 million viewers (ibid.: 
19). EuroNews website also has over 500,000 hits a month with 4 million pages visited 
and 3000 hours of video information downloaded (ibid.). On that basis, it was decided that 
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the EU would co-finance EuroNews new programmes and more hours of broadcasting of 
European programmes.
34 See Chapter 1, Section 1.2.1.
35 See Chapter 1, Part 1.3.
36 Before the Prodi Commission completed its 5-year mandate and handed over to the 
Barroso Commission, ten new Commissioners from the 10 new member-states were 
added to its body in May 2005 (EUROPA 2006h).
37 For more information and analysis of the 2004 enlargement process see Nugent 2004 
and Commission of the European Communities 2006f. The latter also offers information 
on the developments regarding future EU enlargements.
38 The overall turnout in all EU member-states averaged a poor 45.6% (European 
Parliament 2004a). Amongst the new member states, with the exception of Cyprus and 
Malta, the turnout was also low (ibid.).
39 For more information on the deliberation and negotiation process that led to the agreed 
text of the Constitutional Treaty see EUROPA 2006a and 2006i. For further analysis of 
the theoretical issues related to the Constitutional Treaty see Smismans 2004; Weiler and 
Wind 2003; Habermas 2004; Weiler 1999.
40 More specifically, the data was drawn from four principal sources:
a) The input into a working group that met regularly at the Brussels’ offices of Friends of 
Europe and Gallup Europe as a forum for senior EU information officials, MEPs, national 
governments’ communications specialists, consultants and journalists. The group’s 
activities culminated in a major brainstorming session in Brussels on September 2, 2004;
b) The results of an extensive Gallup Europe opinion poll in the spring of 2004. Over 
2,000 people replied to 25 questions that had in large part been shaped by the Working 
Group;
c) The anecdotal evidence drawn from the opinions expressed by 20 top politicians, 
journalists and opinion formers who were extensively interviewed by Friends of Europe
during the summer of 2004; and
d) The results of an autumn 2004 opinion poll, conducted by Gallup Europe, working in 
partnership with the EurActiv.com web portal. This online survey put forward 30 questions 
arising from the Working Group’s discussion, and was answered by 1,500 people (Davies 
and Readhead 2004: 7).
41 Besides France and the Netherlands, no other EU member-states have rejected the 
Constitutional Treaty through their ratification procedures. 15 member-states have 
already ratified the Treaty, either by referendum or parliamentary vote or other procedure, 
namely Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxemburg, Malta, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain. The remaining member-
states have postponed the ratification of the Treaty, either for the near future or 
indefinitely, following the negative referendums in France and the Netherlands (EUROPA 
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2006a; EUROPA 2006i).
42 “There is an element of naivety within the EU institutional culture, as far as 
communication with the public and the public’s perception of the EU is concerned. Most 
EU officials, particularly those who work on a policy-implementation level, find it difficult to 
understand that the public views the EU institutions in different, negative even, light 
because they are emotionally attached to the issues that they need to communicate to 
the public”, Interviewee 1, Annex 2.
43 Interviewee 1, Annex 2.
Although the Commission on several occasions expressed its strong support for the 
ratification of the Constitutional Treaty by the member-states, an Information note from 
Vice-President Wallström to the College of Commissioners in March 2005, just two 
months before the first negative referendum in France, clarified that the Commission 
would under no circumstances “produce propaganda on the Constitution, campaign 
during election periods or breach national rules on referenda or distribution of information” 
(Wallström 2005: 2). Despite that, the Commissioner declared the institution’s 
commitment to assist any member states requiring support with their Constitution 
campaigns and to ensure that the EU citizens received all necessary information on the 
issue in an unbiased manner (ibid.).  
44 See also the 2006 Commission Communications to the Council on the developments 
on Plan D and the EU’s Communication strategy (COM(2006)212, provisional version; 
COM(2006)211, final).
45 See Annex 1 for a list of the specific actions that the Commission proposed under the 
area of citizens’ participation in the democratic process.
46 See Chapter 1, Section 1.2.1.
47 See Annex 1, Table I.
48 See Chapter 1, Section 1.3.4.
49 See also Commission of the European Communities 2005b; Commission of the 
European Communities 2005d.
50 Interviewee 1, Annex 2.
51 See also Section 3.2.1.
52 See Annex 1, Tables II-IV for the Commission’s proposed aims and expected results of 
Plan D in each of these four areas of action.
53 See also Section 3.2.1.
54 Interviewee 1, Annex 2.
55 Interviewee 5, Annex 2.
56 For more information see the website “White Paper on a European Communication 
policy: Have your say!” (Directorate General Communication/Commission of the 
European Communities 2006). 
57 See Chapter 1, Part 1.2.
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58 See Part 3.2.1.
59 Interviewee 2, Annex 2.
60 Interviewee 5, Annex 2.
61 Interviewee 1, Annex 2.
62 See Chapter 1, Part 1.3.
63 See Chapter 1, Part 1.2.
64 While most of the documents examined here rather tactfully dismiss the claims that the 
EU has a democratic deficit, its main public communication document, Europe in 12 
Lessons (Fontaine 2003), first published in 2003, blatantly rejects such an argument, a 
trend which is reflected in online official webpages, such as the Glossary on key EU 
terms, found on the EUROPA website, and Eurojargon, also found on the EUROPA 
website (EUROPA 2006b; EUROPA 2006d).
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Chapter 4- EU public communication: Online policy 
implementation
The previous chapters have provided the theoretical and analytical 
framework, within which three of the EU’s official websites will be 
examined in this chapter. The aim here is to investigate how the EU’s 
Information and Communication strategy is implemented online, 
particularly with reference to the process of vertical Europeanisation of the 
European public sphere. The focus of this chapter is, therefore, on the 
“how” component of the theoretical model regarding the public sphere, i.e. 
on the process of the online public dialogue between EU officials and the 
general public.
As discussed in Chapter 2, from a theoretical point of view, the role 
of the Internet is seen as key in the implementation of the EU’s public 
communication strategy because it offers the possibility of citizens’ 
participation in the EU decision-making process and in contributing to the 
establishment of non-mediated public debate between the EU institutions 
and the public (vertical Europeanisation of the public sphere). In addition, 
because of the nature of the European public sphere (i.e. fragmented 
public, no common language or collective identity, vertical public dialogue 
between EU institutions and the public mediated by national media) the 
Internet is considered here as a key medium that could enable direct 
public dialogue to develop between EU institutions and the public, 
because of its core characteristic of facilitating interaction regardless of 
identity, censorship and geographical boundaries.
These theoretical hypotheses were then compared, in Chapter 3, to 
the EU’s official Information and Communication strategy of the periods 
2000-2004 and 2004-2006, in order to establish if any elements of the 
theoretical model appear in the policy-making level of the EU’s public 
communication strategy. The findings indicated that, overall, the proposed 
Information and Communication strategy focuses on improving the public’s 
perception of the EU, on facilitating public dialogue and supporting the 
emerging European public sphere. Furthermore, the Internet is given a 
central role in the implementation of the proposed strategy, particularly in 
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the period 2004-2006.
In addition, the review of the documents also provided a set of 
values and ideas, which the Commission has proposed as the conceptual 
“thread” that should connect all EU public communication messages and 
actions. The core of the proposed EU Information and Communication 
strategy revolves around the ideas of peace, prosperity and democracy1, 
under which several more specific issues and topics have been identified2.
Finally, the Information and Communication documents and 
interviews with Commission officials involved in the policy-making and/or 
policy-implementation of the EU’s public communication strategy revealed 
a difference of perception between the policy-makers and the policy-
implementing officials pertaining to who the target audiences of the 
strategy should be online. The Commission also appears reluctant to 
assume a leading, proactive role in communicating with the public, leaving 
this role to the member-states, despite their disappointing efforts in this 
area so far.
The issues, then, that the coding and analysis of the homepage 
contents of three of the EU’s official websites will aim to address are the 
following:
a)How close is the EU’s online public communication to the normative 
model of public communication identified in Chapters 1 and 2? Are the 
criteria for successful public communication met online? Is the Internet 
used to promote openness, participation in the decision-making process 
and public debate on EU/European issues? Is there any evidence of the 
vertical aspect of the European public sphere being facilitated by the EU’s 
official websites? 
b)Are the goals of the EU Information and Communication strategy, as set 
out in the documents examined in Chapter 3, met by the EU’s official 
websites and to what extent? Are the core values of the EU Information 
and Communication strategy covered by the EU’s official websites?
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4.1 Methodology
4.1.1 The websites
The data used in this analysis includes all the links found on the 
homepages of three official EU websites, namely the websites EUROPA 
(Commission of the European Communities 2006bb), European Union @ 
United Nations (Commission of the European Communities 2006d), which 
from now on will be referred to as EU@UN, and European Union- The 
Delegation of the European Union to the USA (Delegation of the European 
Commission to the USA 2006), henceforth referred to as EURUNION.
EUROPA is the EU’s official portal, linking the websites of all its 
institutions, delegations, committees and so on, as well as providing 
access to legal documentation, general information on the EU and 
specialised information targeting specific groups (for example, young 
people and women). The European Commission has overall supervision of 
the portal3 but is in close collaboration with the other European institutions 
with regard to the published material4. The website was therefore chosen 
for this study as it is the EU’s main online public communication tool.
On the other hand, EURUNION is a website targeted at a non-EU 
audience, i.e. the US public, and was therefore chosen as a sample of the 
EU’s external public communication strategy online. It is managed by the 
Commission’s Washington DC Delegation in the US5 and is therefore 
subject to the Guidelines for the European Commission’s Delegation 
websites (RELEX 1/5- Information and Communication/Directorate-
General for External Relations/Commission of the European Communities 
2006). However, the Commission is not directly involved in the 
management or editorial process of the Delegations’ websites. The 
specific website chosen here, EURUNION, is of particular interest not only 
because it is addressed to the public of one of the EU’s biggest and most 
influential allies, but also because until 2005 it did not even comply with 
the general Guidelines for the Delegation websites.
Finally the EU@UN website is a sample of targeted online 
communication, aimed at a specialised audience (UN diplomats, state 
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representatives etc) and it was chosen as a control website. It is part of the 
EUROPA portal and is, therefore, under the supervision of the 
Commission, with the collaboration of the other EU institutions.
Links have been monitored for 24 weeks, 12 weeks in 2004 
(13/03/2004 to 10/06/2004) and 12 weeks in 2005 (03/05/2005-
20/07/2005). The coding took place once a week. The dates were chosen 
to coincide with the period leading up to and right after the accession of 
the ten new Member-States on 1 May 2004 as well as the negotiations 
leading to the opening of the accession negotiations with Turkey in 
October 2005.
The coding period also coincided with the commencement of the 
ratification process of the Constitutional Treaty as well as the appointment 
of a new Commission of the European Union in 2005. As we have already 
seen in Chapter 3, the Barroso Commission for the first time appointed a 
Commissioner (Vice-President Margot Wallström) solely to oversee the 
EU’s Information and Communication Strategy and there has been a 
significant shift in the EU’s policy-making with regard to the EU’s public 
communication strategy since the new Commission took office in late 
20046. Although the policy documents of the period 2004-2005 were not 
produced until after July 2005, when the second coding period of the three 
websites had already been completed, traces of the changes that these 
documents introduced can already be detected in the coded data.
4.1.2 Coding values
The coding process included all the links found on the homepages 
of the three selected EU websites, with certain exceptions, which are
outlined in the following paragraphs. The content of the webpages linked 
to the homepage of EUROPA, EU@UN and EURUNION was coded 
according to the type of public communication covered on each webpage, 
the text and the communication available on each webpage7.
More specifically, the main text of the links found on the homepages 
of the three EU websites was coded, at first instance, according to the type 
of public communication conducted through it, i.e. according to whether 
the text was written:
127
a) As a reaction to an event/incident that had already taken place (re-
active public communication; taking place hours/days after an incident 
has occurred);
b) With the aim to inform the public about forthcoming EU actions/ events 
and to create awareness and/or engage the public in EU issues currently 
on the EU institutions’ agenda (pro-active public communication; 
strategy aiming to get results within weeks/months); or
c) With the aim to build a relationship of trust with the public, by 
highlighting and providing information on EU actions directly linked to the 
EU’s core values and aims (relationship-building public 
communication; long-term strategy that shows results after years).
This time-based approach of public communication has already 
been discussed in Chapter 18. This approach allows for one of main 
aspects of the EU’s online public communication strategy to be observed 
and quantified, i.e. is the Commission’s aim to build/reinstate the public’s 
trust towards the EU institutions (proactive/relationship-building public 
communication) being implemented online? We have already seen that 
the Commission recognises the lack of the public’s trust towards EU 
institutions as one of the key factors that need to be addressed if the issue 
of the EU institutions’ legitimacy is to be successfully resolved, although it 
will not recognise that there is an actual democratic deficit in the EU 
institutions9. Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter 1, building the 
audiences’ trust towards an institution is a first step towards establishing 
that institution in the collective consciousness of these audiences, and 
thus achieving their recognition of the institution’s legitimacy10. For these 
reasons, relationship-building, and to a lesser extent proactive, public 
communication is crucial in the case of the EU. The question is whether 
this type of public communication is deployed on the three EU websites 
under examination here.
The criteria for classifying a webpage as conducting reactive, 
proactive or relationship-building public communication were two: firstly, to 
establish whether the webpage was permanent or temporary. In order for 
a webpage to qualify as permanent, it would have to be linked to the 
website’s homepage throughout the entire period that the coding took 
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place. Links that were updated on a daily/weekly basis were considered 
temporary. Secondly, the information contained in the main text/body of 
the webpage was analysed, according to whether it was general 
information aiming to present a positive image of the EU and/or relate its 
actions to everyday issues of its citizens; whether the contents of the 
webpage aimed to inform/ create awareness regarding a specific issue/ 
area of EU action within the next few months; or, finally, whether it was 
information released in response to a recent internal/international 
development/incident.
For example, the webpage “The EU at a glance” (EUROPA 2006g)
found on the EUROPA website, was classified under relationship-building 
communication, because it is permanently linked to EUROPA’s homepage 
and contains information about the EU in general (e.g. information about 
the Treaties of the EU, the Member-States, the EU symbols etc). This 
information aims to create a positive image of the EU, highlight its 
strengths, relate its achievements to day-to-day improvement of living 
standards and increase the public’s trust to its institutions.
Similarly, the webpage of the Luxembourg Presidency 2005 
(Luxembourg Government 2006) aimed to increase awareness regarding 
the Luxembourg presidency of the Council of the European Union, its 
aims, and achievements, whilst aiming to contribute to the construction of 
a positive image of the EU at the same time. However, it was linked to all 
three websites’ homepages for only six months, i.e. only for the duration of 
the presidency by that member state. It was therefore classified under 
proactive, instead of relationship-building, public communication.
An example of reactive public communication can be found in the 
“EU day-by-day” links found on the EUROPA homepage, which are 
updated usually on a daily basis. These links mostly contained official 
responses/ information with regard to a specific recent event/ 
development, be it internal or concerning third countries. They were 
therefore coded as reactive public communication webpages.
It is important to clarify here that it has not always been clear at first 
glance whether a webpage could be classified as solely reactive, proactive 
or relationship-building public communication. For example, a webpage 
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containing the EU’s official congratulatory message to the new elected 
leader of a third country (reactive) would often contain further information 
regarding recent political developments in that country (proactive) and the
EU’s general relations, political or financial, with that state, as well as 
information regarding the different sectors of EU activity in the wider 
geographical area (relationship building). In these cases, a webpage was 
coded under all the applicable public communication categories.
The second issue under investigation in this chapter is if the core 
EU values (“main thread”), which the Commission has identified in all its 
proposed Information and Communication strategy documents, 
consistently and continuously underpin the content of the three EU 
websites’ pages, regardless of whether these webpages are of reactive, 
proactive or relationship-building nature. In other words, is there 
coherence in the messages the EU chooses to communicate to the public 
online, or does it deviate from its main public communication “thread” in 
cases of crises, for example?
In order to answer this question, after breaking down the online 
messages found on the three selected EU websites’ homepages into the 
categories of reactive, proactive and relationship-building public 
communication, the areas/issues addressed through each type of public 
communication were determined. The coding values used for this purpose 
were defined initially using the ideas and the issues comprising the 
Commission’s proposed EU Information and Communication strategy, as 
these were identified in Chapter 3, namely peace, democracy and 
prosperity. However, these three ideas are very broad and when a trial 
coding was carried out based only on these three values, it became 
obvious that these did not cover all the material that was available on the 
websites’ homepages. Therefore, further categorisation was necessary.
By examining more closely the more concrete and specific issues 
identified in the Commission’s documents proposing an EU Information 
and Communication strategy as related to these core values11, it became 
possible to regroup these in three further categories, i.e. politics, economy 
and society, as shown in Table 4.1 below.
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Table 4.1: Phase 1 of defining Coding values for the content found in EUROPA, 
EU@UN and EURUNION homepages, adapted from Table 3.1, Chapter 3.
Peace Democracy Prosperity
1. A Europe open to 
the world: EU 
Common Foreign and 
Security Policy
2. Safety and security/ 
Rule of law
1. Accountability, 
openness and 
participation
2. Enlargement
Politics
1. Environmental 
protection and 
sustainable 
development
Economy
1. A sense of belonging/ 
a European identity
2. Freedom of movement
1. Creating new 
jobs
2. Social security 
issues
Society
A repeat trial coding of the three EU websites’ homepages indicated 
that these areas of action specified in EU Information and Communication 
strategy documents were not enough, in order to allow for the content of 
all webpages to be coded appropriately. For that reason, two other key 
public communication sources were used, one printed and one electronic:
The European Union in 12 lessons (Fontaine 2003) and The EU at a 
Glance (EUROPA 2006g). Unlike the documents examined in Chapter 3, 
these are not policy-making documents but policy-implementation 
material. Their purpose is to summarise the main values for which the EU 
stands, the way the EU works and the benefits that the EU has brought 
and continues to bring to its citizens.
Despite the fact that both sources verge on the edge of 
propaganda, particularly The EU in 12 Lessons12, they nevertheless follow 
the concept of the “main thread” of core values proposed in the documents 
examined in Chapter 3, and go on to provide concrete examples of areas 
where the EU has been or will be proactive in relation to these three core 
values. After reviewing these sources and juxtaposing their content to the 
topics identified during the trial coding of the websites’ homepages, it 
became possible to compose a more comprehensive list of areas of 
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action, under the categories of politics, economy and society, which 
allowed for accurate classification of all the content found on the 
EUROPA, EU@UN and EURUNION homepages. These are presented in 
the table below.
Table 4.2: Phase 2 of defining Coding values for the content found in EUROPA, 
EU@UN and EURUNION homepages, adapted from Table 3.1, Chapter 3.
Peace Democracy Prosperity
1. The EU’s role in the 
world:
EU Common Foreign 
and Security Policy/ 
Safety and security/ 
Rule of law- EU 
external
2. Main ideas the EU 
stands for, including 
democracy and the rule of 
law
3. How the EU works/ 
Internal politics/ Relations 
among member-states/ 
Enlargement
Politics:
3 thematic 
areas
1. Trade/ development-
EU external
2. Environment- EU 
external
3. Financial aid- EU 
external
4. The Euro
5. Transport issues 
within the EU
6. Trade/ development-
EU internal
7. Environment- EU 
internal
8. Financial aid- EU 
internal
Economy:
8 thematic 
areas
1. Freedom of movement/  
Travelling in the EU
2. Volunteering/ Social
solidarity
3. Language issues
4. Employment issues, 
including creating new 
jobs/fighting 
unemployment and social 
security issues
5. Health
6. Education
7. Culture/ A sense of 
belonging/ A European 
identity
8. Science-Research
Society:
8 thematic 
areas
The final list of the combined public communication and content 
coding values is presented in Tables VI, VII and VIII in Annex 2. When the 
main text of a webpage fell under more than one of the thematic areas 
defined above, it was coded several times under all the relevant public 
communication-content values13.
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Further coding values were needed in order to determine whether 
another of the criteria for successful public communication (that of moving 
beyond intellectual/ specialised forms of communication and reaching a 
wider audience) was being met. For this reason, the main text found on 
each webpage was classified as using either “formal” or 
“informal/everyday” language14. All official documentation, including all 
legal documents, official press releases and announcements, was coded 
as “formal”. Similarly, any texts containing institutional jargon, without 
further explanatory phrases/notes, were classified as “formal”. Texts 
written for publication on the specific websites, without containing legal or 
institutional jargon, were coded as “informal/everyday language” texts. In 
addition to that, in line with the aim of the EU Information and 
Communication documents examined in the Chapter 3, to explain to the 
public what the EU is and what it does, text was coded according to 
whether it provided only information on an issue without any 
accompanying explanatory text or notes (informational content); or it 
focused primarily on analysis of a topic (analytical content); or both15. 
The third main issue under investigation is the facilitation of public 
dialogue through these websites. In order to assess the degree to which 
interaction between the public and EU officials is facilitated on the three 
EU websites, all webpages linked to the websites’ homepage here were 
further coded according to the communication opportunities they offer to 
the visitors. Three main types of online communication were identified, 
namely email, online discussion/forum and online real-time communication 
with officials. Webpages were thus classified under eight categories, 
according to whether they provided links to one, several, all or none of the 
above types of communication16. Additionally, the webpages which 
provided the users with links to an online discussion/forum were further 
analysed, in order to identify the types of discussion topics covered on that 
forum. The coding also aimed to provide an insight of the actual 
participation of European citizens in debates regarding European issues, 
with regard to the numbers of participants other than EU officials, and 
degree of interaction amongst them17.
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4.1.3 Descriptive statistical analysis
For the coding and processing of the data, the software applications 
SPSS and Microsoft Excel were used. The resulting coded data and the 
statistical analysis performed were divided in two data sets.
Data Set 1 covers the variables 1-64 presented on Tables V-IX in 
Annex 3. These variables include the website on which each link was 
found, the date that the coding took place and the different types of public 
communication, topics, text and content that were found on each of the 
webpages linked to the three websites’ homepages. In order to identify 
any correlation between these variables, the following descriptive 
statistical tests were carried out:
a)Cross-tabulation and chi-square test of the website and type of public 
communication and topics variables, aiming to determine which type of 
public communication and topics occurred on each website as well as 
whether the variables of website and type of public communication are 
independent;
b)Cross-tabulation and chi-square test of the website and interactive 
communication variables, aiming to identify possible relation between the 
websites under examination and the interactive communication provided 
on each website;
c)Cross-tabulation and chi-square test of the text and the public 
communication occurring on each website, intending to determine the 
extent to which language is dependent on the type of public 
communication conducted and the website where the text appears; and
d)Cross-tabulation and chi-square test of the type of interactive 
communication and the type of public communication per website. These 
tests were carried out in order to investigate the relationship between the 
types of interactive communication and public communication and the 
website on which they appear.
Data Set 2 covers the variables 1A-8A presented on Table X in 
Annex 3. These variables were used to map the process of online 
interactive communication taking place in the fora found on the three EU 
websites during the coding period. The variables include the topics 
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covered in the online discussions, the number of participants per topic and 
day, as well as the official input. The data was analysed in the following 
ways:
a)Frequency tables of topics and number of participants per discussion 
topic, which gave an overview of the topics favoured by each website. 
Cross-tabulation and chi-square tests of topics and number of participants 
per website was also carried out in order to identify a possible relation 
between these variables;
b)Cross-tabulation and chi-square test of the topic and official input per 
website, aiming to identify a possible relation between the topic/s of the 
online discussion/forum and the official contribution to that discussion; and
c)Descriptive statistics of the number of participants on each online 
discussion/forum, the number of comments per topic and the number of 
responses aimed at other participants of the online discussion.
4.2 Findings
The results indicate that all the three selected websites aim mainly 
towards a relationship-building public communication, although there are 
significant differences amongst them, regarding the types of topics 
covered on each website. In general, though, all contents adhered to the 
main thread of “peace-prosperity-democracy” outlined in the EU 
Information and Communication strategy documents. With reference to the 
theoretical model established in Chapters 1 and 2, the analysis of the 
websites produced no surprising results as far as the language used is 
concerned as, in the majority, the webpages analysed tended to move 
beyond intellectual forms of communication.
The surprise, both from a theoretical and policy-making point of 
view, came from the analysis of the interaction opportunities available on 
the three websites. The results show that while interactive communication 
in the form of email is almost always provided by all three websites, online 
discussions/ fora were scarcely available during the coding period. The 
figures are equally disappointing as far as the continuity of the online 
discussions is concerned. The few opportunities for online public dialogue 
available on EUROPA and EURUNION in 2004, disappeared altogether in 
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2005. Nevertheless, the constant increase on the number of participants in 
the websites’ online fora in 2004 can be interpreted as encouraging, as far 
as the emerging European public sphere is concerned. The findings are 
presented below in two sections according to the two periods that the 
coding took place (2004 and 2005).
4.2.1 Coding period March-June 2004
During the period 13/03/2004 to 10/06/2004, 442 links were coded 
on the EUROPA homepage, 609 links on the EU@UN homepage and 979
links on the EURUNION homepage. Table 4.1 summarises the frequency 
with which each type of time-related public communication and category of 
topics was recorded on each website18.
As far as the type of public communication most frequently 
occurring on all three websites is concerned, the analysis of the data 
shows that relationship-building communication is favoured by all three 
websites. Looking at the three categories of content (politics, economy, 
society), a first difference in the issues covered on each of the three 
websites emerges: While most links classified under relationship-building 
public communication on the EU@UN and EURUNION homepages 
covered political issues, in the case of the EUROPA homepage, most links 
coded under the same type of public communication covered social 
issues.
At first glance, this is positive, as the overall predominance of social 
issues on the website’s permanent links indicates that the Commission’s 
proposed strategy of matching the messages to the public’s priorities is 
being implemented on EUROPA. Social issues, and in particular 
employment and national pension schemes, always feature highly in 
Eurobarometer public opinion surveys, and are identified as sectors where 
the EU is perceived to have poor performance (Commission of the 
European Communities 2006e; Eurobarometer 2006b).
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Table 4.3: Frequency of occurrence for type of public communication and category 
of topics per website in Year 1 (2004), Source: The author, Source of data: EUROPA, 
EU@UN, EURUNION.
Type of public communication
EUROPA EU@UN EURUNIONPolitics
Reactive Proactive Relation-building Reactive Proactive
Relation-
building Reactive Proactive
Relation-
building
Political ideals 
the EU stands 
for
24 75 159 23 96 212 90 57 350
Relations 
between 
member states/
How the EU 
works
35 123 296 65 118 198 177 321 358
External 
relations/
Foreign policy of 
the EU
51 73 119 137 288 434 243 408 635
Totals 110 271 574 225 502 844 510 786 1343
EUROPA EU@UN EURUNION
Economy
Reactive Proactive Relation-building Reactive Proactive
Relation-
building Reactive Proactive
Relation-
building
Euro 4 61 130 12 14 24 14 33 106
Transport/
Internal 18 53 83 12 25 43 24 91 150
Trade/
Development/
Internal
30 91 180 14 28 24 81 122 231
Environment/
Internal 17 68 119 15 29 50 13 97 150
Financial 
Aid/Internal 5 29 101 12 13 12 0 42 32
Trade/
Development/
External
8 46 91 17 85 122 98 153 196
Environment/
External 3 30 66 16 71 99 1 55 91
Financial Aid/
External 17 51 130 35 140 174 27 85 123
Totals 102 429 900 133 405 648 278 678 1079
EUROPA EU@UN EURUNION
Society
Reactive Proactive Relation-building Reactive Proactive
Relation-
building Reactive Proactive
Relation-
building
Work-related 
issues 0 47 200 13 16 24 1 28 74
Health-related 
issues 19 56 173 18 39 58 33 151 173
Volunteering/
Solidarity issues 2 35 113 14 51 45 2 26 22
Education 1 32 163 12 18 24 0 13 53
Culture 2 38 119 12 29 36 1 24 79
Science/
Research 0 7 139 12 13 12 1 63 94
Language-
related issues 0 37 83 12 12 12 3 0 23
Travelling in EU 0 22 71 12 12 12 0 2 31
Totals 24 274 1061 105 190 223 41 307 549
: Highlights the sub-category covered most per category of topics and type of public communication
: Highlights the category of topics (politics, economy or society) covered most per type of public communication
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However, when looking across all the sub-categories of content 
under relationship-building public communication, the single most 
frequently covered sub-category of topics on EUROPA is that of relations 
between member-states/how the EU works (Politics category), and not a 
sub-category of social issues, as would be expected. This also 
distinguishes the EUROPA website from the other two websites under 
scrutiny, where there is consistency between the single most frequently 
covered sub-category (External relations and foreign policy of the EU) and 
overall thematic category (Politics) under relationship-building public 
communication.
This would not be a problem for EUROPA (on the contrary, it could 
even be considered as an indication of a more balanced content) if it was 
not for the fact that the thematic category of Politics or one of its sub-
categories predominate on this website across all three types of public 
communication. More specifically, politics, and in particular external 
relations/ foreign policy of the EU, is the most frequently occurring 
category on EUROPA under reactive public communication. Similarly, 
although most proactive public communication links found on the 
EUROPA homepage fall under the category of Economy, the single most 
frequently occurring sub-category of content under this category of public 
communication is that of political relations between Member-States/ how 
the EU works, with internal trade and development (Economy) coming 
second across all sub-categories of content.
As a consequence, despite the high number of social issues 
recorded under relationship-building public communication (42.5% of all 
relationship-building links), EUROPA focuses mainly on internal political 
issues and institutional procedures etc, since out of a total of 442 links 
recorded on the homepage in Year 1, 296 were classified under that 
particular content category. Likewise, in the case of proactive public 
communication, while the overall emphasis is given on Economy, a 
category with direct connotations to the concept of prosperity, the 
message is somewhat lost, since the sub-category with the greater 
presence on the homepage is again that of internal EU politics and 
institutional procedures. In other words, political issues prevail on the 
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EUROPA website, even if its homepage appears to have a balanced 
content. 
With regard to the other two websites, Politics is also the most 
frequently covered category when it comes to reactive and proactive public 
communication, with the two websites consistently offering more coverage 
on issues regarding the EU’s external relations/ foreign policy. Economy 
topics come second in frequency of occurrence across all three types of 
public communication. However, the focus is on different sub-categories of 
topics: EU@UN hosts links mainly regarding financial aid that the EU 
provides to third countries while the EURUNION homepage covers mainly 
issues regarding EU trade policies towards and agreements with third 
countries.
When it comes to social issues, although it is the category least 
favoured by EU@UN and EURUNION, we find that there is one sub-
category of topics, that regarding health issues, which receives by far the 
most coverage of all social issues on these two websites. Health issues 
are also the most frequently recorded social issues on the EUROPA 
homepage, in terms of reactive and proactive public communication.
As far as the EURUNION website is concerned, the data from Year 
1 confirms the expectations that this is one of the EU’s external public 
communication websites. As such, the EURUNION website should aim to 
reach as wide an American audience as possible and create a positive 
image of the EU amongst the American public. It would therefore be 
expected to have a balanced content but also cater for the interests of the 
public in that particular country. This could explain why the website puts 
most of its emphasis on issues regarding external relations/ foreign policy 
of the EU, with a particular focus on issues that affect the US directly or 
indirectly, but at the same time topics regarding the EU’s trade with third 
countries, and in particular the US, receive high coverage too. Even in 
cases where health matters are covered, there is almost always reference 
to financial implications or repercussions that the EU’s actions regarding 
those health issues may have on the US economy/businesses.
Nevertheless, it was not possible to confirm that the focus on these 
specific topics was a direct result of the Delegation responding to the 
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public’s needs or even a specialised niche audience. The EU officials 
interviewed on this matter admitted that a relevant public survey had not 
taken place on a large scale19. They did stress, though, that the feedback 
they received from individual users of the website was positive20. 
Furthermore, it was confirmed through the interviews that monthly and 
quarterly statistical measurements on the numbers of visitors and 
webpage hits are carried out, although the interviewees declined to divulge 
any of that data.
On the other hand, the control website used in this study, EU@UN, 
confirmed its role as a specialised website, aimed at a niche audience (UN 
diplomats, third-country representatives and/or member-states’ diplomats) 
since most of the links found on its homepage concern the EU’s relations 
with third countries. At the same time, the website underlines the EU’s 
importance as an international guarantor of welfare, by favouring coverage 
of issues regarding the EU’s financial aid towards third countries and its 
role in addressing international health crises such the AIDS and SARS 
epidemics.
As far as the text (i.e. the language) used by the three websites is 
concerned, the analysis of the data indicates that all three websites favour 
informal/every-day language and have most of their contents written in a 
way that can appeal to as broad an audience as possible, as Figure 4.10
illustrates. The highest percentage of every-day/informal language on all 
three websites is recorded in links that fall under the category of 
relationship-building public communication, as would be expected.
So far, the data shows that, overall, the three EU websites under 
examination comply with two of the criteria for successful public 
communication identified in Chapter 1, i.e. they are trying to increase 
awareness of what the EU is and what it does as well as to move beyond 
intellectual forms of communication and appeal to a wider public, even in 
the case of a specialised website such the EU@UN. Yet fulfilling these 
criteria alone does not address the wider issue of vertical Europeanisation 
of the public sphere. In other words, telling the public how good the EU is 
in simple every-day language is not sufficient to initiate and maintain a 
direct public dialogue between the European public and the EU 
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institutions. Furthermore, one of the core advantages of online public 
communication is that it can deploy the Internet’s key characteristic of 
unmediated interaction, bypassing national media and overcoming 
geographical boundaries. So, the question that follows is whether or not 
interaction and online public dialogue between EU officials/institutions and 
the public are facilitated on these three websites.
Unfortunately, the answer to this is negative. When it comes to 
interactive communication, the analysis of the data shows that all three 
websites provided email addresses in almost all the webpages linked to 
their homepage. However, online discussions/ fora, which would provide 
the basis for an emerging European public sphere, are scarce. The topics 
covered in those few online discussions/ fora were classified under the 
umbrella of relationship-building public communication. The fora
themselves have also been classified as relationship-building tools, as 
they encourage people to discuss the long-term effects that the European 
Union may have on the lives of the European citizens.
Of the three websites only EUROPA provided a permanent forum 
for discussion, which was also combined with real-time online 
communication with EU officials occasionally. EURUNION briefly provided 
a link to an online discussion regarding various topics, but that only 
amounted to 1% of all the webpages linked to its homepage coded 
throughout the entire 2004 period. The EU@UN website initially appeared 
to have had the highest percentage of discussion/ fora and real-time online 
communication with EU officials linked to its homepage. However, a closer 
look at the data revealed that this was only because this website provides 
a permanent link to the EUROPA homepage, where this category of
interactive communication can be found. For this reason, the EU@UN 
website was excluded from the further analysis of the data concerning 
official EU online fora.
This brings us to the findings from the analysis of Data Set 2, which 
maps the type of discussion available on the EUROPA and EURUNION 
websites: This second data set revealed a significant difference between 
not only the discussion topics found on the two websites, but also the 
official input and the number of participants in each discussion topic.
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EUROPA’s “Discussion Corner” was a permanent link on its 
homepage and the data analysis shows that throughout the monitoring 
period in 2004 the discussion topics remained the same. The areas 
covered by these online discussions regarded the European Union’s 
internal politics (in particular the Constitutional Treaty) and the EUROPA 
website itself (where discussants were asked to comment on the quality of 
the website and/ or on the changes carried out on its webpages).
The discussion topics were always provided by the webpage (i.e. 
the EU officials) and in most cases there was sufficient official 
documentation and further links related to the discussion topic. There were 
also real-time debates occasionally taking place on the forum’s webpage, 
but as these had taken place before the coding commenced, they were not 
included in the coded data. Finally, there were no EU officials found to be 
participating in any way in the ongoing debates.
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Figure 4.1: EUROPA Discussion topics and type of official input in 2004, Source: 
The author, Data Source: EUROPA.
In contrast to EUROPA, the links to online discussions/ fora found 
on EURUNION’s homepage were sporadic and temporary, covering a 
wider variety of issues, namely the EU’s internal and external politics, the 
Euro and trade and development issues both within the EU and between 
the EU and third countries, as Figure 4.2 illustrates below. The analysis of 
the data indicates that the emphasis of the fora linked to the EURUNION 
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homepage is on economy, with 33.3% of all the discussion topics covering 
Trade and Development within the EU and another 33.3% covering trade 
and development issues between the EU and third countries.
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Figure 4.2: EURUNION Discussion topics and type of official input in 2004, Source: 
The author, Data source: EURUNION.
Furthermore, again contrary to the findings in the EUROPA website, 
the discussion topics linked to the EURUNION homepage were not 
determined by the EU officials but each participant could contribute to the 
discussion with a topic of their choice (although the overall framework of 
discussion was outlined by the EU officials responsible for the website). 
The discussions in this case had more the form of Q&A (question and 
answer) session, with EU officials providing a response/ an official point of 
view on 25% of the topics. However, there was no email provided on the 
discussion webpages linked to the EURUNION homepage, unlike the 
discussion webpages linked to the EUROPA website, where interactive 
communication in the form of email was permanently available.
The analysis of Data Set 2 indicates a further difference between 
the two websites with regard to the number of participants, as Figures 4.3, 
4.4 and 4.5 illustrate. EUROPA reached a total of 2343 contributions to the 
political discussions regarding the EU Constitutional Treaty found on its 
designated webpage on week 12 of the monitoring, while the participants 
in the forum found on EURUNION website on the second week of the 
forum’s operation amounted to only eleven.
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EUROPA: Youth Discussion - Does Europe need a Constitution? (2004)
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Figure 4.3: EUROPA Youth Discussion- Does Europe need a Constitution? (2004),
Source: The author, Data source: EUROPA21.
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Figure 4.4: EUROPA- Results of the European Summit on the Constitution, Source: 
The author, Data source: EUROPA22.
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However disappointing the numbers of participants on both 
websites may be, the data analysis reveals an encouraging tendency, as 
far as the emerging European public sphere is concerned: The number of 
participants other than EU officials steadily increased over the 12-week 
period of the websites’ monitoring. In the case of the EUROPA forum, 
there was a steady increase of approximately 3.7% in the number of 
comments found on the topic and 14% in the number of answers to other 
participants. The debate regarding the Constitution, in particular, 
generated a much higher number of participants’ responses to comments 
already posted on the webpage than the number of original comments to 
the discussion topic, as Figure 4.3 shows. In other words, the data showed 
a genuine public dialogue process emerging among European citizens 
online. In the case of the EURUNION forum, despite it being available 
temporarily and therefore having only two days of data available on it, the 
increase in the number of participants was even more dramatic although 
the numbers can in no way be considered satisfactory, as Figure 4.5 
illustrates.
On the whole, it is evident from the coded data that the interactive 
part of the EU’s Information and Communication strategy was poorly 
implemented in 2004. This reflects the tendency observed in the 2001-
2004 EU Information and Communication documents to put emphasis on 
the informational rather than the communicational aspect of the strategy. 
From a theoretical point of view, this means that in 2004 the EU’s online 
public communication failed to fulfil a key aim of successful public 
communication, identified in the normative model discussed in Chapter 1-
to engage people with the EU/ in the debate of EU affairs23.
When asked about the disappointing number of opportunities for 
online public dialogue found on EUROPA and EURUNION, all 
Commission officials interviewed referred to the ongoing re-structuring 
process within the Commission and DG Communication as the main factor 
impeding the full deployment of the Internet in the EU’s public 
communication strategy. The organisation of the Directorate-General for 
Press and Communication (nowadays known as Directorate-General 
Communication and under the authority of the Commission President 
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Barroso and Vice-President and Communication Commissioner 
Wallström) underwent four significant structural changes between 2001 
and 2006 and at some point it was even functioning without a Head of DG, 
albeit for a short period of time. The interviews also revealed that the 
Commission officials have low expectations as far as the public’s 
participation in the official EU online fora is concerned: The low numbers 
of participants in the FUTURUM forum in 2004 were seen as a result of 
the public’s general indifference towards politics and as proof that the 
Internet is a public dialogue tool for the EU-informed elites only24.
The following section presents the results from the second coding 
period (2005), during which the lack of consistency between the EU’s 
Information and Communication policy and its online implementation 
became even more evident.
4.2.2 Coding period May- July 2005
During the period 03/05/2005-20/07/2005, there were 372 links 
found and coded on the EUROPA homepage, 658 on the EU@UN 
homepage and 1011 on the EURUNION one. The following table 
summarises the frequency with which each time-related type of public 
communication and thematic category (Politics, Economy and Society) 
occurred.
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Table 4.4: Frequency of occurrence for type of public communication and category 
of topics per website in Year 2 (2005), Source: The author, Source of data: EUROPA, 
EU@UN, EURUNION.
Type of public communication
EUROPA EU@UN EURUNIONPolitics
Reactive Proactive Relation-building Reactive Proactive
Relation-
building Reactive Proactive
Relation-
building
Political ideals the 
EU stands for 26 60 87 47 89 194 45 101 313
Relations between 
member states/
How the EU works
40 98 207 60 102 168 84 142 355
External 
relations/Foreign 
policy of the EU
36 73 72 188 247 388 200 332 400
Totals 102 231 366 295 438 750 329 575 1068
EUROPA EU@UN EURUNION
Economy
Reactive Proactive Relation-building Reactive Proactive
Relation-
building Reactive Proactive
Relation-
building
Euro 5 32 85 12 24 12 11 13 81
Transport/ Internal 3 42 38 13 25 24 33 66 60
Trade/
Development/
Internal
16 50 122 19 14 12 44 54 104
Environment/
Internal 8 41 58 13 37 6 13 49 86
Financial Aid/
Internal 12 18 57 14 13 12 15 18 38
Trade/
Development/
External
6 35 45 33 90 133 116 150 217
Environment/
External 1 27 25 22 74 84 12 58 59
Financial Aid/
External 9 42 44 58 133 169 36 68 86
Totals 60 287 364 174 420 452 280 466 731
EUROPA EU@UN EURUNION
Society
Reactive Proactive Relation-building Reactive Proactive
Relation-
building Reactive Proactive
Relation-
building
Work-related 
issues 0 22 147 15 14 13 11 25 76
Health-related 
issues 19 24 62 20 27 36 11 24 89
Volunteering/
Solidarity issues 2 19 48 14 48 49 17 24 23
Education 1 29 92 16 13 12 10 23 65
Culture 2 16 86 14 24 24 12 17 67
Science/ Research 0 36 80 14 13 12 19 54 78
Language-related 
issues 0 0 36 12 12 12 10 10 27
Travelling in EU 0 5 48 12 12 12 10 13 40
Totals 24 151 579 127 163 170 100 190 465
: Highlights the sub-category covered most per category of topics and type of public communication
: Highlights the category of topics (politics, economy or society) covered most per type of public communication
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Similarly to the data collected in Year 1 (2004), the data in Year 2 
(2005) shows that relationship-building communication is favoured by all 
three websites, as Figure 4.6 illustrates below.
The sub-categories of content covered mostly under the umbrella of 
relationship-building public communication remain different for each 
website, as Figure 4.7 illustrates: EUROPA favoured issues regarding 
internal EU politics and relations between Member-States with second in 
coverage work-related issues, such as employment, workers’ mobility 
within the EU, pensions, insurance and development through work. In this 
respect, the inconsistency recorded in EUROPA’s case in Year 1, when 
one single sub-category of politics (relations between Member-States/ how 
the EU works) received more coverage than any of the social or economic 
issues, continues in 2005. On the other hand, EU@UN and EURUNION 
continued to cover mainly topics related to the External relations and 
foreign policy of the EU, with second favourite category of issues being the 
EU’s trade relations with third countries for EURUNION, and financial aid 
towards third countries for EU@UN.
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Figure 4.6: Public communication in 2004 and 2005 per website, Source: The author, 
Data Sources: EUROPA, EU@UN, EURUNION.
When it comes to the links where proactive public communication is 
conducted, EUROPA favours economic issues, while the other two 
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websites consistently favour political issues, as can be seen in Figure 4.8. 
In particular, the links covering economic issues on EUROPA mainly 
concern trade and development within the EU, with transport and 
environment second and third most covered topics in 2005. In contrast, the 
links regarding economic issues found on the EU@UN homepage 
primarily concerned financial aid to third countries, with second-favoured 
topics those concerning trade and development relations with third 
countries.
Trade and development relations between the EU and the US as 
well as other third countries were the most covered issues on EURUNION 
as well. Although the number of links found on EURUNION’s homepage 
was significantly reduced in the second half of the monitoring period in 
2005, as a result of changes in the structure of the website, trade and 
development relations between the EU and the US by far outnumbered 
any other economic issues, both in the case of proactive and reactive 
public communication.as illustrated in Figures 4.7 and 4.8. They were also 
most favoured topics for this website in 2005, as far as relationship-
building public communication is concerned, while in 2004 this category 
was second-favourite only to trade and development issues within the EU, 
as Figure 4.7 illustrates.
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Figure 4.7: Relationship-building public communication per website and year,
Source: The author, Data Sources: EUROPA, EU@UN, EURUNION.
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Proactive public communication per website and year
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Figure 4.8: Proactive public communication per website and year, Source: The 
author, Data Sources: EUROPA, EU@UN, EURUNION.
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Figure 4.9: Reactive public communication per website and year, Source: The 
author, Data Sources: EUROPA, EU@UN, EURUNION.
The most notable shift in the choice of topics in 2005 concerns the 
thematic category of social issues. While in 2004 health topics were the 
social issues most favoured by EU@UN and EURUNION, in 2005 health 
issues are preferred by EUROPA and EU@UN, and only as issues of 
temporary coverage (reactive public communication). Instead, science and 
research-related links are those that appear more frequently on EUROPA 
and EURUNION, under the umbrella of proactive public communication for 
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the first, and reactive and proactive public communication for the latter25.
On the EU@UN website, links to topics classified under the 
Volunteering/Solidarity category are the social issues most frequently 
recorded, under proactive and relationship-building public communication. 
On closer inspection, these links covered EU actions in relation to major 
natural disasters (earthquake and tsunami in South-East Asia in 
December 2004), political and humanitarian crises around the world and/or 
their aftermaths (i.e. in Sudan and Afghanistan), and the terrorist attacks in 
London on 7 July 2005. This indicates that EU@UN not only remained up-
to-date with the international socio-political developments, but offered 
coverage on issues which featured highly in the agendas of conventional 
and electronic media worldwide.
As far as the text (i.e. the language) used by the three websites, the 
analysis of the data indicates that EUROPA and EURUNION continued to 
favour informal/every-day language and have most of their contents 
written in a way that can appeal to as broad an audience as possible, as 
Figure 4.10 illustrates. On the other hand, EU@UN favoured official 
documentation more in 2005, i.e. a lot of the links contained official 
declarations, reports and announcements, which had not been written 
specifically for that website and also did not contain adequate information 
or explanations regarding the issues concerned. Therefore, it was not 
always easy or possible even to put the official documents into context, 
unless further research was performed either on the EU@UN website or 
other sources. This shift in style of language, however, is not the result of 
a change in the aims of the communication policy of this website. A closer 
look reveals that the number of links containing formal/ technical text 
remained more or less the same compared to 2004. What changed was 
the number of links containing text with informal language, written with a 
wider audience in mind, which decreased dramatically in Year 2. This 
reflects an overall decrease in the number of links found on the homepage 
of the particular website.
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Type of text per website and year
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Figure 4.10: Type of text per website and year, Source: The author, Data Sources: 
EUROPA, EU@UN, EURUNION.
The highest percentage of every-day/informal language in all three 
websites was recorded in links that fall under the category of relationship-
building public communication (65% for EUROPA, 54% for EU@UN, 81% 
for EURUNION). 
So far, the results of the coding from Year 2 have remained 
consistent with the results from Year 1 overall, insofar as the types of 
public communication and thematic categories are concerned. The 
surprise in the Year 2 data lies elsewhere: When it comes to interactive 
communication, Figure 4.11 shows that there were no active online 
discussions/fora recorded in Year 2, although there were still links to 
online discussions/fora that had been available in the previous year. Of 
course all three websites continued to provide email addresses in almost 
all the webpages linked to their homepage.
This is particularly peculiar, as the coding in Year 2 took place 
during a period of rigorous public political debate in several EU Member-
States with regard to the ratification of the Constitutional Treaty. The links 
leading to EUROPA’s FUTURUM webpage and discussion forum featured 
permanently on its homepage and the FUTURUM website had been 
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updated in order to be in sync with the local/regional/national debates 
regarding the Constitutional Treaty. Nevertheless, the online debate coded 
in 2004 regarding the Treaty was no longer active. This was at a time 
when the interest of EU citizens regarding the issue would have been 
greater, and thus the conditions for a European public debate online to be 
established would have been more fertile.
When put to the EU officials who were interviewed for the purposes 
of this research project, the suspension of the FUTURUM debates was 
justified as “necessary” and “appropriate” as there were offline debates 
taking place in the Member-States26 and the new webpage Debate Europe 
(Commission of the European Communities 2006ba) was being 
prepared27. Moreover, the replies of the interviewees reflected the official 
Commission line of the time, according to which it would provide all 
necessary facts and information regarding the Treaty but could in no way 
be seen to be actively involved in the debates, for fear of being accused of 
trying to influence national ratification procedures and of conducting 
propaganda (Wallström 2005)28.
However, Debate Europe was not launched until March 2006, as 
part of the Plan D strategy, which resulted from the rejection of the 
Constitutional Treaty by the Dutch and French publics. In other words, 
Debate Europe was a reactive move of public communication, rather than 
a proactive one. After it was re-launched, in March 2006, the Debate 
Europe online forum reached 1 million hits within 4 months, while the 
contributions to the three parallel debate topics were 12,040 at the
beginning of October 2006, a figure never seen before on an official EU 
online forum. The contributions are written in various languages, and often 
participants will reply to postings written in a language different from the 
one they are using.
The numbers of participants on the Debate Europe forum 
demonstrate that there is a public sphere online, debating EU issues, and 
that it is possible to host part of this debate in official EU websites, without 
the mediation of national offline media or the need for a pan-European 
language. Nevertheless, the question remains of the extent to which the 
public’s feedback will be incorporated in the decision-making process in 
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the future. 
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Figure 4.11: Interactive communication per website and year, Source: the author, 
Data Sources: EUROPA, EU@UN, EURUNION.
4.3 Conclusion
As far as the aims of the Commission’s EU Information and 
Communication strategy are concerned, the choice of topics and 
information provided on the three websites is not always in accordance 
with its recommendations. Revisiting the table used in Chapter 3 to define 
the coding values for the three EU websites29, it becomes obvious that the 
topics pointing at peace and prosperity are generally more favoured by all 
the three websites’ homepages than those falling under the umbrella of 
democracy.
The following table is a reviewed version of Table 3.1, which 
summarises the main themes and values of the EU’s public 
communication strategy used to code the three EU websites’ content. The 
themes and topics that appear in bold received most coverage on the 
three websites examined in the present chapter.
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Table 4.5: EU core values and related thematic areas as these appeared on 
EUROPA, EU@UN and EURUNION, adapted from Table 3.1, Chapter 3.
Peace Democracy Prosperity
1. The EU’s role 
in the world:
EU Common 
Foreign and 
Security Policy/ 
Safety and 
security/ Rule of 
law- EU external
2. Main ideas the EU stands 
for, including democracy and 
the rule of law
3. How the EU works/ 
Internal politics/ Relations 
among member-states/ 
Enlargement
Politics:
3 thematic 
areas
1. Trade/ 
development- EU 
external
2. Environment-
EU external
3. Financial aid-
EU external
4. The Euro
5. Transport issues within 
the EU
6. Trade/ development- EU 
internal
7. Environment- EU internal
8. Financial aid- EU 
internal
Economy:
8 thematic 
areas
1. Freedom of movement/  
Travelling in the EU
2. Volunteering/ Social 
solidarity
3. Language issues
4. Employment issues, 
including creating new 
jobs/fighting unemployment 
and social security issues
5. Health
6. Education
7. Culture/ A sense of 
belonging/ A European 
identity
8. Science-Research
Society:
8 thematic 
areas
It is clear from the above that the concept of the core values of 
peace, prosperity and democracy, upon which the Commission has 
intended to base the EU’s Information and Communication strategy, is 
being partially implemented. As a consequence, the figure used in Chapter 
330 to illustrate the balanced concept of EU core values no longer reflects 
the EU’s Information and Communication strategy, as this was 
implemented on the three websites examined here during the period 2004-
2005. As shown below, peace and prosperity appear to be the main focus 
of the EU’s online public communication strategy, whilst democracy, as a 
core EU value and a key issue, is more a point of reference rather than a 
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driving factor of the EU’s public communication strategy. This means that 
although a lot of the websites’ material coded during the monitoring period 
contained references to the value of democracy and democratic 
procedures, no action was really taken to enhance these democratic 
procedures by enabling citizens’ online participation in the decision-making 
process and/or consistently encouraging public debate regarding the EU 
online. 
Figure 4.12: Online implementation of “The circle of prosperity”, the three key 
ideas underlining the EU’s Information and Communication strategy, adapted from 
Figure 3.2, Chapter 3.
On the other hand, the Commission’s aim to educate the European 
public with regard to the role and achievements of the EU was generally 
met by the three websites examined, as was (for the most part) the policy 
of using easily understood, everyday language, which does not alienate 
less interested or educated audiences.
Further differences which were recorded among the three websites 
in terms of type content and format/ presentation of the information can 
also be partly attributed to their targeting different types of audiences. 
Furthermore, they are an indication that the Commission’s Information and 
Communication policy is perceived slightly differently by the Commission 
and the EU Delegations: EUROPA, which is the responsibility of the 
Commission, reflects the aims of the Information and Communication 
strategy much more clearly than EURUNION, which is the responsibility of 
the EU Delegation in the US, or EU@UN, which is under the collective 
Peace Prosperity
The 
EU
Democracy
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responsibility of all the Member-States Delegations and the EU Delegation 
at the United Nations. Much as the Commission emphasises the 
importance of the EU “speaking with one voice” and of achieving 
maximum coherence in the Information and Communication policy of all 
the EU Institutions, it is clear that it allows for some freedom to be 
exercised by the Delegations, when it comes to managing their websites. 
This freedom was obvious in the case of EURUNION in particular, which 
only fully conformed to the Commission’s Guidelines for Delegations’ 
Websites in mid-2005 (RELEX 1/5- Information and 
Communication/Directorate-General for External Relations/Commission of 
the European Communities 2006).
From a theoretical point of view, the 24-week mapping of the three 
websites has shown that all three websites focus on relationship-building 
public communication, which is crucial for the long-term establishment of 
the EU and what it represents in the minds of the EU citizens and foreign 
audiences alike, as discussed in Chapter 1. However, with regard to the 
three criteria that determine the success of public communication 
(understanding the target audience and proving relevance to it; interaction; 
and non-intellectual forms of communication) examined in Chapter 1, the 
analysis of the three websites shows that only the third criterion (moving 
beyond intellectual forms of communication) is met in full by all three 
websites.
As far as understanding the target audience and relating to it are
concerned, only the EU@UN website fully fulfils its role as an external 
public communication, specialised website. EUROPA, which is meant to 
be the first and main EU point of contact online, only partially meets its role 
as a wide ranging EU portal, as its attempt to offer a balanced content that 
would appeal to as wide an audience as possible is not clearly 
communicated. With regard to EURUNION, which in theory targets a 
broader foreign audience than EU@UN, it is difficult to assess whether its 
focus on mainly trade and EU-US political relations appeals to a wide 
regional audience or only a niche, already well-informed public, since there 
has been no survey profiling the average visitor of EURUNION.
The third criterion, interaction, particularly important not only in 
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achieving a successful public communication strategy, but also in 
encouraging the emergence of a Habermasian public dialogue, as 
discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, were not really a priority for any of these 
three websites during the coding period. There were certainly enough 
opportunities for limited interaction, in the form of generic email addresses 
and online inquiry forms. Yet, the possibility of substantial interaction in the 
form of online public debate between the public and EU officials or 
amongst the members of the public was barely present and only on one of 
the websites.
Nevertheless, the constant increase in the number of participants in 
the few online debates found on EUROPA in 2004 can be interpreted as 
encouraging, as far as the emerging European public sphere is concerned. 
This is not only because of the increase in the overall number of 
participants, but mainly because the number of responses to other 
participants is overall far higher than the number of original comments 
posted on the discussion forum. In other words, not only was there a 
quantitative increase in participants but a qualitative increase was
recorded too, in the sense that there was more on-going communication 
among participants- a fact which in turn indicates that there can be a 
public dialogue between European citizens emerging online. 
Interaction, therefore, and the encouragement (or lack of it) of EU 
citizens to engage in a public dialogue regarding the EU is the issue where 
the EU’s Information and Communication strategy and its online 
implementation were found to be inadequate during the systematic 
mapping of the three EU websites. Although the European Commission 
has clearly recognised the lack of interest among most Europeans towards 
the EU and has identified the Internet as one of the most important means 
through which participation and transparency can be encouraged, the data 
analysis indicates that this aim is not met to the full.
As mentioned above, this inconsistency between the Commission’s 
Information and Communication strategy documents and their 
implementation, as far as interaction with the EU citizens is concerned, 
was attributed by the Commission officials interviewed for this project to 
practical reasons, e.g. the continuous re-structuring of the DG 
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Communication. The data from the analysis of the EU’s public 
communication strategy documents and of three official EU websites
supports the officials’ view that this constant re-structuring process has 
had an impact on both the EU’s public communication policy-making and 
policy-implementation processes, as it has caused lack of continuity and 
consistency in the approach of the EU’s public communication strategy.
However, the interviews highlighted further underlying reasons for 
this inconsistency between policy and implementation as far as the 
facilitation of online public dialogue is concerned. As we have already 
seen in Chapter 331, the Commission officials interviewed appeared 
divided into those who believe that it is not really possible or likely that the 
EU will manage to reach out to the general public via its websites and that 
the official EU websites are mainly working tools for people who already 
have an interest and/or extensive knowledge of the EU and EU issues32; 
and those who believe that the Internet is a medium which allows for 
communication with multiple target audiences, and most importantly 
enables the EU to communicate directly with the public, rather than rely on 
national/local media to act as intermediaries33.
Besides this difference in opinions, the officials working on the EU’s 
Information and Communication strategy are in their majority “non-experts 
in the field of public communication”34. This could partly lie beneath the 
very slow embrace of new communication technologies and in particular 
the Internet in the implementation of the EU’s public communication 
strategy, despite policy-makers constantly underlining in every EU 
Information and Communication document the importance of this medium 
in reaching target audiences. This lack of expertise could also be the 
reason why “everyone wants to be transparent but not really know what 
they are to be transparent about”, as one senior EU official put it35.
With reference to the components of the theoretical model of the 
European public sphere outlined in Chapter 236, these need to be re-
examined here in order to incorporate the findings of the EU websites’ 
analysis, which reflect the “how” process of the public dialogue within the 
vertical European public sphere. In this respect, the findings indicate that 
the actual online model of public communication deployed by the three EU 
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official websites examined here is not facilitating an online European 
public sphere based on the principles of the theoretical model outlined in 
Chapter 2.
Figure 4.13: Key components of the theoretical concept regarding the EU public 
sphere: Online implementation, adapted from Figure 2.1, Chapter 2 and the analysis of 
the EU websites EUROPA, EU@UN and EURUNION.
Thus far, we have addressed the research questions identified in 
Chapter 2 from the perspectives of EU public communication policy-
making (Chapter 3) and of its online policy-implementation (current 
chapter). There remains one more level of analysis- the impact of the EU’s 
online public communication strategy on key EU audiences. This last 
component of this research project is discussed in the following chapter. 
More specifically, Chapter 5 presents the results of an EU websites’ online 
user survey carried out by the author during the period October-December 
2005, which aimed to map the views of Internet users on the three official 
EU websites examined here. The results of the survey are then juxtaposed 
The European 
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Europeanisation not 
facilitated by the 
three websites
The Internet:
§ 2004: Minimal 
use of its 
interactive 
capability.
§ 2005: Online 
public dialogue 
abandoned 
altogether.
Democratic deficit: 
§ Participation: Not 
facilitated
§ Meeting public’s 
priorities: Partially 
met
§ Accountability: 
Not fully implemented
EU Public communication:
§ 2004: Implementation reflects overall 
spirit of 2000-2004 Information and 
Communication documents- Main focus on 
information;
§ 2005: Implementation continues to 
reflect more the 2000-2004 aims 
(information) rather than the 2004-2006 
one (communication).
The Habermasian public sphere:
§ The public sphere as a realm in which 
individuals gather to participate in open 
discussions (how): Not facilitated on EU 
official websites, therefore
§ Democratisation of the EU institutions
(Outcome- what) through an all-inclusive 
public sphere (participants- who): Do not 
appear as EU priorities in practice.
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with the above findings in order to determine the degree to which these 
coincide with the users’ perception of the key public communication 
messages of the EU presented on EUROPA, EU@UN and EURUNION.
  
Notes
1 See also Figure 3.3, Chapter 3.
2 See Table 3.1, Chapter 3.
3 Within the Commission, the general coordination, development and day-to-day running 
of EUROPA are handled by the Directorate-General for Communication, in collaboration 
with the Secretariat-General, the Informatics Directorate and the Publications Office.
4 An Inter-Institutional Editorial Committee is responsible for maintaining and monitoring 
the overall consistency of the material put out jointly on the Internet.
5 There is another Delegation in New York.
6 See Chapter 3, Part 3.2.1.
7 The full list of the variables, which were used in the coding process, is presented in 
Tables V-X, Annex 3.
8 See Chapter 1, Part 1.3, Section 1.3.4.
9 See Chapter 3, Part 3.3.
10 Chapter 1, Part 1.3.
11See Table 3.1, Chapter 3.
12 This document clearly attempts to reverse the negative image that a lot of Europeans 
hold of the EU institutions and the Union as a whole. Within this context, it refers to the 
majority of Europeans several times, when explaining what the EU does, in an effort to 
add value to its argument regarding the democratic nature of the EU. At this point the 
reader is informed that the EU “stands for the values the majority of the Europeans 
support” (Fontaine 2003), i.e. democracy, rule of law and peace. The main message that 
the Commission puts across throughout this document is that the EU is the result of 
peace among the European countries, which in turn is based on the ideals and 
procedures of democracy. The EU is in a way the guarantor of the peace that the 
European countries have been enjoying for the last 50 years. And because of that peace, 
and the adherence to the ideals of democracy, the member-states of the EU have also 
been enjoying an era of steadily rising prosperity (ibid.).
The section regarding the way in which the EU works was clearly written with the EU 
public’s scepticism and lack of trust towards the EU institutions and policy-making 
processes in mind. By emphasising the democratic nature of the EU institutions and of 
the decision-making process, the document manages to portray an image of a fully-
functioning democratic institutional structure quite convincingly, provided the reader is not 
aware of the debate regarding the EU’s democratic deficit, in particular the lack of 
openness and accountability within its institutions.
Although the document does not refer to the above three core ideas vaguely, these are 
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also core values which can be attributed to other democratic states as well and one could 
argue that most European member-states were democratic and upheld these exact same 
values even before the creation of the EU. So, despite the lengthy sections which give a 
detailed list of specific examples of everyday issues which the EU has improved/ 
achieved or is aiming to improve/achieve within the next few years (e.g. the Euro, the 
common market, increased stability, “community method of working together” in resolving 
international differences etc), the arguments used to support the case for the EU are 
rather weak (ibid.).
With regard to future challenges, the document refers to some of the most publicly-
debated issues in the last few years concerning the EU’s efforts to effectively address 
terrorism and organised crime, to achieve a common Foreign and Security Policy as well 
as to radically improve the member-states educational systems and to make the EU 
economy the “most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world” 
(ibid.: 49). Another “hot” issue is that of the EU’s enlargement and here “Europe in 12 
Lessons” manages to address some of the main areas of the debate concerning the EU’s 
enlargement (e.g. definition of the EU’s geographical limits, cohesion, representation on 
the world stage, democratic governance, the EU Constitution) without at the same time, 
being critical of the Enlargement decisions taken so far. Rather, the document provides 
an overview of the questions and arguments that arise from the Enlargement process and 
smoothes out any concerns (i.e. Turkey’s potential membership) by repeating the 
importance of achieving a stable and prosperous Union (Fontaine 2003).
13 Any audiovisual material found in the main text of the webpages linked to the EUROPA, 
EU@UN and EURUNION homepages was coded in the same way as the text-only 
webpages.
14 See Annex 3, Table IX, Variable 62.
15 See Annex 3, Table IX, Variable 63.
16 See Annex 3, Table IX, Variable 64.
17 See Annex 3, Table X.
18 Note that if added up, the number of links that appears under each website on this 
table is higher than the actual number of links found on each website’s homepage. This is 
because some links contained information on more than one topic or covered a 
combination of issues and were, therefore, coded under more than one content variable.
19 “We have never conducted a survey of users […] I monitor the information requests 
that our Public Inquiries section receives and, given my professional background and 
training, try to provide the most requested information in the most user-friendly format
possible […] However, the Webtrend’s (the webhosting contractor of EURUNION) 
statistical reports provide some of this information monthly and quarterly”, Interviewee 6, 
Annex 2.
20 “Most of the replies (feedback regarding content of websites) were positive, which 
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surprised us”, Interviewee 3, Annex 2.
21 The drop in the number of participants on week 10 is not caused by the suspension of 
the debate but because the count of participants was disrupted (it started from zero on 
week 10, for no apparent reason).
22 The drop in the number of participants on week 2 is not caused by the suspension of 
the debate but because the count of participants was disrupted (it started from zero on 
week 2, as the topic of the debate was rephrased).
23 Chapter 1, Part 1.3.
24 “We are supposed to reach over to everybody but we have to get people interested but 
there are other more interesting things for the public online”, Interviewees 3 and 4, Annex 
2.
“It is important, it is good to have a discussion like this, but these (the participants in the 
FUTURUM forum) are […] the informed ‘classes’ […] the public who participated in that 
debate (The FUTURUM debate on the Constitutional Treaty) was primarily organised 
NGOs, who are only half a mile away from this office […] The only way to reach the 
(general) public is via the Internet but of course, although we provide a discussion corner 
for people to do what they want with it, we are under no illusion that everyone is going to 
start using it. It’s more about the symbolic gain, of how open we are [..] we are open to 
criticism, but we know that not everybody is going to criticize, because they have better 
things to do in their life”, Interviewee 5, ibid.
25 Compare Tables 4.1 and 4.2. See also Figures 4.6-4.9 for further comparison of the 
data from Year 1 and Year 2. 
26 “Our priority at the time was to familiarise European citizens with the complex 
constituents and provisions of the text that they or their parliaments had to vote on. 
Discussion fora were held in the Member States though, partly in cooperation with the 
Commission”, Interviewee 2, Annex 2.
27 Debate Europe was launched as part of the implementation of Plan D (see Chapter 3, 
Part 3.2 for more information on Plan D).
28 See also Chapter 3, Part 3.2.3.
29 See Table 3.1, Chapter 3.
30 See Figure 3.2, Chapter 3.
31 Chapter 3, Section 3.1.5.
32 See Chapter 3, Section 3.2.4.This is a view closer to the “two-gear European public” 
perception prominent in the official Information and Communication documents before 
2004, as discussed in Chapter 3, Part 3.1.
33 This belief was mostly expressed by policy-making officials and coincided with the shift 
in the Commission’s Information and Communication strategy from information-focused to 
communication-focused after 2004. See Chapter 3, Section 3.2.4.
34 Interviewee 1, Annex 2.
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35 Interviewee 1, Annex 2.
36 Figure 2.1, Chapter 2.
164
Chapter 5- EU website’s online user survey
The analysis of three official EU websites’ homepages has shown 
that there is a gap between the EU’s Information and Communication 
strategy as this is set out in formal documentation and its implementation 
online to date, particularly with regard to the opportunities for public 
dialogue provided to Internet users by these websites. The element of 
interaction is also fundamental to the concept of the public sphere 
examined in Chapter 1 and to the success of the EU’s public 
communication. Furthermore, unrestricted interaction, in terms of gender, 
ethnicity, socio-economic or nationality background, is one of the Internet’s 
core characteristics, and one of the reasons why the Internet has been 
heralded as the new Habermasian public sphere, as discussed in Chapter 
2.
Having examined the research questions from a policy-making and 
policy-implementation perspective in previous chapters, the focus in the 
present chapter is on the impact that the EU’s online public communication 
has on certain audiences- those which the Commission has identified as 
“key” and “target” audiences in its proposed Information and 
Communication strategy1. Despite the data showing that the EU websites 
did not actively promote an all-inclusive online public dialogue during the 
period 2004-2005, it is important to have an idea of what the recipients of 
the EU’s online public communication message think as well. Do Internet 
users rate interaction as highly as it would be expected according to the
theoretical framework examined in Chapters 1 and 2? Do they think the 
Internet can play a role in addressing the EU’s democratic deficit? More 
importantly, do they accept there is a democratic deficit on EU level that 
needs to be addressed?
This chapter presents the results of an online survey conducted 
amongst Internet users in order to obtain their feedback with regard to the 
three official EU websites analysed in Chapter 3 (EUROPA, EU@UN, 
EURUNION). The survey focused mainly on, but was not limited to, 
experienced Internet users who fit the profile of some of the Commission’s 
priority communication target groups- that is, young and educated 
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individuals, who are also the most likely to be experienced Internet users, 
according to the latest Internet-user profile reports (ClickZ Network 2006a; 
ClickZ Network 2006b; ClickZ Stats 2006c).
More specifically, the online survey aimed to collect data regarding:
a)The profile of the Internet users who accessed the three EU websites 
(demographic data).
b)The frequency with which these users access the three EU websites (if 
applicable).
c)Their overall evaluation of the three websites.
d)Their evaluation of the interaction opportunities found on the three 
websites.
e)Their opinion on the role of the Internet in addressing the EU’s 
democratic deficit.
The results are discussed in the wider context of the Habermasian 
approach of the public sphere and the role of public communication and of 
the Internet in promoting an all-inclusive, democratic public sphere and in 
particular an EU public sphere. The findings are also juxtaposed with the 
aims of the EU’s Information and Communication strategy, in order to 
assess whether the strategy corresponds with the users’ needs and 
expectations of the EU’s websites.
5.1 Methodology
This online survey took place over a period of four months (October 
2005-January 2006). It comprised 27 questions, both closed-response and 
open-end, of which 12 questions (namely questions 1, 2, 5, 13, 14, 23, 24, 
25, 26, 27 in Annex 4) were compulsory (i.e. the respondents had to fill 
these questions in, in order to be able to submit their questionnaire).
5.1.1 Sample
The sample chosen was a non-probability, “snowball” sample 
(Deacon, Pickering, Golding, Murdock 1999)2. Ideally, the online survey 
sample would have been an all-inclusive one, aimed at non-frequent 
Internet users, as well as individuals who do not specifically fit the profile 
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of the Commission’s priority target audiences. However, that was not 
feasible for practical reasons, not least the methodological problems of 
selecting a representative sample from the global Internet population that 
would also be representative of offline demographic groups and the 
enormity of the financial and time-related costs that would arise from 
pursuing an online survey on such a scale. Therefore, a small, specialised 
sample that would include individuals who would statistically be more likely 
to have visited EU official websites and/or online discussion fora (EU or 
non-EU alike) was deemed more appropriate.
For this reason, the individuals/organisations contacted regarding 
the survey were chosen on the basis of two criteria: As mentioned in the 
introduction, the respondents needed to fit both the EU Commission’s 
profile for priority target audiences and the profile of the average Internet 
user. Young and educated Internet users are likely to be found in 
academia, so the majority of organisations/individuals initially contacted for 
this survey were from academic circles. The other main target group were 
the EU-related weblogs, which are important online fora of public debate.
However, in order to maintain balance and avoid receiving 
responses from EU-specialised young academics and keen online EU 
discussants only, think tanks, student societies and online media were 
also included in the sample. In addition, further selection criteria were 
introduced when compiling the sample for this survey. 
Individuals/organisations were chosen according to the following:
a)Whether they were EU specialists/with a professional interest in EU 
issues or non-EU specialists/with no professional interest in EU issues.
b)Whether they had Pro-EU, EU-neutral or anti-EU stance.
This distinction was necessary in order to obtain as balanced an 
outcome as possible. As noted in Chapter 3, the opinions of EU specialists 
have been measured in at least two surveys in the past four years, one 
survey conducted by the Commission in 2002 (COM(2002)705, final) and 
one by Friends of Europe in 2004 (Davies and Readhead 2004). However, 
no survey so far has aimed to identify the views of individuals who are 
non-EU experts, yet are keen Internet users and are likely to participate in 
online public discussions. Therefore, a survey measuring attitudes and 
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opinions regarding the EU’s main communication tools online (i.e. its 
official websites) could not exclude or ignore the general public and focus 
solely on EU experts and officials. The need to approach external publics 
has also been identified in the official EU public communication documents 
but mainly by EU foreign policy experts (de Gouveia and Plumridge 2005; 
Lynch 2005; Moravcsik and Nikolaïdes 2006)3.
In addition to these criteria, an email address was a prerequisite for 
an individual/organisation to be included in the sample. The survey also 
sought to include individuals/organisations of as many nationalities as 
possible, although it was not always possible to identify the country of 
origin of a weblog or the nationality of an individual acting as a contact 
person on behalf of a non-religious, non-ethnic student society.
The questionnaire was initially emailed to 148 individuals/ generic 
email contacts with the request to further circulate it to as many people as 
they saw appropriate/ possible. If the respondents had not accessed the 
websites under examination (EUROPA, EU@UN and EURUNION) before, 
they were asked to take a few minutes to access one or more of them via 
the links provided on the survey’s webpage and then to proceed to fill in 
the questionnaire.
The 148 initial contacts comprised the following:
a)80 individuals/generic contact points in academic/academic-related 
institutions (i.e. university departments of various disciplines, research 
centres, EU research centres, postgraduate academic support networks) 
in 26 countries as follows4:
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Table 5.1: List of initial academic/academic-related contacts per country, Source:
The author
Australia 1 contact Hungary 2 contacts
Austria 1 contact Ireland 4 contacts
Belgium 4 contacts Italy 4 contacts
Bulgaria 1 contact Lithuania 1 contact
Canada 1 contact Netherlands, the 4 contacts
Croatia 1 contact Norway 2 contacts
Cyprus 1 contact Poland 3 contacts
Czech Republic, the 1 contact Portugal 2 contacts
Denmark 2 contacts Slovakia 1 contact
Finland 4 contacts Spain 3 contacts
France 3 contacts Sweden 3 contacts
Germany 5 contacts UK, the 20 contacts
Greece 3 contacts USA, the 3 contacts
Of the educational institutes chosen, 23 were EU research centres 
or Jean Monnet European centres of excellence; 30 were university 
departments of social sciences (including politics, international relations, 
communication, sociology, psychology and language/literature studies); 
and 27 were university departments under the faculties of engineering and 
science5; 
b)24 weblogs (11 anti-EU, 11 EU-neutral and 2 pro-EU)6;
c)4 online newspapers/magazines (1 British, 3 multi-lingual/multi-national);
d)17 public policy networks/ think tanks (10 EU-neutral; 3 Eurosceptic/anti-
EU; and 4 pro-EU)7; and
e)23 young people’s/students’ societies in the UK (all identified as EU-
neutral and chosen solely on the basis of contact email availability)8.
A distinctive feature of the survey is that, whereas previous studies 
have incorporated the electronic version of the EU’s Information and 
Communication strategy, none have as yet solicited opinions on sites 
other than EUROPA. Nevertheless, the sample chosen for this survey can 
still be considered an elite sample, in the sense that excludes people 
without Internet access. Such an audience though, is not within the target 
audiences of the EU’s online Information and Communication strategy in 
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the first place, and there are other communication policies identified to 
reach out to those EU citizens who do not have access to the electronic 
public sphere (currently the majority)9. These policies are out of the scope 
of this study.
5.1.2 Questions and data processing methodology
The issues that the present study set out to address were the 
following:
a)The frequency with which respondents normally access the three EU 
websites. Considering the emphasis placed on new communications’ 
technologies and in particular the Internet by all the Information and 
Communication strategy documents examined in Chapter 3, the question 
that arises is how highly the official EU websites rank (at least the three 
chosen here: EUROPA, EU@UN and EURUNION) with Internet users.
b)The users’ overall evaluation of the three websites, in terms of 
accessibility, quality of information and credibility.
c)The users’ evaluation of the interaction opportunities found on the three 
websites.
d)The users’ opinion on the role of the Internet in addressing the EU’s 
democratic deficit.
e)The profile of the Internet users who accessed the three EU websites 
(demographic data and overall Internet habits).
The data was initially processed using the Loughborough 
University’s online survey software programme Learn, and the results on 
certain questions were further categorised and analysed using Microsoft’s 
Excel programme. Annex 4 presents the results of the survey per 
question, before the data under certain questions were submitted to further 
categorisation, and further explains the way in which that data was then 
regrouped under fewer categories. Apart from descriptive statistics used to 
determine the demographic profile of the respondents, cross-tabulations 
and chi-square tests were used to determine the relationship between the 
demographic profile of the respondents and their views on the official EU 
websites as well as the EU in general and their overall Internet habits.
170
5.2 Findings
5.2.1 Demographic data
The initial 148 contacts generated 221 responses. The response 
rate to the compulsory questions was an average of 92.8%, thus allowing 
for conclusions to be drawn from these questions. The aim to attract 
mainly respondents that would fit into the EU’s target audience groups and 
represent the average Internet user’s profile was achieved. Recent 
demographic statistics for Internet users worldwide continue to show that 
the average Internet user is a 25-35 year-old, middle-class, educated male 
(ClickZ Network 2006a; ClickZ Stats 2006c). In the present survey, over 
70% of the respondents were 20-34 years old as Table 5.2 below shows; 
while over 40% were university students and 28% in 
professional/managerial positions, as can be seen in Tables 5.3, 5.4 and 
5.5. Approximately two thirds of the respondents were male.
Nevertheless, as discussed in Chapter 210, the fact that the 
respondents were predominantly young, educated males can be attributed 
more to the socioeconomic inequalities of contemporary societies, rather 
than to the medium itself. Further analysis of the data showed that gender, 
education and age were not definitive factors with regard to the users’ 
overall Internet habits and their attitude towards the EU websites and 
online fora.
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Table 5.2: Number of respondents per age group and gender, Source: EU websites’ 
online user survey, conducted by the author in October 2005-January 2006.
Age Female Male Totals Percentage
Younger than 15 years old 0 1 1 < 0.5%
15-19 years old 1 7 8 4%
20-24 years old 19 33 52 24%
25-29 years old 36 35 71 32%
30-34 years old 8 28 36 16%
35-39 years old 3 11 14 6%
40-44 years old 2 8 10 4%
45-49 years old 3 5 8 4%
50-54 years old 0 13 13 6%
55-60 years old 0 4 4 2%
61-65 years old 0 4 4 2%
Over 66 years old 0 0 0 0%
TOTALS 72 149 221 100.00%
Table 5.3: Number of respondents per occupation and gender, Source: EU websites’ 
online user survey, conducted by the author in October 2005-January 2006.
Occupation Female Male Totals Percentage
Public Officials EU 1 4 5 2%
Public Officials Non-EU 1 5 6 3%
IT 1 11 12 5%
Professional/Managerial 17 45 62 28%
Skilled Manual/Manual 1 7 8 4%
Unemployed/ Economically inactive 1 4 5 2%
Education Professionals 11 18 29 13%
Education: Students 38 52 90 41%
Health 1 3 4 2%
TOTALS 72 149 221 100%
With regard to the categories of the respondents’ age and 
occupation, the survey produced some unexpected, although not 
statistically significant, results; for example, there were 8 respondents who 
were younger than 19 years of age, and even 1 respondent younger than 
15. As far as occupation is concerned, although the relative data was 
eventually grouped in 9 categories, the respondents’ occupations varied 
widely, from legal and financial advisors to students and from restaurant-
owners to people working in the agriculture sector and individuals who 
were at the time economically inactive (unemployed or housewives)11.
As far as the nationality of the respondents in concerned, the 
majority was from EU countries, although the collective percentage of non-
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EU citizens and of respondents with two or more nationalities was 
unexpectedly higher than that of respondents from EU accession 
countries. The figures below present the number of respondents per 
country and per category (i.e. EU, EU-related, Non-EU, Multiple 
nationalities and N/A).
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Figure 5.1: Nationality of respondents per country, Source: EU websites’ online user 
survey, conducted by the author in October 2005-January 2006.
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Figure 5.2: Nationality of respondents per category, Source: EU websites’ online user 
survey, conducted by the author in October 2005-January 2006.
What is interesting about the data regarding the nationality of the 
respondents is that 3% of those under the “EU nationalities” category 
defined themselves as European, and not solely British, Spanish, German 
etc. British nationals make for more than 30% of the respondents. This is 
something that can also be observed in past surveys, performed by the 
EUROPA website team themselves (EUROPA 2003), where most 
respondents were of British nationality. Although it is not possible to 
determine all the factors that led to British nationals responding at a higher 
rate than the nationals of other countries in past surveys, in the case of the 
present survey this result may be attributed to the fact that most 
educational institutions and think tanks contacted were, for practical 
purposes only, British.
The final component of the demographic data regarding the 
respondents of this survey is that of education. As mentioned earlier, the 
respondents are educated, in their majority, to university level, with those 
who have a Master’s degree having the overall majority within the sample. 
The tables below demonstrate the distribution of the individuals according 
to their education, gender and age. Further statistical analysis of the data 
showed that in the present survey education was independent from gender 
and age.
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Table 5.4: Number of respondents per level of education and gender, Source: EU 
website’s online user survey, conducted by the author in October 2005-January 2006.
Education Female Male Totals
Not completed compulsory education 1 3 4
Completed compulsory education 4 16 20
Vocational Qualification 1 5 6
University Degree (BA, undergraduate degree) 24 46 70
University Degree (MA, postgraduate degree) 35 56 91
PhD 7 23 30
TOTALS 72 149 221
Table 5.5: Number of respondents per level of education and age group, Source: EU 
website’s online user survey, conducted by the author in October 2005-January 2006.
Education <15 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-60 61-65 >66 Totals
Not completed 
compulsory 
education 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 4
Completed 
compulsory 
education 0 4 9 3 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 20
Vocational 
Qualification 0 0 3 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 6
University 
Degree (BA, 
undergraduate 
degree) 0 4 27 17 6 4 5 2 4 0 1 0 70
University 
Degree (MA, 
postgraduate 
degree) 0 0 10 45 18 4 5 1 5 2 1 0 91
PhD 0 0 2 6 11 4 0 2 3 2 0 0 30
TOTALS 1 8 52 71 36 14 10 8 13 4 4 0 221
5.2.2 The respondents’ Internet profile
Before proceeding with the analysis of the data regarding the 
respondents’ views on the three official websites and their habits regarding 
EU-related websites and online fora in general, it is important to look at the 
overall Internet behaviour of the respondents. This will enable us to put the 
respondents’ EU-specific online behaviour into a wider context.
The majority of respondents are frequent Internet users, thus 
achieving the aim of the sample to attract responses from experienced 
Internet users, as they would be more likely to have visited EU official 
websites and have had experience of online discussion fora (EU or non-
EU). Nearly 96% of the respondents access the Internet every day and the 
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remaining approximate 4% go online every other day or at least once a 
week12.
The respondents were also asked whether they access 
governmental/ political websites and if so, with what frequency. The 
majority of the respondents replied positively to the first part of the 
question (84% of those who answered the question, 83% of all 
respondents), although men appear to access governmental/ political 
websites slightly more frequently than women, as we can see in Figure 
5.3. 70% of male respondents said that they access governmental/ 
political websites often, while in women, the percentage drops to 37% for 
the same level of frequency of Internet access. The majority of women 
respondents said that they only sometimes access such websites (46%).
When chi-square test and multi-variate analysis was performed, to 
determine the relationship between the three variables of “gender”, 
“occupation” and “frequency of accessing governmental/ political 
websites”, gender did not appear as a significant variable, when 
occupation was controlled, and vice versa. It would, therefore, be safe to 
presume that the differences between women and men, as far as 
frequency of accessing governmental/ political websites is concerned, 
occurred by chance in this particular sample.
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Source: EU website’s online user survey, conducted by the author in October 2005-
January 2006.
Of the 218 respondents who answered the second part of the 
question (i.e. regarding the frequency with which they access 
governmental/ political websites), 96 went on to give further details of 
those websites. The majority mentioned governmental and local 
authorities’ websites, as well as political parties’ websites. Fewer listed 
national newspapers and television channels’ websites and only seven 
mentioned political weblogs. 20 respondents mentioned at least one EU 
official website, or an EU-related, non-official website, with Euractiv13
being the website most frequently named.
Questions 21 and 22 aimed to assess the respondents’ online 
behaviour with regard to online discussion fora. Although the response 
rate for these questions was relatively low, the replies make for interesting 
reading. More specifically, 97 individuals (44% of the respondents) replied 
that they access online fora in general14. 85 of them went on to give details 
of the fora they access, of whom 74 gave a valid answer15. Political fora
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was the most frequently occurring type (38% of respondents mentioned 
such fora) followed closely by entertainment and lifestyle fora (35% of valid 
responses). The table below lists analytically all the types of online fora
mentioned by the respondents16.
Table 5. 6: Categories of online fora that the respondents access most often, 
Source: EU website’s online user survey, conducted by the author in October 2005-
January 2006.
"Which online fora regarding other issues (not EU issues) do you access?”
Type of forum Totals Percentage (calculated on a total of 74 valid responses)
Politics 28 38%
Academic 9 12%
Entertainment/ Lifestyle 26 35%
IT 10 14%
Work-related 6 8%
General 18 24%
Total Number of respondents 74
Because of the high “no-response” rate for question 22 (74 valid 
responses, out of possible 221), the above table can only be used as an 
indication of the respondents’ online habits, as far as discussion fora are 
concerned. Nevertheless, it is important to note that politics is of interest to 
most of these respondents, whether they only access 
political/governmental websites or online political fora as well, regardless 
of their age, gender, education and occupation. This will be used as a 
comparative measure, when examining the data regarding the 
respondents’ access of official EU websites below.
5.2.3 EU official websites: The respondents’ views
As seen in the paragraphs above, the respondents of the survey 
are frequent Internet users, the majority of whom also access 
political/governmental websites on a regular basis, some of which are EU-
related (but not necessarily official EU websites). They, therefore, 
constitute the target audience that EU’s online Information and 
Communication strategy would aim to attract and address, as it transpired 
from the review of key documents in Chapter 3. Consequently, their 
comments and evaluation of the three official EU websites under 
examination (EUROPA, EU@UN and EURUNION) offer an indication of 
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the degree of success of the EU’s online communication strategy. The 
sample may not be statistically suitable for generalisation of the results, 
yet valuable conclusions can be drawn from the respondents’ comments, 
particularly when these are cross-referenced with the results of previous 
surveys on the EUROPA website and on the EU’s overall communication 
strategy.
The first thing to notice when looking at the data is that the 
respondents hardly ever access any of the three official websites in 
question. EUROPA is the most frequently accessed of the three, still only 
ranking an average 2.7 degrees of frequency of access on a scale from 1 
(Never) to 5 (Every day), while the EU@UN and EURUNION barely 
average 1 degree17. The respondents were asked to access the three 
websites at least once before filling in the questionnaire. The majority of 
the respondents had never accessed any of the three websites before, 
which makes their comments particularly valuable, since the first 
impressions an Internet user obtains of a website are crucial in 
determining whether she/he will return to that website in the future.
Most of the respondents chose to look for general information on 
the EU, with second most popular activity the search for legal/official 
documentation. A significant number of respondents (42%) also read the 
news. Of those who appear to have accessed these websites before, only 
5% (calculated on the total of 221 respondents) had participated in an 
online discussion. Several respondents chose to contact an EU Institution 
or an individual at an EU institution (16% and 17% respectively). The table 
below illustrates the results regarding the respondents’ activity on the 
three websites18. 
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Table 5. 7: Activities that the respondents chose to do on each of the three official 
EU websites, Source: EU website’s online user survey, conducted by the author in 
October 2005-January 2006.
"Which of the following did you choose to do on each of the three websites (EUROPA, EU@UN, 
EURUNION)?"
Activity Number of respondents who chose this category Percentage
Looked for general information on the EU: 146 66%
Looked for legal/official documentation: 127 57%
Looked for information on business in the EU: 34 15%
Read the news: 92 42%
Participated in the online discussion: 12 5%
Contacted an Institution: 35 16%
Contacted an individual at an EU institution: 37 17%
Obtained information regarding travel in the EU: 24 11%
Other19: 9 4%
No response 15 7%
Total number of respondents 221
When asked to assess the overall quality of information and the 
accessibility of the websites they visited, the respondents gave all three 
websites mediocre ratings20. EUROPA received the highest ratings, with 
the respondents giving it an average 3.4 rating on a scale of 1 (poor 
quality) to 5 (excellent quality) as far as the information provided is 
concerned. Both of the other two websites got average ratings of 2.8, for 
quality of information, while all three websites scored quite low with 
respondents as far as accessibility is concerned, with their average 
rankings not going over 2.9. Given that some of the respondents visited 
these websites for the first time for the purposes of the survey, and that a 
large number of respondents do not visit these websites very often, the 
low ratings on the quality of information and accessibility are a concern. As 
a result of poor accessibility, first-time visitors are unlikely to re-visit these 
websites, whilst for those who do access them poor accessibility is a 
plausible cause for their infrequent visits.
On a more positive tone, EUROPA was thought to provide 
adequate opportunities for interaction with EU officials by over 29% of the 
respondents, compared to a very poor 2.3% for EURUNION and 5% for 
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EU@UN. Nevertheless, the number of respondents who thought the 
opportunities for interaction were insufficient was also quite high (58 
respondents/ 26%), while a significant 41.6% of the respondents opted for 
the “I don’t know” answer21.
In order to better understand what constitutes “adequate 
opportunities for interaction with EU officials” for the respondents, question 
6 of the survey required them to chose one or more types of interaction 
they would like to see more of on the three websites, while also giving 
them the opportunity to add their own suggestions under the “Other” 
option. The majority of the respondents (163) replied that they would like 
to see more opportunities for interaction on the websites as Table 5.8 
below illustrates. 36.2% of those thought that the EU websites need to 
both have more individual email addresses, rather than generic ones, and 
more opportunities for online dialogue with EU officials.
Table 5.8: Types of interaction that the respondents would like to see more on 
EUROPA, EU@UN and EURUNION, Source: EU website’s online user survey, 
conducted by the author in October 2005-January 2006.
"What type of interaction would you like to see provided more 
on EUROPA/ EURUNION/ EU @ UN websites?"
Number of 
respondents Percentage
Email addresses directed to individuals, instead of generic email 
addresses 45 20.3%
More opportunities for online dialogue with EU officials/ politicians 29 13.0%
Both of the above 80 36.2%
Other 9 4.0%
The opportunities for interaction are adequate 26 12.0%
No response 32 14.5%
Total 221 100.0%
However, when asked if they have ever contacted an EU institution/ 
an EU official through the three websites (EUROPA, EU@UN and 
EURUNION) or over the phone/by correspondence/by visiting their offices, 
the majority of the respondents answered negatively on both accounts. 
More specifically, less than 40% of the respondents have ever contacted 
an EU institution/official through the three websites mentioned above, and 
less than 50% have contacted an EU institution/ official via more traditional 
means of communication, such as telephone, post etc22.
EUROPA is the website used to contact EU institutions/officials by 
most respondents, with request for documents, legal inquiries and
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inquiries regarding contact details of individuals within EU institutions 
being by far the most popular types of inquiries online. When contacting 
EU institutions/officials over the phone/via correspondence etc, the 
respondents are again more likely to have legal inquiries, although less 
likely to request contact details of individuals (10.9% as opposed to 13.6% 
who would do so online).The respondents are also more likely to request 
general information about the EU and about business issues/doing 
business within/with the EU via traditional means of communication than 
they are to do so online.
The fact that the respondents had previously requested more 
opportunities for interaction with EU officials, in Question 623, when it now 
transpires over 50% of them have never contacted an EU institution/ 
official in the first place, appears contradictory at first sight. A closer look at 
the data, however, shows that the majority of respondents would prefer 
contact emails directed to individuals rather than generic email addresses, 
which could explain why some of them at least have never contacted an 
EU institution. The results of this question also need to be examined in 
conjunction with the responses the participants gave with regard to their 
criteria of the websites’ evaluation, and their opinion on the credibility of 
the official EU websites, which is examined below.
The official EU websites may not be a popular source of information 
for the majority of the respondents, but 84.2% of them look to newspapers 
for information on the EU24. National TV is also an important source of 
information on the EU for over 50% of the respondents with magazines 
and books both preferred by 49.8% of the respondents. This is hardly 
surprising, since traditional media, such as television and the press, are an 
integral part of contemporary societies25. Rather, what makes for 
interesting reading are the alternative sources of information that the 
respondents themselves have provided, under the option “Other” of this 
question: 42 out of 47 alternative information sources listed (19% of the 
221 respondents) are online sources (respondents either mention the 
Internet in general as a source, or specific websites). Furthermore, 20 
respondents specifically name weblogs as their alternative sources for
information on the EU, while Café BABEL, EurActiv.com, EU Observer 
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and Euronews are the only other online information sources mentioned26.
This further emphasises that for a significant number of 
respondents, the Internet is an important source of information on the EU, 
but although they access EU-specific websites, none of them are official 
EU websites. The fact that weblogs are also quite popular alternative 
sources of information suggests that the decision of the Commissioner for 
Communication to create her own weblog and interact with the public was 
a move in the right direction. More importantly, the argument presented by 
some EU officials during the interviews conducted by the author, that the 
EU citizens are not really interested in information regarding the EU, is not 
confirmed by the data examined here27, as only 6% of the respondents 
declared their disinterest in the EU. The data also confirms that the 
Commission has been accurate in identifying young, educated Europeans 
as one of its priority target audiences, as they appear to have a high 
interest in EU issues.
This is also supported by the information collected under Questions 
10 and 11 of the survey28: 40.3% of all respondents confirmed that they 
access other EU websites except for EUROPA, EU@UN and EURUNION. 
86 respondents went on to provide further information regarding the EU 
websites that they usually access. Of these, 79 responses were valid, and 
the results are displayed in Table 5.9 below29. The table lists the websites 
that were mentioned by at least 3 respondents, while the category “Other” 
includes all the other websites that appeared in the respondents’ answers. 
The EU Parliament website was mentioned by 24% of the respondents, 
making it by far the single most popular official EU website on the list. 
Other EU official websites, such as the EU Council and the EU Presidency 
ones, also feature in the table below, alongside EurActiv and EU 
Observer, which appear consistently throughout the survey.
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Table 5.9: EU websites other than EUROPA, EU@UN and EURUNION, usually 
accessed by the respondents, Source: EU website’s online user survey, conducted by 
the author in October 2005-January 2006.
"Do you access any other EU websites except for EUROPA, EURUNION and EU @ UN?" 
Websites Number of respondents
Percentage (calculated on the 
total number of valid 
responses for this question)
EU Parliament website 19 24%
Euractiv.org 6 8%
EU Delegations' websites 6 8%
EU Council website 5 6%
EU Presidency website 4 5%
CORDIS 4 5%
Eurostat/ Eurobarometer 4 5%
CURIA 3 4%
EUObserver 3 4%
Other 43 54%
Total number of respondents 
(excluding invalid answers) 79
When asked to compare the EU websites they have accessed, 
including EUROPA, EU@UN and EURUNION, the respondents gave quite 
revealing answers as far as the criteria they use to evaluate a website are 
concerned. This is important, since it helps to better understand the way in 
which they evaluated the three official EU websites under examination. 
The analysis of the open-end responses to question 12 of the survey 
showed that the respondents use five criteria to evaluate a website, as 
illustrated in Figure 5.4 below30.
Evaluation criteria for websites
16%
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7%
41%
57%
Accessibility
Clarity of
content/message
Interesting / varied
content
Credibility
Relevance to audience
Figure 5.4: Respondents’ criteria for evaluating websites, Source: EU website’s 
online user survey, conducted by the author in October 2005-January 2006.
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Although the non-response rate for this question was high, the 
value of the results is not affected as these match the results of previous 
questions regarding the overall quality of the EUROPA, EU@UN and 
EURUNION websites31, which received high response rates. It becomes 
apparent that unless a website is easy to navigate, it will not rate highly 
with the users, even if its content is interesting. Apart from accessibility 
and interesting/varied content, the respondents also expect clarity of the 
message/s that a website conveys. Furthermore, 14% of the respondents 
look for credibility of the source, while 7% evaluate the content of a 
website according to its relevance to their circumstances.
On a second level, the data collected under Question 12 was used 
to determine which of the EU websites (official and unofficial) that the 
respondents had accessed were considered best. In order to determine 
that, all answers were coded a second time, according to the five 
evaluation criteria identified above, and according to whether each 
respondent referred to a website in a positive or negative way, with regard 
to one or more of the five criteria. The results put EUROPA on top of the 
list, with 25 respondents (57% of those who gave a valid answer) agreeing 
that of all the official EU websites they have visited, EUROPA was the 
best. For these 25 respondents, EUROPA’s content counteracted the 
negative effects of poor accessibility and opportunities for interaction with 
EU officials, which had caused the majority of the respondents to give it an 
overall low rating under Questions 3 and 4 of the survey.
The European Parliament’s website came second in preference, 
with 7% of the respondents rating it best, while Café Babel and EurActiv 
received a small percentage of votes as best EU websites (2% of valid 
responses respectively). However, a substantial number of respondents 
(18% of those who gave a valid answer) thought that none of the EU 
websites that they had visited was good/worthy enough.
When asked if they ever access official online EU discussion fora, 
such as the FUTURUM webpage (where, however, ongoing active 
discussions were suspended in 2005), only 9% of the respondents replied 
positively. In contrast, the number of respondents accessing unofficial EU 
fora to discuss EU issues was higher (25%), with 10% actually visiting 
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such fora often. The questions from which this data was extracted32 had a 
very high rate of valid responses (96.8 % and 95.9% respectively) and 
thus reflect quite accurately the online habits of the respondents, as far as 
online EU debates are concerned.
Comparing these results with the data regarding the respondents’ 
overall attitude towards online debates in general, it becomes apparent 
that the majority of respondents are likely to participate in debates 
concerning EU issues, but when they do, they prefer to debate in online 
fora other than the official EU ones (only one respondent mentioned 
Margot Wallström’s weblog for example). More importantly, a significant 
number of respondents tend to visit national governmental websites to 
follow or to participate in EU debates. So they are more likely to obtain 
information or form opinions on EU issues through the prism of national 
politics.
This is crucial to the theoretical argument regarding the vertical 
Europeanisation of the public debates and its role in the democratic 
legitimation of the European institutions. As discussed in Chapters 1 and 
2, vertical Europeanisation, i.e. the direct communication between the EU 
institutions and the public, is important if the former are to be incorporated 
in the emerging European public sphere, and therefore be recognised as 
legitimate participants of the public debate. Public communication was 
deemed central to this process, and its electronic/online form was 
identified as having the unique potential to bring EU officials and the public 
in direct, unmediated contact with each other33. Yet what is emerging from 
the analysis of the data here is that the online debate regarding the EU is 
mainly mediated by national online fora. In other words, the EU institutions 
are failing to establish themselves as equal participants of the emerging 
online European public sphere.
The data examined so far has mainly concerned the effectiveness 
of the EU’s official websites and has offered an indication of how Internet 
users, particularly EU nationals, view these websites. Nevertheless, the 
scope of this survey was not only to bring new data in the discussion 
regarding the EU’s Information and Communication strategy online, but 
also to obtain Internet users’ views on the EU’s democratic deficit debate 
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and of the role that the Internet could play in addressing that deficit. The 
following section presents the survey results regarding the respondents’ 
general views on these issues.
5.2.4 General questions: The role of the Internet in the EU’s public 
sphere
As seen above, the majority of the respondents felt that there 
should be more opportunities for interaction with EU officials on EUROPA, 
EU@UN and EURUNION in the form of both email and online debate. In 
order to better understand the underlying reasons for the respondents’ 
answers, Question 13 of the survey returns to the issue of interaction with
EU officials, thus linking it to the accountability of the EU institutions. The 
respondents were asked whether they felt that having direct access to the 
EU officials/MEPs would increase the accountability of the EU institutions: 
Not surprisingly, over 60% replied “Yes”, with another 11% opting for the “I 
do not know” response.
This question had a two-fold purpose: Firstly, to put the 
respondents’ earlier answers regarding interaction opportunities on the 
official EU websites in a wider context; and secondly, to make a link with 
Question 14, one of the survey’s most important questions, regarding the 
role of the Internet in addressing the EU’s (perceived) democratic deficit. 
More specifically, as far as the second aim is concerned, the scope of 
Question 1434 was to determine whether the respondents associate 
interaction with the accountability of the EU institutions and with 
democracy.
In order to answer these questions, the answers to Question 14 
were coded in two ways: The responses were initially divided into four 
categories: those who agreed that the Internet can help address the EU’s 
democratic deficit; those who disagreed; those who gave a non-valid 
response or were uncertain/ did not know; and those who rejected the 
concept of the EU having a democratic deficit in the first place. The 
majority of the respondents agreed that there is a democratic deficit of 
some type within the EU, and thought that the Internet could play a role in 
eliminating that deficit. Figure 5.5 below illustrates the results.
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Do you think that the Internet can play a productive role in eliminating 
the perceived democratic deficit of the European Union?
56%
40%
4%
0%
Yes
No
No response
No deficit
Figure 5.5: Can the Internet help eliminate the EU’s democratic deficit? Source: EU 
website’s online user survey, conducted by the author in October 2005-January 2006.
The question was compulsory, and therefore all respondents gave 
an answer, although a small percentage comprised non-valid/no-response 
answers (4%).
Looking at this data from a different perspective, the first important 
issue that emerges is that 96% of the respondents actually find that, in one 
way or another, the EU suffers from a democratic deficit. The second level 
of analysis of the answers for Question 14 revealed the criteria upon which 
the respondents based their answers.
A high number of those respondents who replied negatively to the 
first stem of the question (i.e. who believe that the Internet cannot help 
eliminate the EU’s democratic deficit) did not explain their view further 
(87% of those who replied negatively). Of those who did, however, (albeit 
very few- 12 respondents), all agreed that the reason why the Internet 
could not contribute towards further democratisation of the EU lies in the 
gap between the Internet-haves and the Internet-have-nots.
On the other hand, the respondents who viewed the Internet’s role 
in eliminating the EU’s democratic deficit as positive produced more 
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elaborate answers in their majority (80% of those who replied positively). 
The main areas in which these respondents thought that the Internet can 
actually have a positive effect were:
a) Increased accessibility of information, which allows the citizens to make 
more informed decisions in relation to EU issues;
b)Increased accountability of the EU institutions by enabling people to 
contact the EU institutions/officials quickly and cheaply as well as by 
establishing more direct forms of democracy, such as e-governance, e-
voting and participation in the decision-making process;
c) Increased opportunities for public dialogue (with or without the 
participation of the EU institutions/officials) which will lead to public 
pressure on the EU institutions for further democratisation of their 
structures and processes; and
d)Increased transparency: the Internet is seen as a medium which 
prevents institutions from functioning in secrecy, either because 
information is circulated via alternative routes or because the institutions 
themselves choose to make part or the whole of their decision-making 
process open to the public.
These criteria are very similar to those identified in Chapters 1 and 
2 as essential in the success of the EU’s public communication strategy in 
increasing the public’s trust towards the EU institutions and contributing to 
the elimination of the EU’s democratic deficit35. They also coincide with the 
aims and actions the Commission proposes in the EU Information and 
Communication documents examined in Chapter 3. Therefore, the only 
weak link so far is the actual implementation of these criteria by the EU’s 
online public communication strategy. Interestingly, some of the EU 
officials interviewed for this research project found the results of the survey 
“not surprising”, and acknowledged the weaknesses in the EU’s public 
communication policy online. This is despite the fact that all interviewees 
have more or less dismissed the claims regarding the democratic deficit of 
the EU institutions.
Of the above criteria, accessibility was the issue quoted by most 
respondents, with accountability being the second most frequently 
mentioned reason for the Internet’s democratising potential given by the 
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respondents. The table below demonstrates the relevant percentages in 
detail.
Table 5.10: Respondents’ views on the role of the Internet in eliminating the EU’s 
perceived democratic deficit, Source: EU website’s online user survey, conducted by 
the author in October 2005-January 2006.
"Do you feel the Internet can play a productive role in eliminating the perceived "democratic deficit" 
of the European Union? If so, in what way?"
Category of response Totals
Percentage 
(calculated 
on the total 
of 221 
respondents)
Yes 25 11%
Yes: Accessibility 43 19%
Yes: Accountability 27 12%
Yes: Public Dialogue 19 9%
Yes: Transparency 13 6%
No 76 34%
No: Gap between the Internet-haves and the Internet have-nots 12 5%
No response 8 4%
No deficit 1 0.4%
Total number of responses 221
The data from this question was cross-tabulated with the variables 
of gender, nationality, occupation, age and education, in order to 
determine whether any of these variables affected the respondents’ 
answers. Chi-square tests and multi-variate analysis were also carried out 
for these variables. The tests indicated that the respondents’ answers 
regarding the role of the Internet in eliminating the EU’s democratic deficit 
were independent of the respondents’ age, gender, nationality, education 
and occupation.
Going back to the respondents’ earlier answers regarding the 
relation between direct access to EU officials and the accountability of the 
EU institutions, it becomes clear that although these two issues are 
interrelated in the eyes of the respondents, accountability alone is not 
considered sufficient to address the EU’s democratic deficit. In fact, for the 
respondents, access to information is more important, as they find that this 
allows them to form more informed opinions regarding the EU. Unlimited 
access to information online and exchange of opinions and data regarding 
the EU are for a large number of the respondents directly linked with the 
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level of transparency and accountability of the EU institutions, which in 
turn directly influence the level of democratic decision-making within those 
institutions.
5.3 Conclusion
One of the main aims of this survey was to obtain feedback from 
regular Internet users on their overall impression regarding the quality of 
three of the EU’s official websites (EUROPA, EU@UN, EURUNION). This 
was considered important because the last user survey regarding an 
official EU website (EUROPA) was carried out four years ago (in 2002) 
and only involved communication experts within EU institutions (EUROPA 
2003). Although the sample for the present survey was a non-probability 
one, it was aimed towards individuals who would be expected to fall within 
the Commission’s priority audiences (women, the young and the 
educated) and who at the same time would represent the average Internet 
user (also young and educated).
The findings clearly indicate that while the respondents show an 
interest in politics online, when they look for information concerning the EU 
online, the official EU websites are not their first choice of information 
source. Similarly, although a significant number of respondents access 
online political discussion fora, few access online fora to discuss EU 
issues. Even when they wish to discuss matters concerning the EU, the 
respondents choose non-official EU fora. The data collected from the 
open-ended questions suggests that this preference of the respondents for 
non-official EU websites and sources of information is two-fold. The 
respondents are either not aware of the existence of official EU discussion 
fora, or they are not confident that they will find reliable, objective 
information on official EU websites.
From the perspective of the EU’s Information and Communication 
strategy aims, the results of the survey indicate that little progress has 
been made in bridging the gap between the EU institutions and the public, 
as far as online communication is concerned. Even the EUROPA website, 
which is the EU’s main portal, and a key tool for the implementation of the 
EU’s Information and Communication strategy online, was rated as best 
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website on EU issues by only 11% of the respondents (25 individuals).
The respondents indicated that the EU websites are difficult to 
navigate in and do not offer interesting contents, but more importantly, the 
majority of them thought that these websites do not offer adequate 
opportunities for interaction with EU officials. The importance of this last 
set of data became apparent when examining the results from the more 
general questions that measured the respondents’ views on the role of the 
Internet in further democratising the EU’s institutions and on the 
importance of interaction as a means to increase accountability of EU 
institutions.
For most respondents, interaction, accountability and democratic 
procedures are interrelated. This means that the EU’s Information and 
Communication strategy is moving towards the right direction on paper, 
prioritising direct communication with the EU citizens and making more 
decision-making processes open, at least partly, to the public.
Nevertheless, the respondents’ expectations go beyond generic 
email addresses, which the analysis of three of the EU’s official websites 
in Chapter 4 has shown that are almost always available: They would like 
to see more opportunities for online dialogue with EU officials, as well as 
more opportunities for contact with individuals within the EU institutions. 
EUROPA also scores low as far as accessibility is concerned, as most 
respondents found navigation on this website difficult. This is a deterrent, 
as apart from quality and variety of content, another element of a quality 
website is the ability to find information on it easily and quickly. 
Furthermore, the respondents link unlimited access to information with the 
ability to form informed opinions regarding the EU and with the level of 
democracy within the EU. The failure of official EU websites to facilitate 
easy navigation enhances the perception that the EU institutions lack 
transparency and does not help to increase the credibility of the 
information available on the websites.
Besides this, despite the Commission’s efforts to introduce various 
EU sources of information such as Europe Direct and Information relays, 
national media, particularly TV and newspapers, are still the most popular 
sources for information regarding the EU (for example, Europe Direct was 
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not once mentioned by the respondents). At the same time, most 
respondents also look for information regarding the EU online, but they 
prefer weblogs and non-official EU websites to official ones, again 
because of a lack of trust in EU official sources of information and/or lack 
of awareness as to the official websites’ existence. Although it is positive 
that there is an indication of an emerging European public sphere online, 
with reference to the theoretical concept of online vertical Europeanisation 
of that public sphere, this survey provided no evidence that the EU 
institutions are part of the online public debate regarding the EU.
On a second level, the findings of this survey confirm what the 
official documents regarding the EU’s Information and Communication 
strategy acknowledge overtly or covertly: The EU institutions are perceived 
by the public as lacking democratic legitimation and/or being deficient of 
democratic procedures. Whether scholars and Commission officials accept 
that there is a democratic deficit within the EU or not36 is, therefore, 
irrelevant. Unless the public is convinced otherwise, they will remain 
sceptical towards the EU institutions on the whole, and towards the official 
EU information sources in particular.
Furthermore, what transpired through the survey data is that, for the 
respondents, democratic deficit and accountability, transparency and 
public dialogue go hand-in-hand. They accept that there is a democratic 
deficit within the EU and suggest more direct contact with EU officials, 
more access and openness of the decision-making processes and more 
opportunities for public dialogue with EU officials as remedies to the 
problem. For most of them, the Internet can help towards eliminating the 
democratic deficit because it facilitates interaction, openness and 
accessibility of information.
Most importantly, these suggestions did not come from 
communication experts, EU officials or EU theorists only. The varied 
professional background of the respondents indicates that the EU’s online 
Information and Communication strategy should not only target elite 
audiences, such as journalists, academics and officials, as suggested in 
some of the Information and Communication strategy documents and by 
some Commission officials during interviews. The educational and 
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professional profile of the respondents suggests that the online European 
public sphere may be more inclusive than previously assumed and the 
EU’s online Information and Communication strategy needs to take this 
into consideration.
Of course the online public sphere will be an elite one for as long as 
Internet access is not universally available. Working towards creating an 
all-inclusive public sphere online means aiming to eliminate the divide 
between Internet-haves and Internet-have-nots as well as close the gap 
between specialists and the general public. The latest EU Information and 
Communication documents, published after Margot Wallström’s 
appointment as Communication Commissioner, have acknowledged this, 
as they set out the aim of addressing and involving the wider EU public, as 
well as the elites.
The fact that the respondents prefer to access non-official EU fora
and weblogs in order to discuss EU issues suggests that the EU 
institutions/officials (with the exception of Margot Wallström’s weblog) 
remain absent from the emerging online EU public sphere. This is crucial, 
for as long as the online EU public dialogue continues to evolve without 
any input or with only marginal input from the EU institutions/officials, the 
EU’s public communication strategy will not become effective enough to 
change the EU public’s perception of the EU institutions as lacking 
democratic legitimation.
The following figure summarises the main points of this survey in 
accordance with the theoretical framework first presented in Chapter 237. 
All four components of the framework have been updated here, in order to 
reflect the results of the online EU websites’ user survey.
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Figure 5. 6: Key components of the theoretical concept regarding the EU public 
sphere: Internet users’ views, adapted from Figure 2.1, Chapter 2.
The following and final chapter of this research project summarises 
and compares the main components of the theoretical concept with the 
main points that emerged from the review of the EU’s Information and 
Communication strategy documents, the analysis of three of the EU’s 
official websites, the results of the Internet users’ survey and the 
interviews with key Commission officials. It also briefly looks at any 
developments in the online implementation of the EU’s public 
communication strategy in 2006, which were not measured by the analysis 
The European public 
sphere:
More evidence of 
horizontal than vertical 
Europeanisation of the 
online public dialogue
The Internet::
§ Over 50%
of the 
respondents 
thought the 
Internet can 
help eliminate 
the EU’s 
democratic 
deficit.
Democratic 
deficit: 
§ 96% of 
respondents 
believe there is a 
democratic deficit 
within the EU;
§ Participation, 
meeting public’s 
priorities, 
accountability: 
Used as 
evaluation criteria 
for the EU 
websites by the 
majority of the 
Internet users 
surveyed.
EU Public communication 2005:
§ Overall evaluation of its online 
implementation by Internet users is poor, 
however
§ Users’ evaluation criteria of the websites 
coincide with the criteria for successful 
public communication identified in Chapter 2
and with the Commission’s proposed EU 
Information and Communication strategy 
core aims (Chapter 3).
The Habermasian public sphere online:
§ Participants (who): Elite public (Internet-
haves), Western, educated, young males 
predominantly,  but potential of an all-inclusive 
public sphere confirmed by data;
§ The public sphere as a realm in which
individuals gather to participate in open 
discussions (how): Politics are among top 
interests for individuals surveyed here;
§ Outcome (what): Depends on bridging the 
gap between Internet-haves and Internet 
have-nots and on greater socio-economic 
diversification of the participants.
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of the websites and the Internet users’ survey, and proceeds to suggest a 
set of recommendations for the future planning of the EU’s public 
communication strategy online.
  
Notes
1 See Chapter 3, Parts 3.1 and 3.2.
2 According to Deacon et al, snowball sampling is suitable “where no specific list or 
institution exists that could be used as the basis for sampling […] A snowball sample 
relies on initial contacts to suggest further people for the researcher to approach”  
(Deacon, Pickering, Golding, Murdock 1999: 53). In the present study, snowball sampling 
was deemed appropriate as it would be practically impossible to calculate the exact 
Internet users’ population and determine a representative sample otherwise. The author
relied on the initial contacts to forward the questionnaire to their peers.
3 See also Chapter 1, Section 1.3.2.
4 The classification of the initial contacts according to nationality/country of origin was 
based on the IANA-defined country code Top-Level Domain (ccTLD), i.e. the last part 
of the Internet domain name used by a country or a dependent territory (Internet 
Assigned Numbers Authority- IANA 2006). This is two letters long, for example jp for 
Japan or uk for the United Kingdom. Top-Level Domain, in general, comprises the letters 
which follow the final dot of any domain name. For example, in the domain name 
www.website.com, the top-level domain is com (or COM, as domain names are not case-
sensitive). top-level domain (TLD) is the last part of an Internet domain name; that is, 
the letters which follow the final dot of any domain name. For example, in the domain 
name www.website.com, the top-level domain is com (or COM, as domain names are not
case-sensitive).
Apart from the country code top-level domains (ccTLD), the regulator, Internet 
Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA), currently classifies top-level domains into another 
two types: Generic top-level domain (gTLD), used (at least in theory) by a particular 
class of organizations (for example, com for commercial organizations). It is three or 
more letters long. gTLDs are subclassified into sponsored top-level domains (sTLD), e.g. 
.aero, .coop and .museum, and unsponsored top-level domains (uTLD), e.g. .biz, .info, 
.name and .pro; and infrastructure top-level domain: The top-level domain arpa is the 
only confirmed one. Root has been known to exist without reason.
5 The Yahoo! Directory (Yahoo!Inc 2006) listed 14388 higher education institutes 
worldwide, on 25 February 2006, 47% of which were in the US, and approximately 22% 
(3203 institutes) in EU, or EU-related countries (i.e. accession countries, candidate 
countries and European Neighbourhood policy countries). Of these, the higher number 
(983 institutes) was listed under the UK domain name (.ac.uk), with Italy, Germany and 
France following with much lower numbers (300, 259 and 249 listed institutions 
respectively). In order to maintain a balance between the UK and the US institutes and 
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the institutes from other countries, the final contacts chosen were not in accordance with 
the institutes’ distribution worldwide.
6 According to Blognet statistics (Blogwise.com 2006), there were 71252 weblogs in 204 
countries listed on Blognet.com on 25/02/2006, with 89% of the countries having at least 
one weblog listed. Of all these weblogs, only 7547 were listed under politics and of these 
again only 55 were listed under the keywords “Europe” and/or “the EU” (0.73%). Of these, 
only 30 had an available contact email. In the end, 24 were chosen for the final sample, in 
order to maintain a balance between anti-EU and EU-neutral/pro-EU weblogs.
7 The think tanks chosen here were taken from a list comprising public policy institutes 
referenced on the  Wikipedia list of public policy institutions (Wikipedia.org 2006c) and on 
the much sorter list of think tanks found on Politeia, a socioeconomic forum itself (Politeia 
website 2003). The final list of public policy institutes included 4 British politics think tanks; 
6 EU politics/relations think tanks (2 Belgian, 1 British, 1 Spanish, 1 French, 1 German); 2 
Economics think tanks (1 Danish, 1 US); 2 International Relations think tanks (1 
Australian, 1 British); 2 US politics think tanks; and 1 German interdisciplinary student 
think tank. It must be noted that the categorisation of the institutes was based on how the 
institutes define themselves on their webpages. If a think tank defined itself as “a British 
politics forum” for example, then it was classified as such, even if part of its website’s 
content referred to international relations or EU/UK relations.
8There were no comprehensive lists of youth/student societies found online. A search on 
Google (Google Inc 2006) returned more than 25 million results for the keywords “youth 
student societies clubs”. However, most of the top 50 results linked to UK educational 
institutes. A comparison of the student/young people’s societies and clubs listed on 10 
UK higher education institutes showed that most of these societies were replicated on all 
or most of the institutes. It was therefore decided to use only one UK higher education 
institute’s list of student societies and clubs as the source for the sample of the present 
survey.
The student societies chosen included 1 Indian students’ society; 1 Malaysian  students’ 
society; 1 Greek students’ society; 1 Italian students’ society; 1 Spanish students’ society; 
1 Thai students’ society; 1 Muslim students’ society; 1 Jewish students’ society; 1 
Christian students’ society; and 14 non-nationality/religion-related student societies and 
clubs (i.e. sports clubs, debate societies, music/ drama clubs etc).
9 The main initiative to cover the divide between Internet-haves and Internet-have-nots in 
the EU is the Commission’s i2010 Initiative, which was formed within the framework of the 
Lisbon strategy (March 2000), to transform the EU in the world’s most dynamic and 
competitive economy by 2010. For more information on the i2010 Initiative see 
Commission of the European Communities 2006h. For details on the Lisbon strategy see 
EUROPA 2006e.
10 Chapter 2, Part 2.1.
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11 See Question 26, Annex 4.
12 There was only one respondent who answered that he never accesses the Internet, but 
he makes up for a negligent 0.4% of the total sample.
13 Euractiv.com defines itself as follows: “an independent media portal fully dedicated to 
EU affairs. EurActiv has an original business model, based on five elements (corporate 
sponsoring, EurActor membership, advertising, EU projects, and content syndication). It is 
well funded and the content usage is free” (EurActiv.com PLC 2006).
14 See Annex 4, Question 21.
15See Annex 4, Question 22.
16 See Annex 4, for further details on how the responses were re-grouped. Note that 
when added up, the totals per type of online forum exceed the total amount of valid 
responses to this question, as some respondents mentioned more than one type of fora
in their answer.
17 See Question 3, Annex 4.
18 Note that the data has been regrouped, in order to separate invalid (no response) from 
valid responses and duplicates within the category “Other”. The percentages have been 
calculated on the basis of total number of respondents (221) and not on the added up 
totals of each category, as some respondents chose more than one categories.
19 Of the 9 responses under the “Other” category, 6 concerned a search for job 
opportunities or internships within the EU institutions. All 6 of the respondents were 
students in their first or second university degree.
20 See Annex 4, Questions 3 and 4.
21 See Annex 4, Question 5.
22 See Annex 4, Questions 8 and 9.
23 See Annex 4. 
24 See Annex 4, Question 7.
25 With regard to the national public spheres as these appear through traditional, offline
media throughout Europe and the “Europeanisation” of the offline public debates in the 
Member-states, see Holland and Chaban 2005; Koopmans, Statham, Kriesi, Della Porta, 
de Beus, Guiraudon, Medrano, Pfetsch 2004; Bond and Federal Trust for Education and 
Research 2003; Koopmans and Pfetsch 2003; Risse and van de Steeg 2003; Kantner 
2002; Rauer, Rivet, van de Steeg 2002.
26 See Annex 4, Question 7.
27 See Annex 4, Question 7.
28 See Annex 4.
29 The total number of respondents who gave a valid answer is smaller than the added up 
totals per website chosen. This is because some respondents listed more than one 
websites in their answer.
30 See Annex 4, Question 12. The figure is based on 44 valid responses, and not on the 
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collective total of the number of respondents per criterion, as some respondents based 
their evaluation on more than 1 criterion. If added up, the percentages shown in the figure 
exceed 100%. This is because in several cases, a respondent mentioned more than one 
criterion.
31 See Annex 4, Questions 3 and 4.
32 See Annex 4, Questions 18 and 19.
33 See Chapter 1, Parts 1.2 and 1.3; Chapter 2, Parts 2.3 and 2.4.
34 See Annex 4.
35 See Chapter 1, Parts 1.2. and 1.3; Chapter 2, Parts 2.3 and 2.4.
36 See Chapter 1, Part 1.2 and Chapter 3.
37 See Figure 2.1, Chapter 2.
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Conclusion- Theory and reality of the EU’s public 
communication strategy online
Based on the two theoretical debates regarding the impact of the 
Internet on politics and the European public sphere and the EU’s 
democratic deficit, which have been developing in parallel for the last 10-
15 years, this thesis has investigated the role of the Internet in the EU’s 
public communication strategy and the emerging EU public sphere.
As discussed in Chapter 3, the Commission, in its proposals for an 
EU Information and Communication strategy, has acknowledged that 
direct communication with the EU public is necessary in order to build the 
EU citizens’ trust towards its institutions and address the issues of 
transparency and democratic legitimation of the EU’s decision-making 
process. Furthermore, the EU’s Information and Communication strategy 
regards the Internet as a key tool that would enable more openness and 
citizens’ participation in the decision making progress.
However, when the policy was juxtaposed with its online 
implementation, in Chapters 4 and 5, it became evident that although there 
is an emerging European public sphere online, the EU’s official input is 
mainly absent from that online public discourse. The underlying reasons of 
this gap between policy and online implementation were further 
investigated through interviews with senior policy-making and policy-
implementation Commission officials, the results of which have been 
presented throughout Chapters 3-5, where necessary.
In this final chapter, the empirical data is summarised and used to 
assess the original theoretical model established in Chapters 1 and 2, in 
order to identify the areas where the online implementation of the EU’s 
public communication deviates from the theoretical model and the 
Commission’s proposed strategies.
i. From theory to reality: The concept of the online European 
public sphere
Using the Habermasian concept of the public sphere1 as the 
normative framework of theoretical analysis in this research, two main 
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points were identified in relation to the European public sphere: Firstly, the 
European public sphere is directly connected to the issue of the EU’s 
democratic deficit2. If the purpose of the public sphere, in the Habermasian 
approach, is to ensure that society functions on democratic principles, then 
the European case appears to be one where public dialogue is not fulfilling 
its purpose, i.e. as a safeguard of democratic principles. Secondly, in the 
absence of an institutionalised pan-European public sphere based on a 
common language and mediated by pan-European media, the approach of 
several, interrelated, Europeanised national/regional public spheres offers 
the most realistic, from an ontological and methodological point of view, 
theoretical platform for analysis of the European public sphere3.
Pfetsch’s model of the “horizontal” (communicative linkages 
between various EU member-states) and “vertical” (communicative 
linkages between national and European level) Europeanisation process 
of the public dialogue (Pfetsch 2004: 4) offered the theoretical framework 
within which to define the role of the EU’s public communication strategy in 
the European public sphere4.  Initially, public communication was defined 
as the top-down process of the communication between the EU institutions 
and the public, with three main areas of action, namely to increase 
people’s familiarity with the EU; to increase people’s appreciation of what 
the EU does; and to engage people with the EU/ in the debate of EU 
affairs5. Following Pfetsch’s classification of horizontal and vertical 
Europeanisation of the public sphere, this definition placed public 
communication within the vertical process of Europeanisation of the public 
dialogue.
With interaction being a fundamental element of public 
communication and in the absence of pan-European mediated public fora, 
i.e. pan-European TV channels and/or press, the focus turned to the online 
direct public debate between EU institutions and the general public. 
This brings us to the final component of the present study’s 
theoretical framework: the Internet. The medium’s key characteristics of 
identity fluidity, ability to bypass communication obstacles, elimination of 
geographical and time-related barriers and virtually endless flow of 
information (Poster 2003; Yang 2002; Jordan 2000) have led several 
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theorists to envisage an alternative, all-inclusive public sphere online6. In 
the case of the European public sphere, in particular, given its complicated 
nature (interconnected national public spheres, multilingual community, 
geographical distance between members of the public) the Internet 
becomes an attractive tool, which could be deployed towards the formation 
of a democratic, strong European public sphere (Leonard and Arbuthnott 
2002; Engström 2000). To what extend is this hypothesis confirmed by the 
online reality of the EU’s public communication strategy? This issue, which 
forms the core research question of the present study, was addressed in 3 
stages.
The EU’s public communication: Information and Communication 
policy 2001-2006
Firstly, the EU’s Information and Communication strategy 
documents from 2001 onwards were reviewed in order to obtain the EU’s 
official position on the role of the EU’s public communication in the 
European public sphere and in addressing the EU’s democratic deficit, 
through the deployment of the Internet.
What became evident from the documents reviewed was that the 
Commission is aware of the issues regarding the emerging European 
public sphere and the openness, accountability and democratic 
legitimation of the EU institutions, particularly after 2005. Through its 
Information and Communication documents, the Commission has thus:
a) Declared its intention to establish a two-way communication process 
with the European public, in order to offer more opportunities for citizens’ 
participation in the decision-making process and to gain the trust of the 
public towards the EU institutions;
b) Committed itself to the creation of a more homogeneous 
communication amongst the EU institutions, which, in turn, will reflect a 
more coherent image of what the EU stands for and help communicate 
more clearly the EU’s goals and achievements to the European public; and
c) Recognised the Internet as an integral part of the EU’s public 
communication strategy.
The Commission has also maintained coherence and consistency 
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of the values it suggests as core EU values throughout the documents, 
despite any changes introduced in the proposed Information and 
Communication strategy. The figure below was used in Chapter 3 to 
illustrate the three core EU values, as these emerged from the review of 
the Information and Communication strategy documents. 
Figure 3.1: “The circle of prosperity”, the three key ideas underlining the EU’s 
Information and Communication strategy, Source: the author, based on Commission 
Information and Communication strategy documents 2000-2004 and 2004-2006, Chapter 
3, Part 3.3.
Despite the consistency in the values projected and in its basic 
commitments with regard to the EU’s public communication strategy, there 
are several problems with the Commission’s proposals on paper. To begin 
with, it is not always clear if the Commission is referring to EU member-
states and citizens only, or to the wider European community, thus 
sending confusing messages to the public (intra-EU and foreign alike). The 
references to non-EU audiences are rare, and there are no clear policies 
proposed in addressing these audiences.
Moreover, the Commission recognises that the EU public is 
questioning the democratic legitimacy of the EU institutions yet never 
really goes beyond merely acknowledging the existence of this argument. 
In addition, while most of the documents examined rather tactfully dismiss 
the claims that the EU has a democratic deficit, several of the EU’s public 
communication materials addressed to the public, both online and offline,
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blatantly reject such an argument7.
Not accepting the lack of democratic legitimation of the EU 
institutions undermines the Commission’s emphasis on citizens’ 
participation in the decision-making process and on further openness of 
the EU institutions’ procedures. In other words, it is not clear whether the 
Commission intends to actually address the EU’s democratic deficit by 
introducing new possibilities for the citizens to give feedback and monitor 
the decision-making procedures on EU level, or these measures aim to 
change the public’s perception regarding the EU’s democratic deficit.
Finally, it has not always been clear if it is the Commission’s view 
that the Internet should be used to address a niche public, i.e. the 
European elites, more than it should be used to communicate with the 
general public.
Despite the problems identified in the EU’s Information and 
Communication documents, from a methodological point of view, the 
consistency in the projected values and aims offered a solid basis for 
analysis of the EU’s public communication messages online.
The EU’s public communication: Online implementation
The main points of the Information and Communication strategy 
were juxtaposed with the findings from a 24-week-long monitoring of three 
of the EU’s official websites, in Chapter 4, in order to establish the relation 
between the official communication policy and its online implementation. 
The system of key values identified in the Commission documentation was 
used in conjunction with the theoretical concept of public communication 
developed in earlier chapters as the basis upon which a set of coding 
values was built, allowing for the systematic mapping of the three 
websites’ homepages. This methodological approach made it possible for 
the data produced to be evaluated in relation to both the EU’s Information 
and Communication aims and the normative aims of successful public 
communication.
What emerged from the analysis of the three official websites was a 
gap between policy and implementation online, particularly when it came 
to interaction and citizen’s participation in the decision making process. 
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Although the EU’s messages online adhered to the key concepts that the 
Commission has consistently pointed out as core EU values throughout 
the Information and Communication strategy documents, interaction with 
EU officials was only available in the form of generic email addresses. 
Online public dialogue in the form of discussion forum debates was 
recorded only in 2004, in two instances: the permanent online debate 
regarding EU issues on the EUROPA website (FUTURUM public forum) 
and the brief, temporary online discussion regarding mainly trade issues, 
which appeared on the EURUNION website for three weeks only. In 2005 
the FUTURUM discussion forum was suspended, at the height of the 
debate regarding the future of Europe and the Constitutional Treaty of the 
EU. Although online public debate was reintroduced on the EUROPA 
website in 2006, in the form of the Debate Europe forum, there has been 
no formal commitment that the feedback from the public will be 
incorporated in any way in the policy-making process of the EU nor has 
there been any indication so far that this will change in the future.
Furthermore, all three EU websites were found to lack sufficient 
coverage of the issues which, according to recent Eurobarometer surveys, 
concern the European public mostly, i.e. social issues, such as 
unemployment, pensions and education8. From this perspective, the EU’s 
online public communication, as observed in EUROPA, EURUNION and 
EU@UN, failed to meet another of the aims of the normative model of 
public communication, i.e. to meet the audience’s needs and interests.
EU public communication online: Policy impact on key online 
audiences
Having established a gap between the EU’s public communication 
policy and its implementation online, the third step was to investigate the 
impact of the EU’s public communication online on what the Commission 
has defined as ‘key audiences’, i.e. the young and educated, who also fit 
the average Internet user’s profile, thus being amongst the individuals 
most likely to access the official EU websites and/or participate in an 
online debate. For this reason a survey was conducted in late 2005-early 
2006 aiming to record the views of such priority audiences.
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Conducting such a survey proved challenging, both in respect of 
methodology and resources. Measuring the exact Internet users’ 
population and calculating a representative sample that would fit both the 
profile of “key EU audiences” and that of the average Internet user would 
have been an enormously time-consuming, if not impossible, from a 
methodological perspective, task. Even if the methodological obstacles 
were overcome, conducting a large-scale online survey of a representative 
sample of Internet users would have required financial resources greater 
than the ones available for the present research. For these reasons, the 
survey focused instead on obtaining as wide a range of data as possible 
from a small sample of Internet users, who still matched the key EU 
audience and average Internet user profiles. Although the number of 
respondents was small and the survey, therefore, did not allow for greater 
generalisations by itself, it was possible to reach some generalisations by 
cross-referencing the responses with data from earlier, larger-scale 
surveys on the EU citizens’ attitudes towards the Union (Eurobarometer 
2006a, Eurobarometer 2006b; Davies and Readhead 2004; 
COM(2002)705, final).
Although the survey aimed mainly to obtain responses from 
individuals who fit the demographic profile of key EU audiences and of the 
average Internet user (the majority of the respondents were young, male 
and educated to high levels), the resulting sample included responses 
from individuals who fall under the umbrella of “vulnerable” audiences 
(Eurobarometer 2006b), i.e. women (one third of the respondents), 
individuals who left education early (14% of the total sample) and 
individuals younger than 24 years of age (approximately 30% of the 
respondents). The majority of the respondents also claimed to visit 
political/governmental websites on a regular basis (83% of the 
respondents).
Gender, education, nationality and age were statistically found to 
have no effect on the respondents’ Internet behaviour or views on the EU 
websites and on the role of the Internet in eliminating the EU’s democratic 
deficit. However, the results highlighted something which recent larger-
scale Eurobarometer surveys have also showed: The Commission (in the 
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present case three of its official websites) is struggling to convince the very 
audiences that it has identified as “priority targets” of its public 
communication strategy and which have traditionally been pro-EU 
(Eurobarometer 2006b). The respondents rated the EU websites low in 
terms of accessibility, content and interaction opportunities and claimed 
not to access official EU websites often, despite the fact that several of 
them are interested in EU issues and often access relevant online public 
fora. In other words, there is a possibility of an emerging European public 
sphere online, from which the EU’s official voice is currently absent or 
excluded. More importantly, the respondents almost unanimously agreed 
that there is a democratic deficit in the EU (96% of respondents) and for 
the majority of them (56% of all respondents), the Internet can contribute 
towards eliminating this deficit, as it allows for accountability, openness 
and direct dialogue between the EU officials and the public.
Figure c.1 below illustrates the relation between the theoretical 
framework regarding the EU public sphere (i.e. the democratic deficit of 
the EU institutions, the EU public communication strategy and the role of 
the Internet as both a tool of public communication and a means of 
democratisation of the EU) and the reality of the EU’s public 
communication strategy online, as this emerged from the 3-level analysis 
described above.
This 3-step analysis confirmed the theoretical hypothesis that the 
Internet has an important role to play in the emerging European public 
sphere and highlighted the gap between EU public communication policy 
and its online implementation, insofar as the Internet’s deployment in 
promoting public dialogue between the EU officials and the general public
is concerned. This, in turn, generated another question. If the Commission 
has committed itself to promoting public dialogue and has identified a key 
role for the Internet in all its Information and Communication strategy 
documents since 2001, to what can this gap between policy and 
implementation be attributed? 
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Figure c.1: EU public communication- Theory, policy and online reality, Source: The 
author, based on Figures 2.3, 3.2, 4.12 and 5.7.
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In order to address this question, interviews with key Commission 
officials involved in the EU’s Information and Communication policy-
making process were conducted. The interviews allowed for an 
understanding of the institutional culture behind the policy-making and 
highlighted some of the underlying causes of the EU’s public 
communication strategy shortcomings, thus showing that there is scope for 
further investigation of the institutional culture behind the making of the 
EU’s public communication policy in future projects.
The individuals who were interviewed held key positions within the 
Information and Communication policy-making and implementation 
mechanism at the time (some still hold the same positions today) and were 
interviewed in 3 phases, after the completion of each of the above three 
research steps (documents’ review, websites’ analysis and Internet users’ 
survey), in order to obtain the officials’ input on every aspect of the 
findings. The results of the interviews have been presented throughout the 
previous chapters, where necessary. The main issue that emerged from 
these interviews was that the gap between policy and implementation is a 
reflection of the situation within the relevant policy-making and policy-
implementing bodies, i.e. the Commission and the Directorate-General 
(DG) Communication:
a)The DG Communication has undergone restructuring four times since 
2001, which may well at least partly explain the fact that most public 
communication documents reviewed in Chapter 3 repeat the same aims 
but make little and abstract reference to any progress achieved in 
obtaining these aims9. This also partly explains the poor implementation of 
the EU’s public communication policy online, which this thesis has shown.
b)There is a difference of opinion/perception between officials on policy-
making level and officials who are charged with implementing the policy 
with regard to the aims, online target audiences and role of the Internet in 
the EU public communication strategy10. This is another factor impeding 
the implementation of the policy online.
c)Any references to the emerging European public sphere found in the 
public communication documents reviewed in Chapter 3 occurred mostly 
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“by chance” by the interviewees’ own admittance, rather than through a 
consultation process or dialogue with academics/experts in the field11.
d)There is an element of naivety within the EU institutional culture, as far 
as communication with the public and the public’s perception of the EU is 
concerned, which could explain the surprise of the EU officials when the 
referenda in France and the Netherlands resulted in the rejection of the 
Constitutional Treaty12.
e)The reluctance of the Commission to take the lead from the member-
states in the implementation of the EU’s Information and Communication 
strategy is caused by the fear that the Commission will be accused of 
propaganda and of attempting to countermand national sovereignty 
altogether13.
f) The officials working on the EU’s Information and Communication 
strategy are in their majority non-experts in the field of public 
communication. This partly lies beneath the very slow embrace of new 
communication technologies and in particular the Internet in the 
implementation of the EU’s public communication strategy, despite policy-
makers constantly underlining in every EU Information and 
Communication document the importance of this medium in reaching 
target audiences14.
ii. Is it necessary to bridge this gap between the EU’s public 
communication policy and its online implementation?
The results of this research project have shown that there are 
discrepancies not only between strategic planning and implementation of 
the EU public communication online, but also between policy and 
institutional culture. More importantly, all evidence points to the issue of 
political power within the EU, an issue which underpins the democratic 
deficit of the EU institutions. This is directly linked to the reluctance of the 
Commission to be seen as more proactive in the area of communication 
with the public, continuously leaving the initiatives to national and local 
governments, although this has not been an effective strategy in terms of 
getting the EU’s messages across to the public so far. It is also directly 
linked to the lack of public communication experts within the relevant 
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policy-making bodies, as the Commission would not want to be accused of 
“hiring professionals to try and sell the EU to the public”, as one 
interviewee put it15.
Public communication alone cannot resolve the issue of the 
democratic deficit of the EU institutions. This is more a matter of political 
will and consensus on behalf of the member-states than a technical or 
communication issue. What public communication can do is to create the 
prerequisites for an open political dialogue among member-states and 
ultimately a consensus as to the political nature of the EU. Successful 
public communication is built on mutual trust between the institutions and 
the public. In turn, trust is developed through open dialogue, which allows 
direct input of public opinion in the policy-making process, and honesty, 
not spin-doctoring, on behalf of the institutions with regard to the issues 
that concern EU citizens most.
Although privately, most EU officials would be prepared to accept 
that there is a democratic deficit within the EU institutions, the EU 
institutions appear to be in denial in public, even after the negative 
referenda in the Netherlands and France, which apparently “sent 
shockwaves to the Council and the EU Parliament”, in the words of one 
interviewee16. Even the surveys on how the EU citizens view the future of 
Europe conducted in the aftermath of these referenda are written in as 
mild a way as possible, despite presenting data which clearly show that 
the citizens are unhappy with the EU because they do not feel it is meeting 
their priorities/needs (Eurobarometer 2006a, Eurobarometer 2006b)17.
The evidence, therefore, points to the fact that the Commission is 
far from achieving what Risse et al describe as “similar horizon of 
reference” (Risse and van de Steeg 2003:19), that is the top-down 
communication process within the European public sphere does not 
address issues within the same context as the public does. This is a 
prerequisite for a “community of communication” (ibid.:19) or the formation 
of a public sphere in which participants recognise each other as legitimate 
contributors in the public debate, precisely because they a priori agree on 
the same context framework. This is not to be confused with universal 
consensus over an issue: The official EU position on the democratic deficit 
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may differ from that of the public’s, but they still need to agree on a 
common framework, namely to agree that there is a democratic deficit, if 
they are to engage in a public dialogue between them.
Furthermore, the present study has shown that the Commission is 
failing to meet one of the main aims identified in the normative concept of 
public communication. In other words, the Commission is failing to match 
messages to the public’s priorities18: At the moment, the latest 
Eurobarometer surveys show that the Europeans find that the EU is not 
doing enough to improve areas that they think have direct impact on their 
everyday life, such as unemployment and social security (Eurobarometer 
2006a; 2006b). The EU websites’ analysis presented in Chapter 4 showed 
that the EU’s online public communication focuses on politics more than 
financial and social issues. When we take into consideration the issues 
that the EU public has defined as priority ones, and that these issues do 
not really receive the appropriate coverage not even by EUROPA, the 
EU’s main portal, the reasons behind the negative evaluation that the 
three EU websites received in the survey conducted for the present study
become more apparent. Not only were these websites difficult to navigate 
in and offered little opportunities for interaction with EU officials, but they 
also failed, as it now transpires, to address effectively the issues that 
concern the EU public the most.
The credibility of the EU’s public communication online, and offline, 
does not depend only on the extensive coverage of the EU’s 
achievements in areas that concern the public the most and on the degree 
of accessibility of information. It is also directly linked to transparency of 
the decision-making process, or rather to making this decision-making 
process clear to the public. Apparently, transparency has become a “trend” 
issue within EU institutions with “everyone wanting to be transparent but 
not really knowing what they are to be transparent about” according to one 
senior interviewee19. The institutions have picked up on the public’s 
expectations and demands for greater transparency of the decision-
making process, but have not yet managed to put this issue into 
perspective. Although transparency is a priority in all official documents 
regarding the EU’s governance and Information and Communication 
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strategy and steps have been taken online, for example to make all legal 
EU documentation available to the public, EU citizens, individually, have 
no real input or access in the actual decision-making process, which 
continues to take place, by and large, behind closed doors.
So far, the points concerning transparency, credibility of the 
message and achieving a “similar horizon of reference” (Risse and van de 
Steeg 2003:19) can be applied equally to the EU’s public communication 
strategy online and offline. Nevertheless, the Internet is the only medium, 
at the moment, which allows the EU institutions/ the EU establishment, to 
engage in direct public dialogue with the EU citizens and foreign 
audiences alike. Unmediated public dialogue or, more specifically, 
dialogue that does not rely on national communicators (offline media) is 
crucial if the EU is to establish the credibility of its messages. Since the 
prospect of a widely-accepted supranational TV channel or newspaper is 
distant in the case of the EU, the only other public space where the EU 
establishment has the opportunity to directly approach the EU and foreign 
publics is cyberspace.
The online public sphere has the potential to become all-inclusive, 
as gender, age, socioeconomic and/or ethnic background do not constitute 
eligibility factors in the online public sphere. Furthermore, some of the 
EU’s priority target audiences (for example, young Europeans) are also 
amongst the groups that access the Internet the most. As the data from 
the EU websites’ online user survey has shown, online discussion fora are 
also used by individuals within what the EU calls “vulnerable” groups (for 
example Eurobarometer 2006b), i.e. women and individuals who have not 
reached higher levels of education.
Finally, language does not play such an important role in online 
communication: English is the most widely used language online20. In 
addition, as the recently re-launched Debate Europe webpage 
(Commission of the European Communities 2006b) clearly demonstrates, 
it is possible for a public debate to take place online even if the 
participants speak different languages21.
For all these reasons, the Internet constitutes an important public 
communication tool, which allows for the official EU voice to reach the 
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public directly, bypassing national/regional media and participating in a 
potentially all-inclusive European public sphere. For the last six years the 
Commission has repeatedly committed to promoting dialogue with the 
general public and has identified a key role for the Internet in this process. 
This study has shown, however, that little progress has been made in the 
implementation of these proposals. Even the most recent and significant 
step towards the materialisation of the Commission’s dedication to public 
dialogue, i.e. the re-introduction of an online discussion forum on 
EUROPA in 2006 (ibid.), has not been accompanied by the necessary 
formal commitment that the public’s feedback will be incorporated in the 
EU’s decision-making process.
Nevertheless, for the first time the Commission is directly asking the 
public “What Europe do you want?” (ibid.) and Europeans are responding 
to the call for public dialogue on the future of the EU in far greater 
numbers than before. This is an opportunity for the EU institutions not to 
be missed: At a time when the EU’s identity and its role in Europe and in 
the world are widely debated in traditional media and recent developments 
within the Union have revealed a gap between the officials’ vision of the 
EU and the public’s needs and expectations, the EU institutions cannot 
afford to be excluded from the public sphere debating precisely their role 
and future. Whether the Commission will actually listen to what Europe we
want or not will determine whether the EU’s public communication is 
moving towards a European public sphere or just a European sphere of 
publicity.
  
Notes
1 I.e. a normative model where the public sphere is seen as an all-inclusive public realm, 
which ensures that society functions on democratic principles by publicly discussing all 
aspects of societal life (Habermas 1989). See Chapter 1, Part 1.1.
2 Chapter 1, Part 1.2.
3 Chapter 1, Section 1.2.2 and Part 1.3. The definition of the European public sphere was 
based particularly on the approaches of Pfetsch (2004) and Guidry, Kennedy and Zald 
(2006).
4 See Chapter 1, Section 1.3.4.
5 See Chapter 1, Section 1.3.4.
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6 See Chapter 2, Part 2.1.
7 See Chapter 3.
8 See Chapter 4, Part 4.2.2.
9 See Chapter 3, Sections 3.1.5 and 3.2.5.
10 See Chapter 3, Part 3.2.4.
11 See Chapter 3, Part 3.1.2.
12 See Chapter 3, Note 42.
13 See Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, Section 4.2.2.
14 See Chapter 4, Part 4.3.
15 See Chapter 3, Section 3.2.3.
16 See Chapter 3, Section 3.2.1.
17 See Chapter 4, Part 4.2.
18 See Chapter 1, Part 1.3.
19 See Chapter 4, Part 4.3.
20 See Chapter 1, Part 1.2, Section 1.2.2.
21 See Chapter 4, Section 4.2.2.
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Annex 1- Plan D for Democracy, Dialogue and Debate: 
Tables of actions
Table I: Promoting citizens’ participation in the democratic process, Source: Plan D 
for Democracy, Dialogue and Debate (COM(2005)494, final: 18).
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Table II: Assisting national debates on the future of the EU, Source: Plan D for 
Democracy, Dialogue and Debate (COM(2005)494, final: 16).
Table III: Generating a real dialogue on European Policies, Source: Plan D for 
Democracy, Dialogue and Debate (COM(2005)494, final: 19).
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Table IV: Stimulating a wider public debate, Source: Plan D for Democracy, Dialogue 
and Debate (COM(2005)494, final: 17).
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Annex 2- Semi-structured interviews in a free format
For the purposes of this study, six interviews were conducted with 
senior Commission officials in key EU Information and Communication 
policy-making and policy-implementation positions within the DG 
Communication and the EU Delegation in Washington, DC. The purpose 
of the interviews was to gain an insight into what Commission officials
actually hope and try to achieve through the EU’s websites as well as gain 
a greater understanding of the institutional culture towards the role of the 
Internet in the EU’s public communication in general. Furthermore, the 
interviews aimed to obtain the Commission officials’ views on the issue of 
the EU’s democratic deficit and the role of the EU’s public communication 
strategy in the emerging European public sphere.
The interviews were conducted in three stages, coinciding with the 
three stages of empirical data collection for this project. The officials were 
presented with the results of the EU websites’ analysis and the EU 
websites’ online user survey, in order to obtain the communicators’ 
interpretation of the findings, in relation with the EU’s public 
communication strategy.
The format considered more appropriate for the interviews was that 
of semi-structured (Deacon, Pickering, Golding, Murdock 1999) discussion 
with the Commission officials, in order to achieve as active and open-
ended dialogue as possible. Semi-structured interviews do not undermine 
rapport, like standardised interviews, and, at the same time, reduce the 
interviewer bias, which may occur in completely free-format interviews: 
Although the interviewees have the opportunity to express their thoughts 
and opinions on their own terms and thus give more in-depth answers, the 
interviewer still needs to follow an interview guide, which has to be the 
same for all the interviews conducted in relation to the issue under 
investigation (ibid.: 67-68).
Because of the senior positions held by the interviewees, all the 
data obtained through the interviews is mainly used as background 
information in this study. Any direct quotes are clearly indicated in the text, 
but the names of the interviewees have been substituted with numbers, 
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i.e. Interviewee 1, Interviewee 2 etc. Below is a chronological list of the 
interviews conducted and a description of the position of each Commission 
official interviewed.
Interviewee 1 Senior official, DG Communication, Commission 
of the European Communities.
2006:
Interviewee 2 Member (at the time) of Vice-President Margot 
Wallström’s Cabinet.
Interviewee 3 Senior official, Press and Communication 
Service, Commission of the European 
Communities.
Interviewee 4 Official, Press and Communication Service, 
Commission of the European Communities.
2005:
Interviewee 5 Official, RELEX/I/5, Commission of the 
European Communities.
2004: Interviewee 6 EURUNION website Information Officer, 
European Commission Delegation Washington 
D.C., US.
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Annex 3- EU websites’ coding variables
Table V: Coding Variables 1-3.
Variables 
(number 
and SPSS 
name)
Label Values
1) Website One of the three EU websites 
selected
1. EUROPA
2. The EU@UN
3. EURUNION
2) Link Each link found on the 
homepages of the 3 websites was 
given a unique coding number
1001-1038: EUROPA links
2001-2052: EU at the United 
Nations links
3001-3080: EURUNION links
3) Day The websites were monitored for 
a period of 24 weeks: 12 weeks in 
2004 and 12 week in 2005. The 
coding took place once a week 
(24 days in total).
Day 1: 26/03/04
Day 2: 31/03/04
Day 3: 06/04/04
Day 4: 14/04/04 etc.
Table VI: Coding Variables 4-22, Reactive public communication.
Variables 
(number 
and SPSS 
name)
Label Values
4) pd1.1.1 Reactive-Politics-Political ideals the EU stands for
5) pd1.1.2 Reactive-Politics-Relations between member states/How the 
EU works
6) pd1.1.3 Reactive-Politics-External relations/Foreign policy of the EU
7) pd1.2.1 Reactive-Economy-Euro
8) pd1.2.2 Reactive-Economy-Transport/Internal
9) pd1.2.3 Reactive-Economy-Trade/Development/Internal
10) pd1.2.4 Reactive-Economy-Environment/Internal
11) pd1.2.5 Reactive-Economy-Financial Aid/Internal
12) pd1.2.6 Reactive-Economy-Trade/Development/External
13) pd1.2.7 Reactive-Economy-Environment/External
14) pd1.2.8 Reactive-Economy-Financial Aid/External
15) pd1.3.1 Reactive-Society-Work-related issues
16) pd1.3.2 Reactive-Society-Health-related issues
17) pd1.3.3 Reactive-Society-Volunteering/Solidarity issues
18) pd1.3.4 Reactive-Society-Education
19) pd1.3.5 Reactive-Society-Culture
20) pd1.3.6 Reactive-Society-Science/Research
21) pd1.3.7 Reactive-Society-Language-related issues
22) pd1.3.8 Reactive-Society-Travelling in the EU
1.Yes
2.No
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Table VII: Coding Variables 23-41, Proactive public communication.
Variables 
(number 
and SPSS 
name)
Label Values
23) pd2.1.1 Proactive-Politics-Political ideals the EU stands for
24) pd2.1.2 Proactive-Politics-Relations between member states/How the 
EU works
25) pd2.1.3 Proactive-Politics-External relations/Foreign policy of the EU
26) pd2.2.1 Proactive -Economy-Euro
27) pd2.2.2 Proactive -Economy-Transport/Internal
28) pd2.2.3 Reactive-Economy-Trade/Development/Internal
29) pd2.2.4 Proactive -Economy-Environment/Internal
30) pd2.2.5 Proactive -Economy-Financial Aid/Internal
31) pd2.2.6 Reactive-Economy-Trade/Development/External
32) pd2.2.7 Proactive -Economy-Environment/External
33) pd2.2.8 Proactive -Economy-Financial Aid/External
34) pd2.3.1 Proactive -Society-Work-related issues
35) pd2.3.2 Proactive -Society-Health-related issues
36) pd2.3.3 Proactive -Society-Volunteering/Solidarity issues
37) pd2.3.4 Proactive -Society-Education
38) pd2.3.5 Proactive -Society-Culture
39) pd2.3.6 Proactive -Society-Science/Research
40) pd2.3.7 Proactive -Society-Language-related issues
41) pd2.3.8 Proactive -Society-Travelling in the EU
1.Yes
2.No
Table VIII: Coding Variables 42-60, Relationship-building public communication.
Variables 
(number 
and SPSS 
name)
Label Values
42) pd3.1.1 Relationship-building-Politics-Political ideals the EU stands for
43) pd3.1.2 Relationship-building -Politics-Relations between member 
states/How the EU works
44) pd3.1.3 Relationship-building -Politics-External relations/Foreign policy 
of the EU
45) pd3.2.1 Relationship-building -Economy-Euro
46) pd3.2.2 Relationship-building -Economy-Transport/Internal
47) pd3.2.3 Relationship-building -Economy-Trade/Development/Internal
48) pd3.2.4 Relationship-building -Economy-Environment/Internal
49) pd3.2.5 Relationship-building -Economy-Financial Aid/Internal
50) pd3.2.6 Relationship-building -Economy-Trade/Development/External
51) pd3.2.7 Relationship-building -Economy-Environment/External
52) pd3.2.8 Relationship-building -Economy-Financial Aid/External
53) pd3.3.1 Relationship-building -Society-Work-related issues
54) pd3.3.2 Relationship-building -Society-Health-related issues
55) pd3.3.3 Relationship-building -Society-Volunteering/Solidarity issues
56) pd3.3.4 Relationship-building -Society-Education
57) pd3.3.5 Relationship-building -Society-Culture
58) pd3.3.6 Relationship-building -Society-Science/Research
59) pd3.3.7 Relationship-building -Society-Language-related issues
60) pd3.3.8 Relationship-building -Society-Travelling in the EU
1.Yes
2.No
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Table IX: Coding Variables 61-64.
Variables 
(number 
and SPSS 
name)
Label Values
61) comm1 Text/One-way 
communication
1.Yes
2.No
62) txttype Type of text 1. Formal/Scientific/Official document
2. Informal/Every-day language/Written for 
publishing on the website
3. Both
63) cnttype Type of content 1. Informational
2. Analytical/Explanatory
3. Both
64) comm2 Interactive 
communication
1. Discussion/Forum
2. Email
3. Real-time communication with officials (non-
technical communication)
4. All of the above
5. Types 1 & 2 above
6. Types 2 & 3 above
7. Types 1 & 3 above
8. Not applicable
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Table X: Coding Variables 1A-8A for links that provide interactive communication type 1 
(online discussion/forum).
Variables 
(number 
and SPSS 
name)
Label Values
1A) website One of the three EU 
websites selected
1. EUROPA
2. The EU@UN
3. EURUNION
2A) link Links found to 
provide interactive 
communication type 
1
1001-1038: EUROPA links
2001-2052: EU@UN links
3001-3080: EURUNION links
3A) day The days when the 
coding took place 
(one day per week 
of monitoring)
Day 1: 26/03/04
Day 2: 31/03/04
Day 3: 06/04/04
Day 4: 14/04/04 etc.
4A) offinput Official input 1. Provision of topic for discussion only
2. Provision of topic for discussion and official 
documentation relevant to the topic
3. Provision of topic and leading the 
discussion/debate
4. Provision of topic and participating but not 
leading in the discussion
5. No official input
5A) topic Topic of discussion 1. Politics-Relations between member states/How 
the EU works
2. Politics-External relations/Foreign policy of the 
EU
3. Economy-Trade/Development/Internal
4. Economy-Trade/Development/External
5. Economy-Euro
6. Economy-Financial Aid/Internal
7. Economy-Financial Aid/External
8. Work-related issues
9. Health-related issues
10. Education
11. Culture
12. Language-related issues
13. Other
6A) Partno Number of 
participants (other 
than officials)
The number of participants varies depending on 
the topic and the day.
7A) 
commno1
Number of 
comments on topic
The number of comments on each topic varies 
depending on the subject of the discussion and 
the day.
8A) 
commno2
Number of 
responses to other 
participants
The number of responses to other participants 
varies depending on the topic and the day.
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Annex 4- EU websites online user survey 2005-2006, 
questionnaire and results
The complete questionnaire, including all the original answers of the 
individuals who participated in the survey, are presented in the following 
pages, in LEARN survey analysis format.
For question 2, the option “Other” was further categorised in “No 
response” answers (15) and “Duplicates” (15), with the remaining 6 
answers under the “Other” option re-allocated to the already existing 
categories of “Obtained legal/official documentation”, “Obtained general 
information”, “Contacted an individual at an EU institution” and “Looked for 
business information”.
Likewise, for question 6, the responses under the “Other” category 
were re-classified to “Other” and “No response”. In addition, several 
respondents chose more than one answers, which were either 
contradicting each other (for example some respondents chose both 
“Email addresses directed to individuals” and “The opportunities for 
interaction are adequate”) or were duplicating each other (for example 
some respondents chose “Email addresses directed to individuals” and 
“More opportunities for online dialogue” and “Both of the above”). In the 
cases of duplicate answers, the answer that covered best the respondent’s 
view was chosen. For contradicting responses, the decision was made to 
calculate them in the “No response” category.
Answers under the “Other” category for question 7, were re-
grouped into “Other” and “Duplicates”, with the latter excluded from the 
final results. For the same category in questions 8 and 9, the answers 
were re-grouped in “Other” and “No response”.
The answers to Question 11 (a follow-up to question 10), which 
required respondents to give details of any EU websites other than 
EUROPA, EU@UN and EURUNION that they access, were regrouped in 
11 categories, namely “No response”, “Other” and the 9 websites which 
appeared in 3 or more responses.
Similarly, the answers to Question 12 (a follow-up question to 
questions 10 and 11) were analysed in two ways: Firstly, they were divided 
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in valid and “No response” answers. The responses were, then, coded 
according to the criteria respondents used to compare and evaluate 
websites. From this coding 5 criteria emerged, namely accessibility; clarity 
of content/message; interesting/ varied content; credibility; and relevance 
to audience. On a second level, the data was analysed in order to identify 
which websites the respondents rated as best. In this case, the categories 
that emerged were: one category for each of the 9 websites that were
deemed best by at least one respondent, one category for the “no-
response” answers and one category for the respondents who thought 
none of the EU websites they had visited were good/ worthy enough.
Question 14, which regards the role of the Internet in the EU’s 
perceived democratic deficit, required coding of all the responses and 
classification of the answers in two levels. On a first level, the answers 
were divided in “Yes”, “No”, “No response” and “No deficit” categories, to 
indicate the respondents’ original view on whether the Internet can play a 
productive role in the EU’s perceived democratic deficit. On a second 
level, the answers that were classified under the “Yes” and “No” categories 
were further coded, in order to determine the ways in which the 
respondents thought that the Internet could/ could not play a productive 
role in the EU’s perceived democratic deficit. This process resulted in 8 
categories:
a)Those who only replied “Yes” without further explaining their view;
b)Those who only replied “No” without further explaining their view;
c)Those who related the Internet’s positive role in eliminating the EU’s 
perceived democratic deficit with the increased accessibility it offers to 
information;
d)Those who linked the Internet’s positive role with increased 
accountability on behalf of the EU officials;
e)The respondents who attributed the Internet’s potentially beneficial role 
in eliminating the EU’s perceived democratic deficit to the increased 
opportunities for public dialogue;
f) Those who attributed its potentially beneficial role to increased 
transparency;
g)The respondents who rejected the Internet’s potential as one of the tools 
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for further democratising the EU on the grounds of the increasing gap 
between the Internet-haves and Internet-have-nots; and finally
h)The respondents who rejected the question altogether, and supported 
the view that there is, in fact, no democratic deficit.
Other questions where the responses were further categorised 
were questions17, 20 and 22. The answers to questions 17 (follow-up to 
question 16) and 20 (follow-up to question 19) were divided in valid and 
“No response” ones. The responses to question 22 were coded and 
classified under 6 categories, namely political websites; academic-related 
websites; Entertainment/ Lifestyle websites; IT websites; work-related 
websites; miscellaneous websites; and “no response”.
Finally, questions 23 and 26, regarding nationality and occupation 
respectively, were also open-ended questions, and further categorisation 
of the responses was, therefore, required.
This resulted, with regard to question 23, in the responses being 
regrouped under 34 categories, which were then further classified under 
the following 5 supra-categories:
a)EU;
b)EU accession/ EU related countries;
c)Non-European;
d)Bi-national/ Multinational; and
e)No-response category.
As far as the answers to question 26 are concerned, these were 
coded and classified under the following 9 categories:
a)Public Officials: EU;
b)Public Officials: Non-EU;
c) IT;
d)Professional/Managerial;
e)Skilled Manual/Manual;
f) Unemployed/ Economically inactive;
g)Education: Professionals;
h)Education: Students; and
i) Health.
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1. On a scale from 1(Never) to 5(Every day), please indicate how often you access the three websites below.
Average rank
1 2 3 4 5
EUROPA (2.7)
EU@UN (1.4)
EURUNION (1.4)
2. Which of the following did you choose to do? (You can choose more than one)
Looked for general information on the EU 65.6% (145)
Looked for legal/official documentation 56.6% (125)
Looked for information on business in the EU 14.9% (33)
Read the news 41.6% (92)
Participated in the online discussion 5.4% (12)
Contacted an Institution 15.8% (35)
Contacted an individual at an EU institution 16.7% (37)
Obtained information regarding travel in the EU 10.9% (24)
Other: Avoid 0.5% (1)
Other: Browsed to see what was in each site 0.5% (1)
Other: data search (non-business) 0.5% (1)
Other: follow press conferences 0.5% (1)
Other: Following tenders 0.5% (1)
Other: for reference/study 0.5% (1)
Other: I don't use their sites 0.5% (1)
Other: I have never visited these web sites 0.5% (1)
Other: If I answer never shouldn't there be a not applicable box for this 
question? 0.5% (1)
Other: Ignored 0.5% (1)
Other: Information for internships 0.5% (1)
Other: internships in the EU 0.5% (1)
Other: job opportunities 0.5% (1)
Other: job search 0.5% (1)
Other: Looked for an environmental directive WEEE 0.5% (1)
Other: Looked for info about the uniformization of citizenship laws accross EU 0.5% (1)
Other: looked for info onconstitution 0.5% (1)
Other: Looked for information on trade, the environment and human rights 
policy 0.5% (1)
Other: Looked horrified 0.5% (1)
Other: N/A 0.5% (1)
Other: Never been on the sites 0.5% (1)
Other: never used above 0.5% (1)
Other: newsletter 0.5% (1)
Other: none 0.5% (1)
Other: None 0.9% (2)
Other: nothing 1.4% (3)
Other: Obtained contact information of MEPs 0.5% (1)
Other: obtained information on job opportunities with the EU and registered my 
profile in EPSO 0.5% (1)
Other: schoolarships 0.5% (1)
Other: statements by the DGs or Commissioners on news items- for example 
Mandelsson on the China debate 0.5% (1)
Other: statistics and facts 0.5% (1)
Other: studies, jobs 0.5% (1)
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Other: used it on daily basis for internship in Brussels, incl. public tenders and 
funding programmes like Leonardo etc. 0.5% (1)
3. On a scale from 1 (Poor) to 5 (Excellent), please rate the quality of the information provided on each of the 
three websites below (If you haven't accessed a website, please leave that row blank).
Average rank
1 2 3 4 5
EUROPA (3.4)
EU@UN (2.8)
EURUNION (2.8)
4. On a scale from 1 (Poor) to 5 (Excellent), please rate the accessibility of each of the three websites below, 
i.e. how easy it was for you to navigate around and find what you were looking for (If you haven't accessed a 
website, please leave that row blank).
Average rank
1 2 3 4 5
EUROPA (2.9)
EU@UN (2.9)
EURUNION (2.8)
5. Of the three websites below, which one/s do you think provide/s adequate opportunities for interaction with 
EU officials? (you can choose more than one)
EUROPA 29.4% (65)
EURUNION 2.3% (5)
EU @ UN 5.0% (11)
None of the above 26.2% (58)
I don't know 41.6% (92)
6. What type of interaction would you like to see provided more on EUROPA/ EURUNION/ EU @ UN websites? 
(you can choose more than one)
Email addresses directed to individuals, instead of generic email addresses. 28.5% (63)
More opportunities for online dialogue with EU officials/ politicians 19.0% (42)
Both of the above 32.6% (72)
The opportunities for interaction are adequate 13.6% (30)
Other: A way of finding out which EU representatives are in their positions 
because they were voted for by the people and which were not. 0.5% (1)
Other: Abolished 0.5% (1)
Other: better info about what constitutes EU citizenship and how they intend on 
harmonizing the naturalization procedure 0.5% (1)
Other: Blogs 0.5% (1)
Other: current legislative proposal list 0.5% (1)
Other: D/K 0.5% (1)
Other: deep infrmation about the country's culture 0.5% (1)
Other: depends on institution / DG: some have excellent information, others poor 0.5% (1)
Other: Dissent for those that do not agree with the EU project. These websites are 
self-aggrandising 0.5% (1)
Other: easier menu structures; at present mirrors the public image of the EU as 
labyrinthine 0.5% (1)
Other: European related events 0.5% (1)
Other: I don't know 0.5% (1)
Other: I'm not sure what opportunities exist 0.5% (1)
Other: Info about the website existance 0.5% (1)
Other: Leave the EU 0.5% (1)
Other: Non, abolish it 0.5% (1)
Other: none 0.9% (2)
Other: other languages than English 0.5% (1)
Other: phone numbers 0.5% (1)
Other: RSS, opportunties to comment on policies, weblogs. I'm working on a 
newsfeed which will scrape Europa and the Parliament site - drop me a line if 0.5% (1)
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Other: Suspension of the FUTURUM debate/discussion site was inexcusable 0.5% (1)
7. Do you use other sources of information regarding the EU? (You can choose more than one)
Newspapers 84.2% (186)
National TV 53.8% (119)
EU by Satellite 8.6% (19)
Radio 33.9% (75)
Magazines 49.8% (110)
Books 49.8% (110)
Library 35.7% (79)
EU Information points 15.8% (35)
I am not interested in information regarding the EU 5.9% (13)
Other: Anti-EU blogs 0.5% (1)
Other: BBC News Online 0.5% (1)
Other: BBC, NYTimes 0.5% (1)
Other: Blogs 3.2% (7)
Other: blogs 1.8% (4)
Other: blogs of EU parliament members 0.5% (1)
Other: Cafe Babel 0.5% (1)
Other: cafe babel 0.5% (1)
Other: EU Observer, EURACTIV and many others 0.5% (1)
Other: euobserver.com 0.5% (1)
Other: euractiv 0.5% (1)
Other: Euractiv, State Watch 0.5% (1)
Other: Euronews, 3rd party internet & blogs 0.5% (1)
Other: Euronews, Cafe Babel 0.5% (1)
Other: Info directed jot journalists 0.5% (1)
Other: Internet 1.4% (3)
Other: internet 1.8% (4)
Other: internet media sources from bbc, guardian, 
blogs etc 0.5% (1)
Other: Lecture notes 0.5% (1)
Other: online European Magazine café babel and 
euractiv 0.5% (1)
Other: Online news sites 0.5% (1)
Other: Online sources, blogs, etc. 0.5% (1)
Other: The Internet (blogs) 0.5% (1)
Other: The Web 0.5% (1)
Other: UKIP 0.5% (1)
Other: university courses 0.5% (1)
Other: Web based The EU site give only one view 0.5% (1)
Other: web blogs 0.5% (1)
Other: weblogs 1.4% (3)
Other: wikipedia 0.5% (1)
Other: www 0.5% (1)
8. Have you ever contacted an EU institution/ official through the websites of EUROPA, EURUNION or EU @ 
UN? (You can chose more than one)
No 63.3% (140)
EUROPA- on legal issues 13.6% (30)
EU @ UN- on legal issues 0.5% (1)
EURUNION- on legal issues 0.5% (1)
EUROPA- on business issues 7.2% (16)
EU @ UN- on business issues 0.9% (2)
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EURUNION- on business issues 0.5% (1)
EUROPA- to request access to documents 18.1% (40)
EU @ UN- to request access to documents 1.4% (3)
EURUNION- to request access to documents 0.5% (1)
EUROPA- to request general information about the EU 10.9% (24)
EU @ UN- to request general information about the EU 0.5% (1)
EURUNION- to request general information about the EU 1.4% (3)
EUROPA- to request contact details of an individual 13.6% (30)
EU@UN- to request contact details of an individual 0.5% (1)
EURUNION- to request contact details of an individual 0.9% (2)
Other: All three to reuest interviews with individuals 0.5% (1)
Other: EUROPA for application for work 0.5% (1)
Other: Europa to request copies of survey data 0.5% (1)
Other: EUROPA-to apply for Internship 0.5% (1)
Other: EUROSTAT 0.5% (1)
Other: I contact the press service pretty regularly to 
complain. They're sick of me. 0.5% (1)
Other: no i use paper, email and phone; the websites give 
the contact info I need 0.5% (1)
Other: None 0.5% (1)
Other: request for a meeting 0.5% (1)
Other: research interviews 0.5% (1)
Other: to request information about a certain policy area 0.5% (1)
Other: to request specific information on a dossier 0.5% (1)
9. Have you ever contacted an EU institution by visiting its offices/ over the phone/ by correspondence? (You 
can chose more than one)
No 50.2% (111)
Yes, on legal issues 19.0% (42)
Yes, on business issues 13.1% (29)
Yes, to request access to documents 15.8% (35)
Yes, to request general information about the EU 16.7% (37)
Yes, to request contact details of an individual 10.9% (24)
Other: Contacted my MEP by phone. 0.5% (1)
Other: EPSO 0.5% (1)
Other: Excursions 0.5% (1)
Other: I work for an EU agency (EMEA) 0.5% (1)
Other: in relation to the organisation of debates and discussion on 
the EU 0.5% (1)
Other: in the framework of an European Summer Academy 0.5% (1)
Other: internship 0.5% (1)
Other: only to get to know more of EU business 0.5% (1)
Other: see above 0.5% (1)
Other: to conduct a research interview 0.5% (1)
Other: to request an interview for research 0.5% (1)
Other: Traineeship 0.5% (1)
Other: visited European Parliament for PR and other info material 0.5% (1)
Other: visited the institutions with Loughborough university 0.5% (1)
Other: yes to apply for internships 0.5% (1)
Other: Yes, to apply for a job 0.5% (1)
Other: Yes, to correspond with MEPs on EP debates 0.5% (1)
Other: Yes, to establish working relations 0.5% (1)
Other: Yes, to organise visits. 0.5% (1)
10. Do you access any other EU websites except for EUROPA, EURUNION and EU @ UN?
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Yes, often 18.6% (41)
Yes, sometimes 21.7% (48)
No 55.7% (123)
TOTAL 95.9% 221
11. If yes, which ones? (please provide name and/OR complete URL)
# Response
1 (not EU ones but MEPs home pages can be pretty good for general information. I've used Caroline 
Lucas's and Eryl McNally's.
1 -
1 .
1 Cafebabel, Europarl
1 cafebabel.com
1 can t remember
1 Commitee of regions, Eco and social commitee
1 Cordis
1 cordis.lu, cost295.net
1 Country pages on EU: http://www.vm.ee/eng/euro/ 
http://www.government.fi/vn/liston/base.lsp?r=716&k=en
1 curia
1 curia.eu.int
1 DG Environment, European Parliament
1 don't know any more
1 EC Delegation to Bosnia-Herzegovina
1 Email websites, news, information
1 EU Delegation BiH, EU Delegation Croatia
1 EU in Bosnia and Herzegovina, EUSR, EUPM, EUFOR, Comission's Delegations 
1 eu observer
1 EU Observer. Euractiv, EU Politix
1 EU Parl
1 EU Presidency websites, High Representative for CFSP website
1 EUobserver (though not sure if it is funded directly by the EU)
1 euobserver.com
1 euractiv, europa-digital
1 Euractiv, State Watch
1 Euractive.com
1 EUreferendum
1 Eurocontrol
1 EURODICAUTOM
2 eurolex
1 Europa direkt 
2 EuroParl
1 Europarl, ue.eu.int, ukrep, MEPs websites, presidency websites. 
1 europarl.eu.int, Eur-Lex..
1 europarl.eu.int; council and presidency websites
1 Europe 2020, Interegionet
1 European Commission, European Parliament, Commitee of the Regions, Eurobarometer; 
http://www.europe2020.org; http://european-convention.eu.int; http://www.theepc.be; 
http://www.eurozine.com; http://www.cer.org.uk + loads of others too many to mention
1 European Information Society, European e-gov 
1 European Parliament
1 European Parliament, CORDIS, EPSO
3 EuroStat
1 Factiva.com, presidency wew sites eg.
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1 Friends of Europe, European Environmental Bureau, Eurooppa Tiedotus
1 Homepage of Javier Solana
1 http://europa.eu.int/eures/index.jsp
1 http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/;http://europa.eu.int/celex/;http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/index_e
n.html
1 http://saxontimes.blogspot.com/ http://eureferendum.blogspot.com/ http://eurota.blogspot.com/ 
http://euobserver.com/ http://europhobia.blogspot.com/ http://www.eurosavant.com/weblog.php 
http://www.eursoc.com/ http://blogs.unige.ch/droit/ceje/dotclear/index.php/ 
http://herovonesens.blogspot.com/ http://neilherron.blogspot.com/ http://www.european-
democracy.org/ http://transatlanticassembly.blogspot.com/ 
1 http://weblog.jrc.cec.eu.int/page/wallstrom
1 http://www.emea.eu.int http://pharmacos.eudra.org/ http://www.eudravigilance.org (all for work)
1 http://www.eu.int/documents/index_en.htm
1 http://www.euractiv.com/
1 http://www.euronews.net/create_html.php?page=home&lng=1 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/avservices/video/video_prod_en.cfm?type=docu_vnr
1 http://www.europarl.eu.int/
1 http://www.europarl.org.uk/index.htm 
http://epp.eurostat.cec.eu.int/portal/page?_pageid=1090,30070682,1090_33076576&_dad=portal&_sc
hema=PORTAL
1 http://www.eurydice.org/accueil_menu/en/frameset_menu.html, 
http://www.coe.int/T/E/Cultural%5FCo%2Doperation/education/Teacher%5Ftraining/Courses%5Fand
%5Fseminars/, http://FUTURUM2005.eun.org/ww/en/pub/FUTURUM2005/index_15mins.htm, 
http://www.citizen.org.uk/speakout/about.html, http://www.britishcouncil.org/home/learning/learning-
international-experience/learning-ie-teaching-exchange/learning-council-of-europe.htm
1 http://www.info-europe.fr
1 I can not remember
1 I CAN'T REMEMBER
1 I go straight to the EP website a lot more frequently thant europa.eu.int
1 Legislative Observatory (OEIL), Parliament, ECJ, Eurostat
1 N/A
1 no official but civil society websites
1 official websites of UK, Belgium, France etc - they give the relevant information directly and more 
easily
1 one with stars on it
1 other EU specific EU news websites; and Delegation of EU in Turkey and Russia
1 Permanent Representations of different countries
1 the Council/the EP/the EC/ EC delegations
1 the european parliament and council websites; maybe these are part of Europa; wouldn't know
1 ue.eu.int, eesc, european convention at the time (excellent site)
1 various Baltic and Nordic members of the European parliament's personal blogs; I sometimes 
comment on specific blog entries or e-mail the politician that authored them privately.
1 Websites of EC delegations; all EU institutions websites (Council, Comission, EP etc.)
1 www.cordis.lu
1 www.curia.eu.int
1 www.eds.org
1 www.euractiv.com
1 www.euractiv.com; www.eurotreaties.com........
1 www.euroactiv.com
1 www.europa-digital.de
1 www.europarl.eu.int, Council website, websites of presidencies
1 www.europarl.eu.int/public
1 www.europarl.eu.int;
12. If you noticed any differences between the EU websites you accessed (including EUROPA, EURUNION and 
EU @ UN), please provide further information. Which website did you think is best and why?(please indicate 
which websites you are comparing)
# Response
256
1 no differences 
1 -
1 .
1 All EU web sites take it for granted that there is only one future and that is based on the EU becoming 
the supranational government. Until the people have democratically elected for this I reject the 
assumption because it is not the proven choice of the people. 
1 Cordis is better structured. Europa ist cluttered with a lot of info, not easy to find what you want
1 differences in accessibility/legibility/clarity (see above)
1 EU at UN; because it contains more important and interesting informations than the other two.
1 EU websites vary in their utility in finding specific information. Generally, I find the European 
Commission website easier in this respect than the EU Council website, although both can be 
frustrating to navigate around, and the search facilities never come up with the information I'm looking 
for.
1 Euractiv gives me most of the info I need
1 Europa because it deals directly with issues pertaining to the EU. The other two sites seem to be EU 
policies with regard to global politics and trade...not aimed at the citizen.,
1 europa because it is more official
1 Europa because it was easy to find the materials I was looking for
1 Europa has more info relevent to citizens.
1 EUROPA is a very complex site but it'is necessary to provide such a wide range of information
1 Europa is an excellent site
1 EUROPA is best because it is so large, but difficult to navigate
1 Europa is best. The most comprehensive. Everything that can be found on the others can usually also 
be found on Europa
1 EUROPA is by far the best out of the three sites, since it is very well organised, it is in Greek and very 
easy to navigate. The EU@UN site, comes second, since it offers more or less the same things, but in 
a lower quality. EURUNION is a site far from the European temperament; can't offer much to a 
European individual, on E.U.'s information.
1 Europa is easier to navigate than Eurunion and EU@UN.
1 EUROPA is very easy to navigate, summarises the issues, and suggests new ones to mock. I mean, 
investigate.
1 Europa looks the most professional and feels easier to use. Eudravigilance has all the information 
necessary on this project and easily accessible
1 Europa seemed to be aimed at young people and at convincing the younger generations to learn about 
and to be positive about the EU. EurUnion has similar youth areas but these are presented in an adult 
way, as if adults control this information. EU@UN seemed the site most interested in current news and 
political change, and for this reason, I preferred it, though visually it was the least interesting.
1 Europa, clean laid out, right amount of information on one page, good catergrisation
1 europa, for its somewhat better ease of use and navigation
1 EUROPA, most complete website
1 europa-UN, the un web sites has more links for specific informations
1 EUROPA; easiest to navigate around, more concise info.
1 Europarl has improved, but is still too full of lists. The Council website remains awful. Some of the best 
websites belong to individual institutions (both EU and national) such as those belonging to UKRep or 
individual MEPs.
1 European Parliament website looks different from the others, and is a slightly more recent web design
1 EURUNION - user friendly
1 Eurunion most business focussed - Europa patronising - EU @ UN worthy but uninspiring
1 First impression: EUROPA is most logical to use and contains more valuable information.
1 I find them equally dull/uninformative
1 I like Europarl best because it appears to be very open and clear (I find everything at one click). Also, I 
appreciate OEIL.
1 I only have visited Europa
1 I preferred EUROPA (out of the three). It seemd to contain a lot of information in a simple and 
straightforward layout. Having said that, the absence of a Search facility on the home page was a bad 
omission.
1 I think all of these websites are a bit confusing at first glance. You need to get used to the websites in 
order to find the information you're looking for. I would say Europa is the clearest and EU@UN the 
unclearest.
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1 I think Europa is the best (comparing Europa, Eurunion and EU@UN) because it's easier to find what 
you are looking for
1 It's important the websites do not have too many blinking banners but important issues are clearly 
indicated. Also, the search engine needs to work perfectly.
2 N/a
1 Non, abolish it
1 none
1 None of the 3 above sites provide anything useful to my situation, now that I looked at them. At best, 
they wreak of state propaganda.
1 of EUROPA, EURUNION and EU@UN, EUROPA was most user friendly portal for new-comers. info 
was presented in clear concise manner and was aesthetically pleasing too. there was a wide range of 
nfo from background to more detailed stuff
1 Once you've got the hang of the OEIL site, it's quite impressive by comparison with the others. But it's 
still pretty limited.
1 Out of the three the Europa website is most difficult to navigate it is sometimes easier to google the 
search and it takes me straight to the document/page. However, for content I think the EUROPA 
website is still the best.
1 search capability
1 The entry pages of both EUROPA and EU@UN do not score well for usability - it's annoyingly slow to 
find and click on your chosen language out of the horde of identically-presented options. This 
weakness is also apparent in the large number of textual links once inside. By contrast, the 
EURUNION main page is a bit more well-structured and friendlier.
1 The Europa site was on less of a hard sell
1 the search engines are of different quality. the old celex search engine was working well, while the new 
eur-lex engine produces contradictory results and is difficult to handle for daily research work; 
curia.eu.int has the best search engine but lacks the database of EuR-Lex.
1 The US one is very slow. Europa seems to work most smoothly.
1 they are more or less the same, except that europa.eu.int has more info
1 UNpage is stupid, only english
1 www.cafebabel.com (for a civil society and young generation point of view on EU issues
13. Do you feel that having direct access to the MEPs/European officials would increase the accountability of 
the EU institutions?
Yes 61.5% (136)
No 27.6% (61)
I don't know 10.9% (24)
TOTAL 100.0% 221
14. Do you feel the internet can play a productive role in eliminating the perceived 'democratic deficit' of the 
European Union? If so, in what way?
# Response
1 .
1 absolutely
1 Absolutely, the internet can provide transparency (live broadcasting of meetings, publication of 
decisions and who voted in which way)
1 All EU-related information should be available on the Internet. When it's there, it will be easier to 
count on the system.
1 allows everyone to gain access 
1 At least some people will eventually find out the truth, which is liberty
1 being quicker and cheaper
1 Better & quicker means of contact for information and make comments, if listened to.
1 Bring the common members within easy access of people in power within the governing areas of the 
institution
1 by helping to organise an exit from the EU via democratic referendum
1 Can be used to give correct, non biased information
1 closing the huge gap between "us" and politicians
1 CONVENIENT
1 creating contact between officials and citizens
1 definitely yes
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1 DEFINITLY! The gap between the EU and its citizens is huge at the moment.
1 Depends. If you mean can EU sites play a productive role in eliminating any perceived democratic 
deficit? Then my sense is that they probably can'tt - and almost certainly not in their current form. It 
seems to me that there needs to be a greater pan-European awareness of (and concensus for) the 
political process of 'union'. As for the wider internet - and specifically non-EU sites - the internet 
probably does play a productive role in at least as much as it provides a relatively unregulated forum 
in which a diversity of views are aired. Whether this is per se a 'good' thing is questionable but it does 
at least provide a counter-weight to the established MSM. (*BTW this reply box format sucks.)
1 Direct and reliable information and proccedures are what Internet can provide, in order to strengthen 
E.U., in general.
1 direct interaction with real people
1 direct participation, online vote, treansnational discussions between citizens
1 Directly getting one's voice heard by the MPs in Brussels.
1 Don't think so
1 Dont know
1 Even just a small readers poll on relevant issues facing the EU such as how we feel about new 
entrants, how EU aid gets disbursed and just overall interaction between the citizen and EU 
institutions would be great. As it is now, if we send an email, it seems it's just buried under a mountain 
of paperwork. I doubt anyone actually reads anything there.
1 every little helps
1 Everyone gets a chance to have their say
1 First educate citizens on use of Internet and provide incentives
1 giving information on what's happening and who is deciding
1 good way to bring the EU Integration issues to the ordinary people - increasing legitimity to a certain 
extent
1 greater transparency
1 Hardly, but it could be a way to get more and better info to the public. The possibility is not yet use.
1 Having a chance to cimmunicate with those in charge would increase trust.
1 How do you mean "perceived"
2 i don't know
1 i don't think so. The democratic deficit should be cured from above.
1 I reject the question. Try and answer "Do you feel the internet can play a productive role in eliminating 
the perceived 'democratic deficit' of Saudi Arabia".
1 I think "democratic deficit" regarding EU institutions is more related to a general misunderstundig and 
unknowledge of EU institutions and legal framwork of EU action. Anyway I think internt can play a big 
role on reducing this gap 
1 I think any perceived defict is in the hands of the politicians and not the internet or most media 
sources.
1 I think we need independent websites about EU policies and their consequences that are just giving 
us the facts and relevant contexts about the issues without the pro-EU hardsell or an anti-EU rant.
1 If the EU citizens would have an opportunity to get their opinions through to EU officials/ decision 
makers, they would feel that their voice is heard and that their opinion actually matters. If it would be 
easier for the citizens to express their concerns/ideas, it could increase their interest in the EU issues. 
This would benefit both the EU citizens and the EU itself. Happier citizens increase the voting about 
EU issues, so the democratic deficit is decreased
1 If those with the "democratic deficit" would have easy access to internet.
1 In the future maybe it will be possible to follow the sessions on Internet and to intervene in some way
1 Increased transparency and availability would not increase democracy per se - after all, how often do 
we contact national officials? I think the EU is probably just as accessible as many national 
institutions. That said, the Commission would seem more transparent if you could actually contact 
people directly. However, transparency would not solve the fundamental issue of the democratic 
deficit.
1 Increasing dialogue with EU officials
1 Internet is a good way for young europeans to know more about EU
1 Internet may serve as an excellent source of information that the EU wishes to make public. On the 
other hand, the amount of such information is overwhelming and it is often difficult to find what you 
are looking for because of that. In my opinion, it very much depends on the people, i.e. EU citizens, 
and their willingness to take their time to find what they are looking for. The question is how willing are 
people nowadays to dedicate their time to learning more about processes in the EU. Connected with 
this is question no. 13. I am afraid that 'direct access' to the MEPs/EU officials must be restricted in 
order for them to do their work. If they were asked to answer all e-mails and phone calls, it would 
prevent them from doing anything else, especially with the overall EU population growing.
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1 Involving citizens
1 It can help to expose the waste of money and resources invested in this wretched organization.
1 It can if there is interaction between institutions and citizens 
1 it can, but the knowledge gap problem is worse on the web than elsewhere so the "cure" would just 
shift the type of deficit from low (but more or less fair-distributed) interaction to more, but also more 
selective input
1 it could by asking its citizens to participate in online referendums on key issues 
1 It could, but I'm not sure that the EU actually cares
1 It is a means with which many people can interact and exchange politcal views
1 It is NOT a PERCEIVED deficit ! it's a REAL deficit! The internet could allow us to vote online to 
elect/dismiss EU officials.
1 It may play a supplemantory role in speeding up communication processes and transparency. In the 
case of document transparency it offers a whole new world of working methods. Never the less it 
excludes those who donot have acces, e.g. those who cannot afford it or dont know how to use it 
(elder generations). 
1 it provides access to a larger public than any other communication menas
1 It would be better to have direct voting on representatives and fewer unelected officials
1 It would be great if citizens can make official complaints to their MEPs
1 make information on the websites more userfriendly
1 make them speak English.
1 many peple see the EU as something 'other' to ourselves, something we hear about but never really 
encounter on a personal basis - if more people have access to information and the individuals 
representing us in the EU then this gap between 'us' and 'them' will begin to close. the internet is 
perhaps the most effient way of acheiving this
1 maybe, but the internet is full of scams
1 More openness, accessibility to dpcuments, more transparency in decision-making process, more 
opportunities to bring Europeans together for public debate
3
9 no
1 No (democratic deficit is an illusion nothing can eliminate)
1 No - the principals of the EU must abandon their ivory towers & talk to the people, explain to the 
people, not fire whistle-blowers, account transparently, simplify structures. 
1 No it is being and will be used to create an EU demos, The only thing that will eliminate the 
democratic deficit is for the EU to become fully accountable to the people. After of course the people 
have chosen to allow the EU to become their government. 
1 No, abolish it
1 No, as in my opinion this is due to the power of national governments compared to the elected EU 
Parliament
1 No, because the folks who are interested in the EU and waht's going on in the EU political process 
use the internet. All the other don't. The EU has to reach those another way . A way more easy for 
those people.
1 No, It is not a perceived deficit, the deficit is real. The internet wont change that
1 No, not significantely
1 No, nothing could eliminate that other than the demise of the EU
1 No, only elections can remove a democratic deficit. This would be required at all levels.
1 No, the EU is not democratic
1 no, the lack of accountabilty would remain. it would make expressing views easier, but MEPs still not 
under any obligation to address
2 No.
1 No. Perceived by whom?
1 No. I believe the majority of people who access European websites are well informed. The problem 
arises in providing appropriate information to those who don't.
1 No. The democratic deficit is not 'perceived', it is real.
1 No. See http://mk.ucant.org/archives/000103.html for things net can't help
1 No. The EU is not truly "democratic". It dictates to the individual nations on laws, etc., and can 
detrimentally affect the rights of individuals in those nations to make their own laws, etc.
1 No. The EU is undemocratic. Fancy presentation wilol not change that.
1 No. The European Union will continue to drag its feet, regardless of what the peasants think or say. 
Our "betters" will see to it. And then they wonder why a Constitution that starts with the immortal 
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words "HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF THE BELGIANS" gets flushed down the drain.
1 not all that much, apart from reducing the distance between the people (those with an internet 
connection!) and the institutions
1 Not at all-we need to vote for these people-emailing will not help.
1 Not how these sites work - the EU would need to infiltrate mainstream sites & other media instead of 
relying on people to find their sites.
1 Not in a big way, as it requires access to the net and high IT literacy; it may do something to 
sway/appease the 'always-on' broadband aristocracy, though
1 Not much difference. National politicians need to talk more about the benefits of EU membership.
1 Not nessarily /
1 not really
1 not really, because too many people don't use the net and those who do often don't know about the 
eu's sites
1 Not really. 
2 Not sure
1 not sure, but I do not think that people would really use the opportunity to contact MEPs directly
1 noway
1 Only if enough people feel that it is a useful and appropriate conduit. Not sure what the 'democratic 
deficit' is, but not everybodu has access to the internet - and often those that are under-represented in 
one area are also under-represented in others.
1 only if it serves to provide access to decision-makers
1 Only if people visit the internet pages- and then probably they get an overload of information and not 
the specific bits they wanted
1 Possibly, but probably not
1 Possibly, but these sites need to be more widely known for it to happen. 
1 Potentially yes, if it allows a greater number of facts to escape to the public domain
1 probably yes, because this way you can easily get the (basic) info you want on EU, it is a first contact 
point with the EU
1 providing clear information what they are doing, so that the judgments re the EU are fact-based rather 
than prejudiced
1 rapid access to up-to-date information
1 reducing the geofigureic gap
1 repling to e mails
1 Some people are sceptics no matter what means of contact or information is given to them.
1 Sorry! Not sure what this 'democratic deficit' is!
1 Spreading awareness of the fundamental flaws in the EU should lead to its disintegration
1 sure, because it will allow people to question their representatives
1 The 'democratic deficit' is inbuilt into the very notion of the EU from its earliest days (see Booker & 
North, The Great Deception). As such, not even the internet can eliminate the EU's technocratic 
superiority.
1 The internet brings the European Union closer to the people.
1 The internet can easily provide access to a lot of information and this would help in bringing the EU 
closes to the people. However, TV broadcasting should also be used in my opinion because it can 
address a larger population
1 The internet has made many people aware of the democratic deficit. From it we get our first 
indications of the nature of the EU. The democratic deficit will be eliminated at the same time as the 
EU is.
1 througout more direct informations given to EU citizens than to nationals over national official 
representations
1 To a degree, but only for those who have the time, interest, access, etc.
1 To be honest i believe that the media (television) would really if possible make that difference more 
than the internet
1 Vox populi pressure
8 yes
1 yes 
1 yes - eg it helped the french campaign over the constitution
1 yes - increased transparency
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2 Yes because it provides a quick and easy way for people from all over the world to discuss various 
issues and form for example online petitions. Also the audience is wider and membership (if you 
create a pressure group) will make it easy to join.
1 yes but it depends on the importance they give to that.
1 yes it can but it is not sufficient
1 Yes, because it provides a simple conevtion between the EU and its people.
1 Yes, because it's fast, free and a lot off people have access to internet. In internet a lot off people, like 
me, are doing questions and are starting discussions of EU politics
1 Yes, but I don't need it because I am an ex EU official
1 Yes, but it remains a source used mainly by researchers and elites, and I can't imagine members of 
the public accessing EU websites without prior interest and information.
1 yes, but needs \"push\" as well as \"pull\"
1 Yes, but only if EU officials not only acknowledge the existence of the "democratic deficit" but also 
sincerely attempt to make themselves accountable to the people and those acting on their behalf in a 
non-official capacity. So far, there has been very little sign of that happening.
1 Yes, but only if people would be really interested to get the information they need. Most people just 
believe what is written in their national newspapers, which are often biased.
1 Yes, but to a very limited extent - the deficit is in my view not a matter of new practical solutions or 
improvement of the existing channels of communication between the institutions and the publics, but 
substantial political reforms 
1 Yes, by expanding interactivity in the public sphere.
1 Yes, by making it easier for individuals to identify both MEPs and Commission officials and providing 
a convenient electronic means of contact with appropriate individuals within the EU with a guaranteed 
response, along with published response statistics (e.g. '88% of those who contacted John Smith 
MEP received a response within 14 days').
1 yes, by providing accesible information on how things work and what is going on
1 yes, definitely. easy access for lots of people. however, still too much English based
1 Yes, especially if there is an equivalent to the excellent http://www.theyworkforyou.com/. All EU 
website are SLOW to put news on time. It is a mess to find something on the EP website. EU 
institutions can be accountable only if they have quality information/website. For example, there is no 
XML/RSS system (as far as I know) to keep track on live of the latest developments.
1 Yes, I think that being able to easily reach your MEP using the web is a good way of helping people 
realise how the EU can work for them and that it is not just 'Brussels' running the country. For many 
British people, Brussels is synonymous with the EU in general, with little regard for the individual 
institutions of the EU.
1 yes, if it would be easier to find out information on certain issues
1 Yes, if the websites are interesting.
1 Yes, improve information flow, increase knowledge and decrease the gap between elite and society
1 Yes, in my opinion, information leads to a higher participation in for example EU Parliament elections 
which would definitely increase the democracy inside the EU.
1 Yes, in the sense that the europeans would have access in a public sphere that is now hard -or 
impossible- to experience.
1 yes, internet provide easy access to information and may increase the chances of general public 
taking interest in the EU, However, the content is still control by the EU, it is not excatly a "public 
domain"
1 Yes, it already does. Civil Society is able to exist more visibly and communicate Europe much more 
efficiently than Politicians. 
1 Yes, it can make MEPs seem more accessible
1 Yes, it can provide information and services. A very useful website, which stresses the service 
aspect, is for example the EURES website
1 Yes, it can provide real time information on political processes in the EU institutions (information -
transparency - which then allows direct reaction by citizens). I was amazed when I discovered (by 
chance) that the EUROPA website offers a real time follow up on votings on EU directives... but too 
few people know about that!
1 yes, its a powerfull tool to increase political information gathering
1 Yes, It´s a good way to communicate. More marketing about website and make them attractive to 
visit.
1 yes, more and more general inormation on the EU and institutions in ALL official languages
1 Yes, online discussions and e-mail contact provide with an opportunity to discuss about citizens' 
concerns about the role of the EU. However, these methods also have some limitations.
1 yes, online consultations, discussions and fora
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1 Yes, partly, by facilitating access to documents. but internet alone is not enough to solve the 
democratic deficit
1 yes, perhaps more e-governance etc., something like public "hearings" on the web
1 Yes, reducing distances with the institutions and making direct partecipation in european affairs a way 
to streghten european identity
1 yes, same as for any other media. They should simply increase the information about the EU and 
related topics and diversify the press coverage 
1 Yes, since access available all the time, perception of bureacratic obstacles and closed door dealings 
is reduced
1 yes, the EU websites already provide lots of access to documents (once you have found out 
where...). It is only very hard for an ordinary citizen to influence the policy-making process (even like if 
you have access to documents). 
1 yes, the sphere of action of Internet is very large and it is incresing every day
1 Yes.
1 Yes. Blogs, online fora, etc.
1 Yes. Compare it to the situation 10 yrs ago - then everything was secretive.
1 Yes. Easy access to information will help us hold the politicians responsible for their actions, 
especially if we have direct access.
1 Yes. Everybody needs to be able to have aquick access to information. However, large websites with 
several languages have a creditability problem with slow update of information (eg. docs)
1 Yes. Publicise its generally half-baked socialist tripe for all to see.
1 yes.. transparency
1 yes;
1 yes; Q and A
1 You can already contact MEPs easily enough so the above question is irrelevant. Officials are a 
different matter. The key problem remains that people throughout Europe do not see what the EU 
does for them in their daily lives and visiting the EU institutional websites simply reinforces this - who 
in their right mind would be even remotely interested in some of the technical regulatory issues that 
the parliament or any other institution has to deal with? One thing I can't stand is the pathetic attempts 
on most of the websites, especially member state presidency websites, to include some 'youth'/'cool 
Europe' pages that I know from my own work with young people are condescending and lacking in 
any real information. Why bother? 
15. How often do you access the Internet?
Every day 95.9% (212)
Every other day 2.7% (6)
Once a week 0.9% (2)
Once a fortnight (0)
Once a month (0)
Once every three months (0)
Rarely (0)
Never 0.5% (1)
TOTAL 100.0% 221
16. Do you access governmental/ political websites?
Yes, often 48.9% (108)
Yes, sometimes 34.4% (76)
No 15.4% (34)
TOTAL 98.6% 221
17. If yes, which websites do you access and why? (please provide the name and/OR full URL)
# Response
1 A range of local government websites, especially from other inhternational organisations
1 Aboout 50 sites, no room or time for details
1 All Finnish political parties' websites, at their EU Policy section.
1 All the websites mentioned on question 11 and own interests, Parliament of Finland because I want to 
know what's going on in my own country
1 all the websites related to my job... too much to provide all 
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1 assemblee-nationale.fr 
1 Auswärtiges Amt Deutschland; Bundesregierung
1 BBC News, various blogs
1 belgian government, luxembourg government, EMEA (pharma)
1 Belgian government, UN
1 British and German government websites, for information purposes
1 British Government, French Governement
1 CIA World Factbook, Auswärtiges Amt, Statistisches Bundesamt
1 conservative party website
1 council, local government for information, contacts, opportunities (courses, jobs, fundings)
1 Court service-England, Scotland-I am a lawyer. also UK government sites as interested in UK 
news/politics.
1 Data Protection Authorities
1 environmental / sustainable energy related info
1 EUObserver, www.politikerscreen.de, www.ictsd.org
1 Euractiv Stae Watch
1 EURActiv, DG environment, Emissions Trading websites
1 euractiv, euobserver
1 europa.eu.int; europarl.eu.int; bund.de; French government
1 Eurostat, Most German and UK governmental sites
1 find information
1 For information http://www.hmcourts-service.gov.uk http://www.downingstreetsays.com/ 
http://www.fco.gov.uk/fco/communities/fora http://www.cor.eu.int/en 
http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/ http://www.sparkpod.com/eulaw 
http://weblog.jrc.cec.eu.int/page/wallstrom 
http://www.lboro.ac.uk/departments/eu/monnet_eurofunding.html
1 for MSc and PhD research: http://www.cities-localgovernments.org/uclg/index.asp; 
http://www.ccre.org/; http://www.rgre.de/
1 for teaching and research: governmental (UK, D, A), academic (UK, D, A, I, F) and national statistics 
offices (A). Newspapers/media agencies (UK, US, D, A, HU).
1 for university: euractiv, europa, greenparty for voluntary work
1 Foreign and Commonwealth office, Home Office, Dept of Constitutional affairs, Parliament, Hansard 
(Lords and Commons) "because politics is not a spectator sport"
1 general .gov.uk sites for business purposes
1 German foreign ministry, French foreign ministry, Belgian foreign ministry
1 gov departments
1 gov.ro
1 Greek governmental websites, political parties websites
1 Hansard, HMSO statutes, equivs for other nations + EU, govt depts
1 HMRC - work (+ other UK government websites - DEFRA, EA etc)
1 Home Office and Foreign Office for work purposes.
1 hse, office of dep prime minister general information
1 http://barcepundit-english.blogspot.com/
1 http://euobserver.com; http://www.euractiv.com; http://www.euabc.com; 
1 http://eureferendum.blogspot.com/
1 http://eureferendum.blogspot.com/ - because it's true. Also many others; too many to list here.
1 http://www.direct.gov.uk/Homepage/fs/en I use this site often as it is easy to use and very clear about 
which links take you where. The language used in this is clear, unlike the jargon used on the 
europa.eu.int website.
1 http://www.europarl.fi/ep/index.jsp
1 http://www.formin.fi/
1 http://www.nio.gov.uk/
1 http://www.publicwhip.org.uk/index.php http://www.bloggerheads.com/
1 http://www.samizdata.net/blog/ and others
1 http://www.sdo.lshtm.ac.uk/
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1 http://www.thecep.org.uk 
1 http://www.valtioneuvosto.fi/vn/liston/base.lsp - to obtain information on the Finnish government
1 http://www.ypepth.gr, http://www.ypes.gr, http://www.departmentofjustice.gr and generally, those 
concerning the various Greek ministrys.
1 I acces in political websites: www.parties-and-elections.de for be informed of the elections in the 
European states and regions, Cabe Babel for read some articles about Europe (European Politics, 
statal politics, European problems, European society)
1 I access embassies websites or other governmental websites for work reasons. Websites I visited most 
recently: www.esteri.it; http://www.ambhanoi.esteri.it/
2 I frequent the Campaign for An English Parliament, http://www.thecep.org.uk/ and their blog at, 
http://www.thecep.org.uk/news/ because it is a good source for issues facing England and news 
relating to those issues with various people offering opinions. It also highlights the democratic deficit in 
England and the case for a symmetrical equivalent for parity.
1 I really couldn't list them, let's say my favourites include around 100+ such websites.
1 I see hundreds of sites. You should rethink your question. Maybe list 50 or so well know web sites, 
both official and unofficial that can be ticked.
1 I visit europa.eu.int according to study purpose
1 info on government services, tho more often local government rather than national
1 information for newspaper stories
1 Inland Revenue, MI5, DWP, 
1 Invariably to try and check on media bias
1 Irish government web site, Moldovan government web site, ngos' web sites
1 Labour/ Tony Bliar to ask pertinent questions which he avoids answering
1 local government sites to find out information for my area
1 Lots: www.leics.gov.uk and www.charnwood.gov.uk for local information and access to local council; 
inland revenue and Dept for work & pensions for information, labour party website for news & to 
contact my local MP, other independent websites for political discussions / articles / news
1 many - studies
1 Many and for various countries
1 many national administrations
1 many, for research purposes
1 member state governments, think tanks, research institutions
1 MFA-websites for work
1 ministries' websites for information
1 Ministry of European Integration Croatia/ and Serbia Montenegro are two of the many, for research 
purposes, uptodate information and contact details
1 most EU governments' web pages, plus a number of pol.di-pages 
1 most of the .gov.uk websites for work reasons; the french and italian government and parliament sites.
1 most of the govt sites
1 Most UK government websites (eg dfes, home office, ons) for blogging and use in political debate
1 nasa
1 national government and agency websites
1 NATO, UN, EU, Home Office, Stanford Uni Academic Web Pages. - To learn more, keep up to date on 
contemporary news, academic study
1 New Labour Homepage, BBC Politics
1 newssites (euractiv, eu-observer), think tanks (ICG, ...), newspapers, ... 
1 NHS related websites as work related
1 Not saying
1 number10, firstGov
1 odin.dep.no, regeringen.se, norges-bank.no, several federal reserve banks, 
1 ODPM, Defra, Dept for education, DTI, Various Local Council websites
1 OECD, DTI, National Science Foundation (US), MEXT, METI (japanese ministry urls)
1 oecd.org; odci.gov; cia.gov; nato.org; un.org; Greek government sites--economy, education, justice
1 ones that tell the truth
1 Planning Departments
1 Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Polish Ministry of Defence etc.
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1 politics.guardian.co.uk
1 regularly access an average of 60 such sites every day because of my job
1 sides of all MS, New MS and CCs for professional reasons
1 Some libertarian sites.
1 stratfor.org, aljazeera.net, alahram.org.eg
1 The conservative parties website, as i an active conservative
1 the cyprus government official site
1 the webs of my government
1 They Work For You, Public Whip, BBC Europhobia, Adam Smith, Bloggerheads, Post Political Times, 
Ton Watson, Samizdata, Virtual Stoa
1 to many to mention
2 too many
1 too many to list
1 UK DTI, and other business sites to check on legislation
1 UK gov
1 UK Gov sites, information and advice
1 uk government - tax returns/DTI etc
1 UK government and various departments.
1 UK government dperatment (education, passports, home office).
1 UK government website for visas, legal info etc
1 UK government websites (eg House of Commons, Foreign Office), international NGOs e.g. 
International Crisis Group, International Alert, Research institututes/ EU reportage e.g. EU Institute for
Security Studies, EUobserver, European Voice
1 UK Home Office, Parliament
1 UK, Australian, Canadian & New Zealand Govt sites. Also political party sites, blogs, etc to keep 
abreast of political events affecting my family and friends.
1 UN site, Belgian government site: for information
1 UN, CofE, Uk Parl & NGO's like Amnesty
1 UN, world bank, 
1 uno, european commission, german ministries/ information and contact
1 various websites for research
1 Website in the community. Local laws,happening and help in issues. Also websites about healthcare 
(goverments)
1 Website of German Government / Ministries (for information on policy fields), Website of different Think 
Tanks like TEPSA, CEPS, etc. for news, events and analyse of policy fields; Euractiv for news; 
1 websites of MFA's, MoD's, various governments etc - because I work on the security issues research
1 websites of news agencies such as Agence Europe EUobs, etc
1 Websites of various international organisations, i.e. BIS, ECB, IMF, UN, etc.
1 Why: Politics is my field of study. In the moment: http://www.premier-ministre.gouv.fr/, because I study 
there; http://www.spd.de ; political magazines and newspapers like Spiegel-online oder lemonde.fr
1 www.auswaertiges-amt.de to check stuff, as well as Bundesumweltministerium to keep up with new 
developments
1 www.bundestag.de to get brand nex information and to look for internships
1 www.bverfg.de; www.bverwg.de, www.bundesgerichtshof.de - purpose: research for my phd-thesis
1 www.direct.gov.uk www.statistics.gov. Both useful for supporting academic research
1 www.direct.gov.uk, www.hmrc.gov.uk - for info
1 www.gov.org
1 www.gov.ro
1 www.governo.it www.gov.ie research/teaching
1 www.kemi.se, http://www.naturvardsverket.se/ because of my work
1 www.mae.es; www.la-moncloa.es; www.un.org; www.nato.int; www.stabilitypact.org; www.osce.org
1 www.mol.fi www.minedu.fi www.uvi.fi 
1 www.politilk-digital.de to have an excellent library of articels
1 www.pouruneeuropesociale.org
1 www.service-public.fr ; www.premier-ministre.gouv.fr
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1 www.statistics.gov.uk/; www.direct.gov.uk/; www.canterbury.gov.uk/ mostly for business info (first two) 
or local info (last one)
1 www.un.org (information on member states and UN activities in various fields); www.hrad.cz (access to 
the Czech Constitutions and news about the activities of the Czech President); www.vlada.cz (to 
access an archive of the Czech government's regulations and meetings minutes); www.psp.cz and 
www.senat.cz (mainly to get contact information for the Czech MPs and Senators); www.royal.gov.uk 
(activities of the British Head of State); www.europarl.eu.int (mainly for composition details and 
reports); www.coe.int (general information); www.nato.int (information on current activities, reports, 
access to national representations' websites)
1 www.writetothem.com, www.theyworkforyou.com, www.publicwhip.org.uk, www.parliament.gov.uk, 
europa.eu.int - to keep tabs on politicians, read press releases, debates, legal documents, contact 
MPs/MEPs
18. Do you access the official EUROPA online fora (Discussion Corner) to discuss EU issues?
Yes, often 0.5% (1)
Yes, sometimes 8.6% (19)
No 87.8% (194)
TOTAL 96.8% 221
19. Do you access other online fora to discuss the EU/ EU issues?
Yes, often 10.0% (22)
Yes, sometimes 14.9% (33)
No 71.0% (157)
TOTAL 95.9% 221
20. If yes, please indicate which ones (please provide name and/OR full URL of the online fora you access) 
and the reasons for accessing them.
# Response
1 ---
1 A private forum (www.dasprovisorium.de) for general political discussions
1 again dozens. eg. I read Tom Worstall and Owen Barder's webblogs today
1 BBC news website "Have your say" discussions
1 biased bbc blog, euserf blog
1 cafebabel, radicali.it
1 Conservative party/UKIP discussion groups
1 Contribute to blogosphere about it; google Martin Keegan
1 Cross of St George Forum
1 der standard (austrian newspaper)
1 EU Referendum, EU Pundit, Fist Full of Euros, Europhobia
1 EUreferendum, Road to EU serfdom, MOrgot Wallstrom blog
1 eureferendum.blogspot.com, weblog.jrc.cec.eu.int/comments/wallstrom/Weblog/
1 forum.politics.be
1 french newspaper (lemonde, libération, figaro)
1 General/Private forms, just for talking on general political matters.
1 http://forum.gazeta.pl/forum/71,1.html?f=522
1 http://my.aegean.gr
1 http://no-pasaran.blogspot.com, http://barcepundit-english.blogspot.com
1 http://www.crossofstgeorge.net/forum/
1 http://www.eureferendum.com/forum/viewforum.php?f=2 
http://www.whistlestopper.com/forum/forumdisplay.php?forumid=5 
1 http://www.europhobia.blogspot.com rational debate and interesting articles
1 http://www.finlandforthought.net/
1 Margot Walstrom's Blog site
1 militaryphotos.net
1 MND, iFeminists, SYG, to contribute/discuss.
1 n/a
1 National front , White nationalists party , 
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1 newsgroup: uk.politics.misc
1 no
1 tagesschau.de
1 Technology websites with off-topic sections, to discuss EU issues with a more international POV
1 the forum of the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation in Germany dealing with EU-issues, because I was 
supported during my study in Germany and I keep contact with the foundation and its experts
1 Tim Worstall's blog, EUrota blog
1 to many to mention
1 to tell them they should abolish it
1 Various blogs and chat rooms to exchange comments & ideas.
1 Various Social Networking sites, such as Orkut, DotNode, etc. where the creation of discussion topics 
and of topic-specific fora are bottoms-up, rather than EU's top-down approach.
1 View the blog role on http://saxontimes.blogspot.com/
3 www.cafebabel.com
1 www.cafebabel.com and www.takingitglobal.org for change opinions
1 www.fistfulofeuros.net www.timworstall.typepad.com
1 You are not up to date - the FUTURUM on line discussion site has been suspended for at least twelve 
months, I have visited other sites - e.g. http://www.unieurope.org and others but none of them have 
proved as effective in acting as a platform for engaing ordinary European citizens in discussion about 
European issues
21. Do you access online fora regarding other issues (not EU issues)?
Yes 43.9% (97)
No 52.5% (116)
TOTAL 96.4% 221
22. If yes, what type of online fora do you access? (you do not need to provide full URL, only name or general 
description).
# Response
1 ---
1 academic, current politics
1 Air-pro working holidays, Tenerife workers general forum
1 BBC site (sometimes) about various issues
1 better focussed discussion fora
1 blogger fora dedicated to EU and national issues
1 Blogs and chat rooms to exchange ideas and comments.
1 Blogs, mainly politics or media based
1 come on - give me tick boxes
1 comments at various news/discussion sites
1 Creative Commons, Free and Open Software, anything on Immigration policies in various countries.
1 crooked timber, slugger o'toole, angry bear + wine & bridge fora
1 Cross of St George Forum
1 education, research
1 entertainment; politics
1 EPSRC
1 EUreferendum No2ID Let the people decide etc
1 Far too many to name, on the subjects of technology, games, sports etc
1 FOR THE BUSINESS
1 fora about Economics and political issues
1 Fora about University issues (or politics) and about Computers (regarding malfunctions etc., in order to 
get assistance).
1 fun christian and survivors fora
1 games
1 General computer programming, and particularly Java programming
1 genral politics, sport, music, culture
1 here and there
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1 http://www.sluggerotoole.com/
1 http://www.thecep.org.uk/forum/
2 I go to the Cross of St. George Debate to discuss English issues in a devolved UK and the democratic 
deficit in a smaller but longer established "union".
1 IMDB movie reviews
1 islamonline.net
1 It's dasprovisorium.de which is a general forum. From sports, movies, computer games to politics, 
personal 'my girlfriend left me' stuff and what have you.
1 Karate / Martial Arts
1 Libertarian fora
1 Literary studies fora and discussion groups discussing things regarding the stud of literature
1 Literature discussion groups related to my research, just for details, updates, calls for papers; 
occasionally I access other general fora on music/film/art/writing/towns & local information etc but 
generally I find them ridiculous places where people end up having personal arguments and stating 
grand opinions based on rumours and ignorance of their subject, so I avoid them.
1 mainly blogosphere
1 militaryphotos.net
1 music, science&religion
1 music, studying/working abroad
1 n/a
1 nationalist
1 naval warfare fora
1 no
1 normalt online fora, linked to sports or history
1 Not relevant to EU (private interests)
1 noyb
1 Nursing. Trade Union. Motorcycling.
1 on development issues, like www.epo.de or websites of the UN
1 online magazines
1 Ones related to my work
1 ones that want to abolish the EU
1 online versions of print newspapers; media critic sites.
1 Photofigurey, shooting, British Equalitarian
1 Political blogs
1 political fora, including discussing EU issues like Margot Walstrom's blog, but not actively participating
1 Political fora, students fora.
1 Political Shooting 
1 politics
1 Politics "because politics is not a spectator sport"
1 Politics, Democracy
1 politics, economics
1 politics, music, literature
1 professional
1 relationships, tv series, mobile phones
1 Scientific ones
2 see above
1 Social and work related fora.
1 Technial, legal
1 technical fora
1 Technical IT
1 technology related; gaming and gadgets
1 technology, scienece, UK politics, film, finance
1 The Adam Smith Institute (free market blog), Samizdata.net 
1 to many to mention
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1 UK politics, martial arts, computing
1 US issues-related fora
1 various
1 various, e.g. newspaper, uni
1 wikipedia
1 Wolves (football team), 606 (BBC sports), BBC news
1 WTO issues and also for various hobbies and interests
1 www.iesaf.fi 
23. Nationality
# Response
1 American
1 Australian /English
1 Austria
1 AUT
9 Belgian
2 Belgium
1 Brazilian
39 British
2 British 
1 British and Australian
1 Bulgaria
3 bulgarian
2 Canadian
1 Catalan
1 CHINESE
1 Croatian
3 Cypriot
1 Czech
1 D
1 Danish
3 Dutch
1 Egyptian
17 English
1 English-British-European
2 European
1 European of heart, but Spanish in the papers
1 European/German
1 Finland
2 Finn
11 Finnish
6 French
1 French American
1 French/German (binational)
1 from North West England (I am Mancunian by birth)
1 GB
25 German
1 german 
12 Greek
1 Greek/French
2 Hellenic
9 Irish
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1 Lithuanian
1 Moldovan
1 Multiple - UK, Australia, Sri Lanka, Holland
1 Norwegian
1 Not Willing to Disclose as do not see importnace of collecting this data
6 Polish
3 romanian
1 Slovak
2 Slovenian
4 Spanish
3 Swedish
1 thai
2 Turkish
12 UK
1 UNITED KINGDOM
3 USA
24. Gender
Female 32.6% (72)
Male 67.4% (149)
TOTAL 100.0% 221
25. Age: Please select an age group
Younger than 15 years old 0.5% (1)
15-19 years old 3.6% (8)
20-24 years old 23.5% (52)
25-29 years old 32.1% (71)
30-34 years old 16.3% (36)
35-39 years old 6.3% (14)
40-44 years old 4.5% (10)
45-49 years old 3.6% (8)
50-54 years old 5.9% (13)
55-60 years old 1.8% (4)
61-65 years old 1.8% (4)
Over 66 years old (0)
TOTAL 100.0% 221
26. Occupation
# Response
2 Academic
1 Academic -ex Commission
1 Academic Librarian
1 administrative assistant
1 Administrator
1 Architect
1 asdf
1 assistant
1 Assistant to the CEO
1 attorney
1 Biochemist
1 Campaign Manager
1 Carer
1 CFO
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1 Chemist
3 civil servant
1 Commercial officer
1 communication
2 Company Director
1 construction
3 Consultant
1 Contract Agent at the European Commission, DG Enlargement
1 cs administrator
2 Currently unemployed.
1 Database Administrator
1 development NGO 
1 economist
1 Editor/writer
1 Education advisor
1 Educatior
1 Employed
1 employee
1 energy advisory
1 engineer
1 Entrepreneur
1 EU civil servant
1 European Civil Servant
1 Farmer
1 Financial Services
1 Full time student
1 Full-time student
1 Government Affairs Specialist
1 house wife
1 ICT Technician
1 international civil servant
2 IT
5 journalist
1 Law enforcement
3 lawyer
2 Lecturer
1 Lecturer (HE)
1 Librarian
1 management consultant
1 managing director
1 Manufacturer
1 MD of a Figureic Design & Media company
1 media
1 MEP Parliamentary Assistant
1 n/a
1 Night Porter
1 Nurse
1 Office worker
1 Operations Manager
1 parliamentary assistant
1 Ph.D. student, buisiness consultant
1 PhD
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2 PhD Candidate
16 PhD Student
1 PhD student, researcher
2 phd-student
1 physiotherapist
1 political economist
1 Political Science Student
1 private employee
1 Product Manager
1 programmer
1 project planner
1 Psychologist
1 Quality and enviromental coordinator
1 Quantity Surveyor
1 Reporter
1 reseacher
1 Research
1 Research Associate
1 Research Fellow at the Institute for International Relations, Zagreb, Croatia
5 Research student
8 researcher
1 researcher at university
1 Researcher/PhD Candidate
1 Researher
1 Restaurant owner 
1 Retired
1 sales
4 Scientist
1 Secondary School teacher
1 Self Employed
1 Small Business Owner
2 Software
1 Software Developer
52 Student
1 Student 
1 Student, BSc
1 Student/Bartender
1 Student/Research Consultant
1 System Test Engineer
2 teacher
1 teaching assistant
1 Technical ICT Architect
1 technician, paper industry
1 TELESALES REP
1 terminologist
1 Transport professional
1 UK Civil Servant
1 Uni Staff
2 University lecturer
1 University Student
1 web developer
1 Web editor
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1 Writer
1 xxx
1 young expert in the foreign service
27. Education
Not completed compulsory education 1.8% (4)
Completed compulsory education 9.0% (20)
Vocational Qualification 2.7% (6)
University Degree (BA, undergraduate degree) 31.7% (70)
University Degree (MA, postgraduate degree) 41.2% (91)
PhD 13.6% (30)
TOTAL 100.0% 221
